America’s Worst States for Education (2026 Edition)

A burning green dumpster labeled School Funding, with outlines of Nevada, Arizona, Texas, Florida and North Carolina inside, beside the headline: Only one state can be the worst. Here are the bottom five.

Often when I speak to large national groups in the US, those in the room wish to proclaim their state as the worst on education funding. But only one state can really hold that position. Here, I take a look at the bottom five.

Can’t versus won’t

America’s worst states for education are Nevada, Texas, North Carolina, Florida and Arizona. Not because their kids are the poorest or their test scores the lowest, but because they could do far better by their children and choose not to.

Every summer brings another round of “best and worst states for schools” listicles. Most mash together spending, class size, test scores, safety and whatever else is lying around, then hand out a rank. They tend to reward states for being rich and punish them for being poor. That tells us who has the money. It doesn’t tell us who is failing to use it.

So here’s a different question. Which states pair weak outcomes for kids with a deliberate refusal to put their own economic capacity toward fixing them? Those states aren’t unlucky. They’re making a choice.

How I picked them

I counted red flags on four measures, then used NAEP as a check on outcomes. A state earns a flag for each of the following:

  1. Low fiscal effort. Bottom ten on state and local K-12 revenue as a share of gross state product, 2022-23 (SFID, 8th ed.). The U.S. average is 3.13 percent.
  2. Chronic underfunding. At least half of students in “chronically underfunded” districts, the 20 percent of districts nationally furthest below their National Education Cost Model (NECM) adequacy targets. Ten states meet that bar.
  3. Deliberate choice. Named in the SFID report as low-adequacy and low-effort, meaning inadequate funding is at least partly a policy choice, not a capacity problem.
  4. Child well-being. Bottom ten in the 2026 KIDS COUNT Data Book, which scores 16 indicators across economics, education, health and family/community.

The NECM benchmark is modest: what each district would need to spend to reach national average math and reading scores in grades 3–8, given its poverty, labor costs and size.

StateEffort (% GSP, rank)≥50% chronically underfundedSFID “deliberate choice”KIDS COUNT 2026 rankNAEP Core 2024 rankFlags
Nevada2.10% (#47)YesYes46not available4
Texas2.59% (#40)YesYes44 (tie)364
North Carolina2.05% (#49)YesYes32not available3
Florida2.19% (#46)YesYes35273
Arizona2.10% (#48)NoYes40not available2

Arizona ties several states at two flags. It takes the fifth slot because its retreat from its own pre-recession effort is the largest SFID highlights (−35 percent), which I’ll get to below. NAEP Core ranks (4th and 8th grade math and reading pooled) come from the University of Oklahoma’s Fall to 48th report; I only have them for the states it lists.

The bottom five

1. Nevada

Nevada hits every flag I can measure. It puts 2.10 percent of its economy into K-12, 47th in the country. At least half its students attend chronically underfunded districts, and SFID names it among the states where that’s a choice. Kids pay for it outside school too: Nevada ranks 46th on KIDS COUNT, ahead of only Alaska, Louisiana, New Mexico and Mississippi. On NAEP, Nevada had the seventh-lowest 8th grade math proficiency rate in 2024, with about one in five 8th graders proficient.

This is a state with a casino-and-tourism economy and no personal income tax. It has capacity. It just doesn’t point it at kids.

2. Texas

Texas also hits all four flags, and it does so at a scale no other state on this list approaches. Effort is 2.59 percent of GSP (40th) (SFID). At least half of Texas students are in chronically underfunded districts. Texas ties Oklahoma at 44th on KIDS COUNT. Its NAEP Core rank of 36th is middling, which tells you something: Texas kids are outperforming what Texas is willing to pay for.

And because Texas enrolls so many children, its choices shape the schooling of a very large share of the nation’s underfunded students.

3. North Carolina

North Carolina has the lowest fiscal effort in the nation, 2.05 percent of GSP. It has a large, growing economy and chooses to devote less of it to public schools than any other state. Unsurprisingly, at least half of its students sit in chronically underfunded districts, and SFID lists it among the deliberate-choice states.

North Carolina’s KIDS COUNT rank (32nd) is better than the others on this list. That’s the point: this is a state with the economic and social base to do far better. Instead, it has spent roughly three decades litigating the Leandro case over whether the state is meeting its own constitutional duty to provide a sound basic education.

4. Florida

Florida devotes 2.19 percent of GSP to schools (46th). Had it held to its own 2006 effort level, its schools would have had about 29 percent more state and local revenue from 2016 to 2023, among the steepest losses in the SFID report. At least half of Florida students are in chronically underfunded districts.

Here’s the twist. Florida posts one of the smallest opportunity gaps between high- and low-poverty districts in the nation (−8 points). That isn’t equity. It’s what happens when nearly everyone is underfunded: there isn’t enough money in the system to generate much inequality. Florida ranks 35th on KIDS COUNT and 27th on NAEP Core.

Note: SFID’s opportunity gap compares adequacy in the 40 percent highest- and lowest-poverty districts in each state, in percentage points.

5. Arizona

Arizona puts 2.10 percent of its economy into K-12 (48th). Few states have walked away from their schools faster: had Arizona kept its 2006 effort level, its schools would have had about 35 percent more state and local revenue from 2016 to 2023, the largest proportional loss the SFID report highlights. To reach New Jersey’s effort level, Arizona would have to raise K-12 revenue by about 150 percent.

Arizona is on SFID’s deliberate-choice list and ranks 40th on KIDS COUNT. On NAEP, its 4th graders scored below the national average in both math and reading in 2024; only about a quarter were proficient in reading, and nearly half scored below Basic.

What they have in common

All five are low-effort states with the economic capacity to do more. Four of the five are the four lowest-effort states in the country (NC, AZ, NV, FL), and all five appear on SFID’s list of states where inadequate funding reflects, at least in part, a policy choice. That’s the common denominator: not poverty, not geography, but priorities.

The cost lands unevenly. Nationally, 75 percent of Black students attend districts funded below NECM adequacy levels, versus 37 percent of white students; for chronically underfunded districts it’s 57 percent versus 18 percent. Hispanic students are almost 70 percent more likely than white students to be in an underfunded district. States like Texas, Florida and Nevada, with large Black and Hispanic enrollments and chronically underfunded systems, are where those national gaps are made.

None of this is a pandemic story. U.S. average effort fell from 3.59 percent of GSP in 2006 to 3.13 percent in 2023, and 42 states now put a smaller share of their economies into schools than before the Great Recession. Had states simply held their 2006 effort levels, schools would have had about $575 billion more from 2016 to 2023. The five states here just went further down that road than almost anyone.

Note: the post-2020 dip in effort partly reflects unusually fast GSP growth, not only budget cuts; Matt Barnum at Chalkbeat also raised whether federal COVID aid let states ease off.

The children’s rights picture rhymes. Human Rights Watch’s state scorecard finds no state above a C on child marriage, corporal punishment, child labor and juvenile justice; 16 states get an F. Corporal punishment remains legal in both public and private schools in 22 states. A country that won’t ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child leaves those guarantees to the states, and the states on this list have chosen to guarantee children rather little, starting with their schools.

Dishonorable mentions

Oklahoma would make any outcomes-only list. It ranks 48th on NAEP Core, ahead of only West Virginia, Alaska and New Mexico, and 48th on the KIDS COUNT education domain. Its effort (2.85 percent, 34th) is below average but not bottom-tier, so it misses my cut. It shouldn’t take comfort in that.

Alabama has at least half its students in chronically underfunded districts and a wide gap between its high- and low-poverty districts: high-poverty districts sit about 48 percent below adequate, low-poverty districts about 7 percent below, a 41-point opportunity gap. It ranks 42nd on KIDS COUNT and 44th on NAEP Core.

Tennessee is a low-effort, deliberate-choice state (2.31 percent, 45th) whose NAEP Core rank of 17th shows what reform without money can buy, and its limits.

New Mexico and Mississippi are the hard cases. They hold the bottom two spots on KIDS COUNT, and New Mexico is last on every NAEP test (Mississippi, thanks to its literacy push, now sits 28th on NAEP Core). Mississippi has 99 percent of students in below-adequate districts and 80 percent in chronically underfunded ones. But both try: New Mexico ranks 12th on effort (3.54 percent) and Mississippi 20th (3.30 percent). These are can’t states, not won’t states. Small economies and high child poverty mean even strong effort can’t close the gap alone. That’s an argument for federal foundation aid targeted at high-effort, low-capacity states, not for putting them on a shame list.

Note: Alaska and West Virginia also sit near the bottom on NAEP and KIDS COUNT. SFID doesn’t estimate adequacy for Alaska, whose geography drives costs the national model can’t capture.

These are choices

The usual response to lists like this is that some states are just poorer, more rural, or harder to serve. For New Mexico and Mississippi, that’s partly true. For Nevada, Texas, North Carolina, Florida and Arizona, it isn’t. These states have the capacity. They’ve chosen tax cuts, revenue limits and, increasingly, private school subsidies over adequately funding the public schools most of their children attend.

We know what works. Money matters, and it matters most for the kids these states shortchange. The fix starts with three things:

  1. Raise effort. Getting even to the national average of 3.13 percent of GSP would mean billions in new revenue in each of these states.
  2. Target it. Drive state aid to high-poverty districts based on rigorously estimated costs, and strip out flat grants and minimum-aid guarantees that send money where it isn’t needed.
  3. Tie federal aid to effort. Supplemental federal foundation aid should flow to high-need districts in states that pay their fair share, which would reward New Mexico and Mississippi and give the bottom five a reason to try.

Until then, children in these five states will keep paying for their legislators’ priorities.

Sources and data notes

The Company Store Goes to Tallahassee

In February 2019, Derek Black, Preston Green and I wrote a short piece for The Conversation arguing that charter schooling has a lucrative loophole that would be easy to close. Our one-sentence version of the problem was this: some “nonprofit” charter schools take public money and pay their owners with it.

Seven years later, that sentence describes the household finances of the Republican nominee for governor of Florida.

On October 22, the Tampa Bay Times and Miami Herald reported that five state-funded charter schools have paid more than $30 million over four years to two private companies run by Erika Donalds, and that one of them, OptimaEd, is slated to collect another $15.7 million this year from a single virtual charter school. Byron Donalds’ own federal disclosures show that the largest share of the couple’s wealth comes from those companies. The election is nine days away.

None of this is new to me. I’ve been writing about these arrangements, on this blog and in peer-reviewed and law review work, for more than a decade, and I’ve been quoted in this story from the start, beginning with CBS’s investigation last December. Here I want to do what a quote can’t: put the Donalds’ arrangements in the frame I’ve built over that decade, with Gary Miron on the business models, with Preston Green on the law of related-party transactions, and alongside the company store, real estate and edu-grift cases I’ve been cataloging here.

The frame: having it both ways, and the gatekeepers who aren’t there

Preston Green, Joseph Oluwole and I started from a simple legal observation in “Having It Both Ways” (Emory Law Journal, 2014). Charter schools claim the funding of public schools and the autonomy of private ones. They are public when the money flows in and private when anyone asks where it went.

A year later, Gary Miron and I laid out the business models themselves in The Business of Charter Schooling: Understanding the Policies that Charter Operators Use for Financial Benefit (National Education Policy Center, 2015). We showed how operators, working largely within existing law, convert public revenue into private gain: management fees paid to affiliated companies, less-than-arm’s-length leases, and third-party entities that use taxpayer dollars to acquire land and buildings the public never ends up owning. We also warned that disclosure rules were weak enough that legal violations, ethical problems or simply bad practices would rarely come to light except through investigative reporting, whistleblowers or litigation. Eleven years later, that is a fair description of how the public learned about Optima: from CBS, the Florida Bulldog, the Herald and a lawsuit.

In “Are Charter Schools the Second Coming of Enron?” (Indiana Law Journal, 2018), Preston, Joseph and I followed that logic to its financial and legal conclusion. Enron’s collapse turned on related-party transactions: special-purpose entities controlled by insiders, sitting on the other side of the company’s own deals. We showed that charter operators were building the same structure, with a nonprofit school on one side and affiliated management, real estate and service companies on the other. Our main point was about gatekeepers. Auditors, governing boards, authorizers and state agencies are supposed to catch these arrangements, and the law gives most of them neither the mandate nor the tools.

The 2019 Conversation piece with Derek Black turned that into three fixes. Prohibit charter owners and operators from leasing or buying property from their own other companies. Require state officials to audit facility purchases and leases. Give charter employees whistleblower protection and a reward for reporting abuse.

On this blog, I’ve since organized the mechanisms into what I call the grift model, four repeating types:

  1. Enrollment inflation: getting paid for students who aren’t really being educated.
  2. Related-party transactions: the school’s own leadership on both sides of a contract.
  3. The company store: a captive vendor the school must buy from, owned by the people running the school.
  4. Real estate: arranging for a related party to own the buildings public dollars paid for, then leasing them back.

The central finding of that work, laid out in Edu-Grift Top 5 last month, is that the mechanisms moving the most money are the ones nobody has to break the law to run. That is the right lens for the Donalds. Nothing I describe below has been found illegal, and I’m not suggesting otherwise. The problem is the structure Florida permits, and who would be in charge of it.

What the reporting has shown, in order

The record has been built by three sets of reporters over sixteen months. Taken together, it describes a network that started as a nonprofit and migrated its money toward for-profit companies owned by its founder.

When Outlet What it found
Oct 2026 CBS Miami Byron Donalds said his wife has no charter business involvement today; his campaign then clarified that OptimaEd still contracts with Optima Classical Academy.
Oct 2026 Tampa Bay Times / Miami Herald Five state-funded charters paid more than $30 million over four years to Optima Management Services and OptimaEd; OptimaEd is budgeted to receive $15.7 million from Optima Classical Academy this year. Most of the couple’s wealth comes from her companies.
Jan 2026 Florida Bulldog Treasure Coast Classical Academy’s lawsuit alleges an undisclosed conflict of interest with Summit Construction, which built or renovated much of the network.
Dec 2025 CBS News (aired on CBS Mornings) From 2020 to 2023, four Optima-launched schools spent about 30% of their government funding, roughly $35 million, on outside firms tied to Erika Donalds. All four have since cut ties with Optima; a fifth school in Fort Myers never opened.
Sep 2025 Florida Bulldog After Bulldog’s first story, Rep. Donalds amended his 2023 disclosure to report her stakes in the companies. Treasure Coast alleged Optima reassigned its staff to OptimaEd after the board rejected that plan.
Jun 2025 Florida Bulldog The foundation and its schools paid more than $10 million to her two for-profit firms. The two Jacksonville schools cited “deficiencies” in Optima’s accounting when they ended their contracts in 2023.

The sequence is worth tracing. Erika Donalds founded the nonprofit Optima Foundation in 2017 and used it to open classical charter schools in Stuart, Jacksonville and Naples. She then formed OptimaEd (2020) and Optima Management Services (2022), both for-profit. When three flagship schools left the foundation in 2023, Naples Classical signed instead with her for-profit firms, and its payments rose by more than a quarter, according to the Bulldog. The foundation has since been renamed the Education Freedom Foundation.

What I’ve said along the way

When CBS News asked me about Optima last December, I made two points. The first was about results. As I told CBS:

“Florida’s charter sector is not strong, and Optima schools, at least the four schools that seem to be in that affiliated mix, perform even less well.”

The second was about structure. Nonprofit schools paying for-profit companies with overlapping stakeholders is not unique to Optima; it runs across the charter industry. And charter finances are far more opaque than district finances, which is exactly why it took reporters, auditors and a lawsuit to piece this together.

When the Herald came back to me this month, the question had changed. It was no longer only about how a charter network is run. It was about who would regulate the sector. I said:

“Having people connected to or in positions of power to regulate these things who are benefiting from them not being regulated, in my view, is problematic.”

And on the novelty of it:

“I don’t know if any governor in particular has the same kind of personal wealth accumulated in that one space over which they then would have regulatory authority.”

I also told the Herald something I want to repeat here, because it matters for fairness: the Donalds are far from the biggest profiteers from the flow of public education dollars to private companies. The dollar figures in their story are modest next to the cases below. What’s different is the job.

The company store, Florida edition

In The Charter School Company Store (2016) and its sequel last month, I described operators who require the people and schools they control to buy from a store the operator owns. Relay’s required credential for Uncommon’s teachers in Newark. Academica’s two invoices in Miami, management fee and rent, both ending in one family’s accounts. CSMI in Chester, where it took a public-records fight to see the books.

Optima fits the pattern at three registers:

  • Back office. The schools paid Optima Management Services for management and administration, and paid Educator Solutions, a payroll firm owned by a pro-charter state legislator, nearly $7 million from 2020 to 2022, while Erika Donalds drew more than $500,000 in salary from that firm (Florida Bulldog).
  • Curriculum and instruction. OptimaEd, 81% owned by Erika Donalds per her husband’s disclosures, supplies Optima Classical Academy’s entire program: teachers, curriculum, technology and VR headsets. That school’s payments to OptimaEd went from about $1.1 million in 2023 to $2.1 million in 2024 to a budgeted $15.7 million this year.
  • The relabeling. Treasure Coast’s lawsuit alleges that when its board rejected a proposal to hand Optima’s duties to OptimaEd, Optima reassigned its staff to OptimaEd anyway. That is the company store in its purest form: the vendor decides it is the vendor.

The virtual school is the clearest case, and the most important going forward. The campaign told CBS Miami that state funding goes to the charter school, and OptimaEd is simply paid under its contract with the school. That is true, and it is the whole point. Optima Classical Academy exists as a public charter so that it can receive state and local funds; OptimaEd exists as a private company so that it can keep them. The charter is public when the money comes in and private when it goes out. Preston and I called that having it both ways.

The real estate and construction layer

The grift model’s fourth type, real estate, is where the biggest money in this sector moves. In The Charter Money Trail I traced the usual three hops: management fee, then a related real-estate entity, then tax-exempt bonds repaid out of the school’s own per-pupil funding. And in We Bought It Twice I explained how the public ends up paying for a building it never owns.

In the Optima network, what the record shows so far is construction, not ownership. According to the Florida Bulldog, one Jacksonville firm, Summit Construction Management Group, built the $14.4 million Jacksonville Classical Academy campus (2019), renovated Jacksonville Classical East for $1 million (2022), built the $20 million Naples Classical campus (2020), signed an $11 million deal with Treasure Coast (2023), and was slated to build the Fort Myers school. Treasure Coast’s lawsuit alleges the foundation had an undisclosed conflict of interest with Summit, and that Summit set up investment vehicles that put money into Erika Donalds’ other ventures. Those are allegations in a civil complaint, and neither Summit nor Donalds responded to the Bulldog’s questions.

The Fort Myers campus is the other open question. CBS reported that Donalds sought, in August 2025, to transfer the building to another charter operator after the school failed to open; local reporting says that operator plans to open it. I don’t know the terms of that transfer, and neither, as far as I can tell, does the public. That is the gap: who financed the building, who holds title, and what the public paid for are exactly the questions the related-party framework says to ask, and exactly the ones Florida’s disclosure rules make hard to answer.

Our 2019 recommendation applies directly. A charter’s founders and operators should not be able to lease or buy property from, or route construction through, entities tied to themselves without independent review, and the state should audit those deals as a matter of course.

Where this sits among the big edu-grift stories

In scale, Optima is a mid-sized case. Here it is next to the five largest I ranked in Edu-Grift Top 5, plus Oklahoma’s Epic case. These are different kinds of numbers over different periods, so read them as orders of magnitude, not a league table.

Case Mechanism Headline figure Legal status
National Heritage Academies (MI + 6 states) Real estate $853.6M in bonds (2021) Legal; no charges
A3 Education (CA) Enrollment inflation ~$400M generated, ~$80M allegedly diverted Guilty pleas
Epic Charter Schools (OK) Related-party management State auditor: $145M in spending undisclosed Founders charged in 2022; deny wrongdoing; headed to trial
Chester Community / CSMI (PA) Company store + real estate ~$122M combined Audited; no charges
ECOT (OH) Enrollment inflation $117M ordered repaid School closed 2018
White Hat (OH) Company store + equipment ~$100M over a decade Upheld, 4–3, Ohio Supreme Court
Optima network (FL) Company store + related-party services >$30M over four years, $15.7M budgeted this year No charges; one civil suit

Two lessons from that table matter for Florida.

First, the cases that ended in court were the ones built on fake enrollment. The ones built on structure, the company store and real estate, mostly survived review. White Hat won in Ohio’s Supreme Court. NHA’s $853.6 million deal closed. The Optima arrangements look like the second kind, which is why “nothing illegal” is not a defense. It’s the diagnosis.

Second, several of these stories are also political stories. ECOT’s founder gave heavily to the officials who oversaw his school. Academica’s founder had a brother-in-law on the Florida House committee that funded charter facilities. In Arizona, lawmakers who wrote charter law profited from charter real estate, which Derek, Preston and I noted in 2019. The Donalds case moves that pattern to the top: not a donor, not a legislator, but a governor’s household.

Their side of it

The Donalds and their supporters have made several arguments, and they deserve a fair hearing.

  • Independent boards. Each school is owned and governed by its own nonprofit board, which makes its own decisions (a source close to Donalds, to CBS).
  • Temporary by design. Erika Donalds told the Herald the schools’ partnerships with her foundation were always meant to be temporary, and she disputed the claim that the foundation mismanaged the Jacksonville audits. The campaign says the brick-and-mortar schools have moved to self-management and those contracts have ended.
  • Separation. Byron Donalds has no management role in and no direct ownership of her companies, the campaign says, and he has said he would draw a line between her business and the state’s if elected. The renamed foundation, it says, now provides its help to schools free of charge.
  • Parents choose. Families decide whether to enroll; funding follows them, and losing students means losing money. That, the campaign argues, is a layer of accountability beyond government oversight.
  • Results. Her spokesperson told CBS the schools’ academic performance eventually improved. Erika Donalds has said she has “nothing to hide.”
  • Bias. Defenders called the CBS coverage sexist, and argued that a school delayed by hurricane damage and financing problems says little about her record.

Some of this is fair. Independent boards did, in the end, act: all four original schools have cut ties with Optima, and one sued. That is the gatekeeping system working, late. But each of these points answers a question other than the one I’m asking. The question is not whether parents can leave, or whether any single contract was lawful. It is whether a governor can neutrally oversee a funding system that supports his household, and whether Florida’s rules would let anyone see it if he couldn’t. On the parental-choice argument in particular, I’d point readers to Experimenting With Our Children: parents can leave a school, but the child who lost the years doesn’t get them back.

Why it matters for a governor, and what should change

In the Enron article, Preston, Joseph and I argued that related-party abuse is a gatekeeper failure. The governor is the gatekeeper of last resort. A governor signs the budget that sets per-pupil funding, appoints the state board and education commissioner, and decides whether to sign or veto charter, facility and oversight legislation. Erika Donalds has promised an “economy of education” in which “profit is not going to be a bad word,” the Herald reported. The Herald also reported that Florida’s ethics code applies to the governor but not to his spouse, though it could require him to recuse from some charter-related actions. Recusal from the core of a state’s education budget is not a workable answer.

Nor is it a problem only the Donalds can create. Florida already puts the smallest share of its economy into its public schools of any state, and its rules let the Optima arrangements surface only through reporters and a lawsuit. Whoever wins on November 3, the state should close the loophole. Updated for Florida, our 2019 agenda would be:

  1. Ban related-party facility and service contracts between a charter school and companies owned or controlled by its founders, operators or their families, or require independent, at-market review before any such contract is signed, not a footnote in an audit afterward.
  2. Audit facility purchases, leases, construction and conveyances as a matter of routine, including any transfer of a school building to another operator.
  3. Protect and reward whistleblowers inside charter schools and their vendors.
  4. Treat management and instructional vendors as public for records purposes when they perform a school’s core functions, as Pennsylvania’s Office of Open Records did with CSMI.
  5. Extend the ethics code to cover financial interests of the governor’s household in entities receiving state education funds, with divestment, not recusal, as the remedy.

None of this is about being for or against charter schools. As we wrote in 2019, charter schools run on public money. The public should be able to see where it goes, and no one in a position to set the rules should be on both sides of the deal.

Sources

My prior work

Reporting on the Donalds and Optima

Other cases

The Gender Pay Gap in New Jersey Schools Lives in the Principal’s Office

Dot chart: women are 48% of principals vs 80% of their teachers overall; elementary 57% vs 88%; middle 37% vs 73%; high school 30% vs 59%, 2023-24.

Teaching is a predominantly female profession. Nationally, 77% of public school teachers are women (NCES); in New Jersey, women hold 76% of full-time teaching jobs.

It is also an underpaid one. The Economic Policy Institute finds that teachers earned 25.2% less in weekly wages than comparable college-educated workers in 2025, up from 6.1% in 1996. Counting teachers’ better benefits, the penalty is still 14.5% (EPI). New Jersey does better than most states but not well: EPI puts its penalty at about 14%. School Finance Indicators Database estimates found New Jersey teachers earning 15.9% less than similarly educated non-teachers of the same age (SFID via NJPP; Shanker Institute). A mostly female profession paid well below its peers is already a gender pay story.

Within teaching, though, it would at least seem that there should be no gender pay gap. Public school salaries are set by negotiated guides: a step for each year of experience, a column for each degree, the same scale for everyone in the district. A woman and a man with the same degree and years should earn the same.

The data tell a few different stories. I looked at every full-time certificated employee in New Jersey from 2017-18 through 2023-24, more than 800,000 person-years of salary records.

  1. The pay gap does exist. In 2023-24 the typical woman teacher earned $79,069 and the typical man $83,510, about 95 cents on the dollar. Even among teachers in the same district with the same degree, experience and assignment, women earn about 0.6% less.
  2. It is bigger for principals. The typical woman principal earned $145,500, against $155,567 for men. Within the same district, at the same school level and size, women principals earn 3.3% less, about five times the teacher gap. Among high school principals the median gap is $20,496.
  3. Women tend to be in the lower-paying jobs and settings, even within K-12 schooling. Elementary-only districts are 86% women and pay about 6% below average for the same credentials. Principals are 30 points less likely to be women than the teachers in their own schools, and men principals are twice as likely to lead a high school.

The common thread: where pay follows a published rule, the gap nearly disappears. It persists where pay is negotiated person by person, and where women and men end up in different districts and different jobs.

Teachers: the salary guide does its job

Most of the teacher gap comes from who teaches what, and where. Men are concentrated in high schools, in larger schools, and in fields such as science, industrial arts, vocational education and social studies, and those settings pay more. Hold job code, school level and size, and district constant, and the gap all but disappears.

Bar chart: women teachers' pay shortfall falls from 3.4% raw to 2.8% with degree and experience, 1.3% with job code, 0.9% with school level and size, 0.6% within district and 0.6% within school, 2023-24.
Source: NJDOE certificated staff file, 2023-24; 93,263 full-time teachers with name-classified gender.

Within the same district, a woman teacher with the same degree, experience and assignment as a man earns about 0.6% less, roughly $520 a year. In elementary and middle schools it is 0.2–0.3%, and for teachers with 25 or more years’ experience it is essentially zero.

What is left is mostly money outside the guide. In 2022-23 and 2023-24, men teachers’ supplements, such as coaching and club stipends, averaged $1,460 against $814 for women. Measured on base salary alone, the within-district gap shrinks from 0.71% to 0.39%.

Principals: the gap the guide doesn’t reach

Principals are a different story. In 2023-24, women principals earned 3.3% less than men in the same district, at the same school level and size, with the same degree and experience. That is roughly $4,800 a year, about five times the teacher gap. Assistant principals show about 2%. Superintendents show about 2% after accounting for district enrollment.

The gap does not depend on what kind of school a principal leads: it is 2.6% in elementary schools, 2.3% in middle schools and 3.0% in high schools. It does grow with seniority, from 2.0% for principals with under 15 years of experience to 3.2% for those with 25 or more. That is what we would expect if pay is negotiated contract by contract and differences compound over a career.

Line chart, 2017-18 to 2023-24: raw gap for principals and APs rose from 3.4% to 4.7%, within-district from 2.0% to 2.6%; teachers raw from 2.6% to 3.4%, within-district flat at 0.5-0.8%.
Source: NJDOE certificated staff files, 2017-18 to 2023-24; log-salary regressions by year.

The trend makes the contrast plain. Raw gaps widened for teachers and leaders alike between 2018 and 2024. For teachers, the gap within the same district held at 0.5–0.8% every year. For principals and assistant principals it grew, from 2.0% to 2.6%.

Representation compounds the problem. Women are 76% of New Jersey’s teachers but 48% of its principals, 37% of its superintendents and 31% of its high school principals, the best-paid principal jobs.

Who works where

Much of the raw gap comes from structure rather than from different pay for the same post. Three patterns stand out.

Different districts, different staffs, different guides. New Jersey still runs hundreds of elementary-only (K-8) districts alongside regional high school and county vocational districts. The elementary districts are 86% women and pay about 6% below the state average for the same degree and experience. Regional high school districts (59% women) and county vocational districts (53% women) pay 2–6% above it.

Chart by district type: elementary-only 86% women, pay 5.7% below state average; special services 79%, -2.4%; K-12 76%, +1.2%; charter 72%, -5.1%; high school/regional 59%, +2.4%; county vocational 53%, +5.7%.
Source: NJDOE certificated staff and enrollment files, 2023-24. Pay level = district effect on log salary net of degree and experience.

Men teachers are more likely to work under those higher guides. 8.0% of men teachers work in regional high school districts, against 3.6% of women, and 4.9% of men work in county vocational districts, against 1.7% of women. Nearly one in five women teachers (18.5%) works in an elementary-only district, against one in ten men.

This is not just a difference in job mix. Comparing teachers in the same job code, elementary-only districts still pay 5.1% below average, while regional high school districts pay 0.7% above and vocational districts 2.2% above. District by district the pattern holds: each 10 points more women on a teaching staff goes with a pay scale about 3.5% lower. Which district a teacher works in accounts for about 23% of the raw teacher gap.

Principals don’t look like their staffs. In 2023-24, 48% of principals were women, compared with 80% of the teachers in their own schools. The shortfall is about 30 points at every level: elementary principals are 57% women against 88% of their teachers, and high school principals 30% against 59%. Even in schools where 90% or more of the teachers are women, only 56% of principals were women between 2018 and 2024. If principals mirrored their own schools’ teachers, roughly 620 more women would have been principals in 2023-24. Assistant principals come closer, at 50% women against 70% of their teachers.

Dot chart: women are 48% of principals vs 80% of their teachers overall; elementary 57% vs 88%; middle 37% vs 73%; high school 30% vs 59%, 2023-24.
Source: NJDOE certificated staff files, 2023-24; 1,967 principals matched to schools with 10+ classified full-time teachers.

Men lead the high schools. A quarter of men principals lead high schools, against an eighth of women; 71% of women principals lead elementary schools, against half of men. In regional high school districts, 7 of 50 high school principals are women.

Principals, 2023-24MenWomen
Share leading high schools25%12%
Median salary, elementary$152,230$145,481
Median salary, high school$169,096$148,600

The high school premium goes mostly to men. Men high school principals earn $16,867 more at the median than men elementary principals; for women the difference is $3,120. Women who lead high schools tend to run smaller ones (median enrollment 735 vs. 1,022), and more often in charters and lower-paying districts. Inside the same district, women high school principals earn about 3% less than men, about the same as at other levels.

Putting it together: for teachers, school level, job, school size and district explain about 60% of the raw gap. Experience explains most of the rest, and about a fifth is left unexplained. For principals, school level explains about a fifth and district and school size about a third. Half the principal gap remains unexplained, among people in the same district, at the same level, leading schools of the same size.

The full policy brief, with data and methods, detailed tables, robustness checks and policy recommendations, is available as a PDF:

Carrie Is Not the Mere Creature of Anyone: A Children’s Recourse Reading of Flanagan’s Carrie

Who speaks for Carrie White? Timeline from birth through fifteen years at home to the welfare check and school

Spoilers for episodes 1–3 of Carrie (Prime Video, 2026).

Who speaks for Carrie White? Timeline from birth through fifteen years at home to the welfare check and school
Figure 1. Carrie’s timeline: fifteen years unseen, found by accident.

This month I posted a draft law review article, Not the Mere Creature of Anyone: Parental Control, Public Money, and the Case for Children’s Educational Rights. Its argument is that for a century the Supreme Court has asked one question about children’s schooling, how much control parents get, and has almost never asked the other: what is the child owed? (I walked through the argument in an earlier post.)

Then I started watching Mike Flanagan’s Carrie on Prime Video, and I couldn’t get the article out of my head. What struck me most was how Carrie’s teachers, and especially her school counselor, reached out to her and cared for her, all while working inside the very constraints the article describes.

I did not expect a Stephen King adaptation to be the clearest illustration of that argument I’ve seen. It is.

Flanagan’s Carrie White is not just a bullied teenager with a fanatical mother. She is a child who was, for roughly fifteen years, legally invisible. And the only reason she ever sees the inside of a school is a plot device that our law does not reliably supply: a death in the family that triggers a welfare check.

Fifteen years in the house: exit with no one watching

The series opens after Carrie’s father Ralph dies in a construction accident. Social workers conducting a welfare check find Margaret and her teenage daughter, a girl who has essentially never left the family home. As a condition of Margaret keeping custody, Carrie must attend the local high school. Margaret, for her part, promises Carrie it will only be for a semester, two at most.

Up to that point, Carrie had been “homeschooled,” in the loosest possible sense. She was allowed to read little beyond the Bible. What she knows of the wider world of books she owes almost entirely to a neighbor, Stella, who as a girl began slipping books into the birdhouse Carrie was permitted to tend, the one point of contact she had with the outside.

Sit with that for a moment, because it is a precise picture of the regime described in Part I.D of the article. The Supreme Court has never decided a home schooling case. Home schooling’s legality rests on state statutes read against Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and those statutes range from notice and portfolio review to almost nothing at all. Carrie’s entire educational recourse, for a decade and a half, was the private generosity of a kid next door with a library card. No registry knew she existed. No assessment measured what she had learned. No teacher, nurse, or counselor (no mandated reporter) ever laid eyes on her.

Pierce itself did not contemplate this. The Court was explicit that nothing in its holding questioned “the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils.” Pierce was a bargain: parents could leave the public schools, and the State kept the power to make sure the child was educated anyway. In Carrie’s case, the first half of the bargain was honored for fifteen years. The second half never showed up.

The welfare check: the state as guarantor, by accident

The show’s premise, that the state conditions Margaret’s custody on Carrie’s school attendance, is the closest thing in the story to the framework I call Children’s Recourse. It is the state acting as guarantor of a real education for a child whose parent has failed her.

There is doctrinal room for it. Prince v. Massachusetts remains the clearest statement that parental and religious authority yields to the state’s interest in the child’s welfare: parents “may be free to become martyrs themselves,” but they are not free “to make martyrs of their children.” Even Mirabelli v. Bonta, which this spring expanded parents’ rights to be informed about what happens at school, preserved a carve-out: the State may still “shield children from unfit parents by enforcing child-abuse laws and removing children from parental custody in appropriate cases.” A prayer closet used as a punishment cell is squarely what child-abuse laws are for.

But notice how the state got there. Not through any system designed to find a child like Carrie. It got there because her father died and someone came to the door. Under DeShaney, the state generally owes a child no duty to protect her from harm inflicted by a private actor, including a parent. Absent the accident, Carrie stays in the house, and nothing in federal constitutional law obliges anyone to come looking.

Inside the school: what Mahmoud and Mirabelli would hand Margaret

Opt-out claims lost for decades, then won twice in 2025-26
Figure 2. Opt-out claims, Gobitis (1940) through Mirabelli (2026).

Once Carrie is in school, the show becomes a story about a child discovering what she has been denied, and a mother trying to claw it back.

In episode two, the guidance counselor, Peter Morton, is among the first adults to treat Carrie kindly. He answers her questions and walks her into the school library, a place she has never been. The titles she pulls off the shelf, as Forbes noted, are drawn from authors whose books are among the most frequently challenged in American schools. Carrie wants to read. She wants to understand her own body, which no one has explained to her, and she gets materials and answers from the adults at school that her mother would never have provided. Margaret, true to form, wants her out of all of it.

Twenty years ago, Margaret’s objections would have gone nowhere. The baseline the lower courts drew from Barnette (Mozert in 1987, Parker v. Hurley in 2008) was that being exposed to material in school is not a constitutional injury. Parents who objected could leave. They could not veto.

That baseline is gone. Under Mahmoud v. Taylor, a parent’s free exercise rights are violated by school policies that “substantially interfere with the religious development” of the child, and a burden of the same character as Yoder triggers strict scrutiny even under a neutral, generally applicable policy. Margaret White is close to a law school hypothetical for that test: sincere, all-encompassing religious objection to the library’s novels, to sex education, to the very idea that Carrie’s body is something she is entitled to understand. Mirabelli adds a second weapon. The Court found parents likely to succeed in claiming a right to participate in “decisions regarding their children’s mental health,” which is to say, in what passes between Carrie and Mr. Morton.

Inside the school, the claims run one way: Margaret holds recognized claims under Mahmoud and Mirabelli; Carrie holds none
Figure 3. What each party can claim once Carrie is inside the school.

What neither opinion contains is any account of Carrie’s side. As Part II.D of the article puts it, a child’s interest in learning about the world as it is, in confidential access to a school counselor, and in developing views of her own appear in these opinions only as interests the parental right overrides. They are never treated as rights the child holds.

Justice Douglas saw this coming in Yoder. The children’s own views had not been canvassed, he wrote, and “the children should be entitled to be heard.” Carrie is sixteen or seventeen. She has views. She is literally reading her way out of the house. Under current doctrine, no court would ask her.

Compare England. Its statutory guidance on sex education lets a pupil, from three terms before age sixteen, opt into sex education even over a parent’s withdrawal. Carrie, in England, would have her own say. In the U.S., after Mahmoud, the opt-out runs one way.

Follow the money: the Carrie the state would never have found

Since 2017, funding private schools means funding religious ones too
Figure 4. The funding cases, Norwood (1973) through St. Mary (pending).

Now change one fact. Suppose Margaret White lived in Arizona, and suppose that instead of keeping Carrie home on her own dime, she had signed up for an Empowerment Scholarship Account. I took up exactly this scenario in Experimenting With Our Children, which asks who answers to the eighteen-year-old the voucher failed.

Under Arizona’s statute, a parent’s signature on the account agreement “constitutes school attendance” for purposes of compulsory attendance law. The account requires spending on reading, math, and the other basic subjects, but imposes no testing, no curricular approval, and measures no learning. Florida’s home-education account requires a test to be taken and reported; funding turns on submitting it, not on the score.

In that world, the welfare check does not end with a custody condition. Margaret has a signed account agreement that counts as attendance and a stream of public money to prove it. Carrie’s “education” is a ledger of receipts. And after Carson v. Makin, a state that funds private options cannot exclude a family because the instruction it funds is religious. (The series, like King’s novel, is set in Chamberlain, Maine. Carson is a Maine case.) If the Court rules in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, argued November 3, that neutral conditions cannot bind religious providers, even the conditions a state might want to attach will be in doubt. Preston Green and I sketched where this sequence leads back in 2020, in The Post-Espinoza End Game.

The point is not that religious families shouldn’t get public support. The Netherlands funds private religious schools on the same footing as public ones. The point is that every peer democracy that does so exchanges that support for public accountability, and that money flowing in a child’s name ought to carry some obligation running to the child. Under the doctrine as it stands, it carries none.

What Carrie is owed: the state constitutional right that follows the child

The guidance office is where Carrie’s world opens up. Mr. Morton’s trip to the library is the first time an adult at any institution asks her what she wants to read. It’s a small scene, but it points straight at the question school finance people spend their careers on: not what a parent prefers, but what the state has actually promised each child.

Kentucky’s high court in Rose defined an adequate education in terms of capacities every child must have the opportunity to develop, including enough knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to make informed choices. New York’s Court of Appeals has said a sound basic education must prepare students to compete for jobs that support them and to function as civic participants. Several state high courts, including Kentucky, Wyoming, New Hampshire, and Washington, have called the right fundamental, and have described it as one held by each child.

A right like that does not stay behind when a child leaves the public system. It follows her. On that reading, the relevant question about Carrie is not whether her absence harmed the local public school’s budget. It is whether the state secured for her, at any point in fifteen years, the capacities its constitution guarantees. The honest answer is no, and the only thing that changed it was a funeral.

Children’s Recourse, applied to Carrie White

Part VII of the article lists measures a state can adopt now, on the authority Pierce itself reserved, without overruling anything. Here is how each would have changed Carrie’s story.

Three versions of Carrie: as shown, under an Arizona-style ESA, and under Children's Recourse
Figure 5. Same child, same mother, three rule sets.
Children’s Recourse measureWhat it would have meant for Carrie
Register every school-age child, in any settingThe state knows Carrie exists before age 16, not because of a death
Assess learning, not attendance or receipts; remediate, then require a change of setting after repeated failureA Bible-only curriculum shows up in an assessment years earlier
Keep every child in periodic contact with a mandated reporterSomeone other than Stella sees Carrie, and the prayer closet, long before high school
Attach neutral accountability conditions to every public dollarIf Margaret’s home schooling were publicly funded, the money would buy measurable learning, not a signature
Give older students a statutory voice in decisions about their own schoolingCarrie’s wish to read, and to learn about her own body, counts for something against Margaret’s opt-outs
Repeal provisions that deem a funding contract to be school attendanceMargaret cannot convert an account agreement into a shield against the welfare check

None of these measures requires Margaret to renounce her faith or Carrie to profess anything. They are deliberately content-neutral. That matters, and I want to be careful here, because Margaret White is a horror-movie caricature of religious motherhood, and it would be easy, and wrong, to read this post as an argument that religious parents are the problem. Pierce protected Catholic families from a Klan-backed law; Meyer and Farrington protected German and Japanese American families. Any framework that expands state authority over schooling has to be built so it cannot be turned against minority families again. That is why Children’s Recourse locates the right in the child, not in the state’s preferences about culture or creed. The European Court of Human Rights draws the line at indoctrination, not exposure, and it has held that a child’s interest in a well-rounded education can outweigh a parent’s religious objection to particular lessons. That’s a workable model.

The only recourse in the story

Carrie is a horror story, and the genre gives its heroine one form of recourse: telekinesis. Every adult institution in her life, the family, the church, the school, the state, fails her or arrives too late, and she answers with the only power she has.

Real children don’t have that option. What they have, or ought to have, is law. Right now, the law the Court has built treats Carrie as the object of her mother’s liberty, funds her mother’s exit if her state chooses to fund exit at all, lets her mother veto what the school teaches her once she’s inside, and asks Carrie nothing.

Pierce told us that “the child is not the mere creature of the State.” True. Nor is she the mere creature of her mother, or of a neighbor’s birdhouse, or of a lucky welfare check. If we are going to let a parent hold a child’s education in her hands, and especially if we are going to pay for it, someone has to be answerable to the child.

Read the full draft: Baker, B.D. (2026, October). Not the mere creature of anyone: Parental control, public money, and the case for children’s educational rights. School Finance 101 Working Paper.


Related posts on School Finance 101

Sources on the series

Money Matters. And the Evidence Keeps Piling Up.

Infographic: money matters whether funding goes up or down, whatever the source, across short- and long-term outcomes; operating and capital both matter; effects largest for high-need children.

An update on what the causal research says about school funding, with a new policy brief attached.

In January 2025, the Albert Shanker Institute released the third edition of Does Money Matter in Education? The bottom line, which I put in all caps on purpose: MONEY MATTERS, WHETHER IT’S GOING UP OR DOWN. It matters whatever the source or cause of the change, for operating and capital spending alike, and most of all for children in high-poverty, historically underfunded districts.

That was 21 months ago. Since then, pandemic aid has run out, districts are going over fiscal cliffs, universal voucher programs are diverting public revenue, and the federal role in education is under direct attack. So it’s fair to ask: has anything in the newer research changed the picture?

It has. The picture got stronger.

Infographic: money matters whether funding goes up or down, whatever the source, across short- and long-term outcomes
Figure 1. The evidence at a glance. Sources: Jackson & Mackevicius (2024); Jackson, Wigger & Xiong (2021); Biasi, Lafortune & Schönholzer (2025); Rauscher & Shen (2022).

What’s new

Here’s a quick tour of the rigorous, causally designed studies that have appeared, or appeared in major journals, since the third edition. The attached brief has details and full citations.

Capital spending matters, a lot, in the right places. Biasi, Lafortune and Schönholzer, now published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (2025), study roughly 17,000 school bond elections using close-election comparisons. On average, $1,000 of capital spending raises test scores by about 0.05 SD. HVAC projects raise scores by more than 0.20 SD, and health, safety and building-system projects by about 0.15 SD. Athletic facilities? They raise home prices but not test scores. The gains are concentrated almost entirely in districts serving low-income students. So yes, kids learn better when they aren’t sweltering in 90-degree classrooms with bad air. Who knew?

Teacher pay keeps teachers, and that pays off. Arkansas raised its minimum teacher salary from $36,000 to $50,000 under the LEARNS Act. Zamarro and colleagues (CALDER, 2026) find that the biggest raises produced the biggest retention gains: teachers who got more than $8,000 were 3.1 points more likely to stay in their districts. In New Jersey, Shakya (2024) finds that districts adopting a $50K starting salary saw gains in math proficiency and graduation rates. Rauscher, Mellon, Loeb and Abott (2024) trace part of the effect of voter-approved operating levies to teacher salaries and counselors, and they find returns roughly twice as large in low-spending, high-poverty districts.

Federal pandemic aid helped, mostly where it was targeted. Goldhaber and Falken (CALDER, 2025) use the Title I formula to isolate ESSER’s effects and find positive math gains, larger in high-poverty districts. The Education Recovery Scorecard team (Kane, Reardon and colleagues, 2026) estimates about six extra days of learning per $1,000, and finds that the highest-poverty districts would have seen almost no math recovery without the aid. Those effects are modest per dollar. That’s what you’d expect from one-time money pushed out fast in a crisis, against the largest learning loss in modern history. They’re still positive.

Cuts hurt, including cuts by another name. Chin and Chen (AERJ, 2026) study Indiana’s 2011 voucher and charter expansion. The most exposed districts lost about $433 per pupil, class sizes grew, schools closed, and achievement eventually turned significantly negative for several student groups. Money matters going down, too. It’s the same lesson as the Great Recession studies, with a new cause.

The payoffs extend into adulthood and into state economies. Baron, Hyman and Vasquez, now in the Review of Economics and Statistics (2026), show that Michigan’s school funding increases reduced adult crime. And Kirabo Jackson’s new NBER paper (2026) follows the money all the way to the macroeconomy. After state school finance reforms, earnings per worker stay flat for about 15 years while the affected kids are still in school, then climb to roughly 4.7% above the counterfactual after 30 years. GDP per capita ends up more than 5% higher.

The exception that proves the rule

One new study found no effect. Clemens, Hoxie and Veuger (NBER, 2026) look at districts just above and below an ESSER eligibility threshold and find that the extra federal money didn’t improve test scores. Why? Because those districts didn’t spend it on schools. They used it to cut local property taxes. Per-pupil spending didn’t rise, so outcomes didn’t either.

That isn’t evidence against “money matters.” It’s evidence for it. Money matters when it reaches classrooms. This is why maintenance-of-effort provisions matter.

Flow diagram: funding sources feed operating and capital spending, which reach students through teachers, adult attention, healthier buildings and engagement, raising short- and long-run outcomes
Figure 2. How school funding reaches students: from revenue source, through operating and capital spending, to short- and long-run outcomes.

About those scatterplots

Every so often someone posts a chart of state spending against NAEP scores, or of rising national spending against flat or falling scores, and declares the case closed. In 2025–26 we got a Brookings cross-state analysis and a Texas A&M blog post along these lines. The Brookings authors, to their credit, say plainly that their analysis is not causal.

Those charts are the 2020s version of the Coleman-era correlations that the entire modern literature was built to get past. States that spend more differ in student need, labor costs, and a hundred other ways. And a national score decline that coincides with smartphones, a pandemic and changing test-taking populations tells you nothing about what an additional dollar does in a given district. That’s exactly why researchers turned to close elections, formula kinks, court orders and policy shocks. When you do that, you get the same answer over and over.

Timeline of studies from the 1966 Coleman Report to 2026, showing the shift from correlational doubt to consistent causal evidence
Figure 3. Sixty years of evidence. Green = funding increases improved outcomes; red = funding decreases worsened them.

Why the case keeps getting stronger

Look at the timeline. Through the 1980s and early ’90s, the “money doesn’t matter” argument rested on vote counts of correlational studies. Starting around 2016, quasi-experimental studies began piling up: different states, different decades, different funding sources (courts, legislatures, local voters, the federal government, even recessions and voucher programs) and different outcomes (test scores, graduation, college, earnings, poverty, crime, civic engagement, mobility, state GDP). The direction almost never changes.

Each new natural experiment is another independent test. Each one passes. That’s what a mature, robust body of evidence looks like.

So what?

  • Cuts are not neutral. States staring at fiscal cliffs or voucher-driven revenue losses should expect real, measurable harm to kids, concentrated in high-need districts.
  • Progressive funding is efficient funding. The highest returns are in the districts with the greatest needs and the fewest resources.
  • New money has to add, not replace. Pair aid with maintenance-of-effort requirements.
  • Fund people and buildings. Salaries, staffing, HVAC and safe buildings are complements, not competitors.
  • Use the right time horizon. Several years for operating effects, three to eight for capital, decades for economic returns.

The question isn’t whether money matters. It’s whether we’re willing to provide it.

The full policy brief, “Money Matters — and the Evidence Keeps Growing,” with the infographic, pathways figure, evidence timeline and references, is attached below.

The Education States that will Lead the Way

U.S. map classifying states as Leading, Close behind, or Not there yet on school funding adequacy and NAEP performance

In my last post I described the Dependent States of America: the states, mostly red, whose schools lean most heavily on federal aid, in many cases because they have chosen to underinvest in their own children. This post looks at the other end of the spectrum. These are the states that fund their schools adequately, including the schools serving the poorest children, and that perform well. And they include the states that, after letting their school funding collapse in the Great Recession, eventually chose to reinvest.

In an earlier working paper, I called these the Education States. They are states where courts have been willing to uphold and enforce education rights, where legislators and governors have funded those rights whether a court ordered them to or not, and which are now positioned to protect their own students while the federal government retreats. I noted then that the Education States are not exclusively blue or northern. The data bear that out, though not by much.

Measuring an Education State

I use three measures. The first two come from the School Finance Indicators Database (SFID), 2026 release, which covers school years through 2023. Funding adequacy compares what districts actually spend per pupil with what our National Education Cost Model estimates they would need to spend to reach national average test scores, given their students’ needs and regional costs. A ratio of 1.00 means spending is exactly adequate; 0.75 means districts spend three-quarters of what they need. I look at adequacy statewide and in each state’s highest-poverty fifth of districts, because a state can be well funded on average while its poorest districts are left behind. The third measure is performance: each state’s 2024 NAEP scores in grade 4 and grade 8 reading and math, expressed as standard deviations above or below the national public school average.

From these, I sort states into three groups:

  • Leading: adequate funding statewide and in high-poverty districts (both ratios at or above 1.00), with NAEP performance at or above the national average.
  • Close behind: adequate statewide, high-poverty districts at 85% of adequate or better, and NAEP at or above, or within 0.10 standard deviation of, the national average.
  • Not there yet: everyone else.
U.S. map classifying states as Leading, Close behind, or Not there yet on school funding adequacy and NAEP performance

Six states lead: Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Wyoming and North Dakota. Eleven more are close behind, including New York, Maine, Rhode Island, Minnesota, Washington, Colorado, California and Illinois, along with Kansas, Nebraska and Montana. The remaining 31, including nearly the entire South, are not there yet, though several of them are moving in the right direction. (Alaska, Hawaii and Vermont aren’t rated, because the cost model can’t produce reliable estimates for them.)

Funding and performance go together, though not perfectly. Across states, the correlation between statewide adequacy and NAEP performance is about 0.45. Every leading state performs above the national average, with Massachusetts (+0.27 SD) and New Jersey (+0.18) at the top.

The Great Divergence

The Great Recession hit every state’s school budget. What separates the Education States from the rest is what happened next.

Line chart of funding adequacy in high-poverty districts, 2009 to 2023, by 2024 presidential result: Democratic-leaning states recovered to about 1.0 while Republican-leaning states stayed near 0.6

Nationally, adequacy in high-poverty districts fell from 0.79 in 2009 to 0.66 by 2013. Those districts spent, on average, about two-thirds of what they needed. In the states Harris carried by 10 points or more, high-poverty adequacy dropped from 0.95 to 0.76 at its 2013 low. Then those states climbed back steadily, reaching 0.96 by 2019, before any federal pandemic aid arrived, and about 1.00 by 2023. In the states Trump carried by 10 or more, high-poverty adequacy fell from an already low 0.63 to 0.52, crept back only to 0.56 by 2019, and stood at 0.62 in 2023, still below where it was in 2009.

In other words, the gap between blue and red states’ highest-poverty districts was wide before the recession (about 0.32) and wider after the recovery (about 0.40 in 2019). Both groups cut their effort. In 48 of the 50 states with data, state and local school revenue is a smaller share of personal income today than in 2008; only Illinois and Hawaii are exceptions. But the median solidly Democratic state’s effort fell from 4.3% to 3.8%, while the median Lean R state’s fell from 3.8% to 2.4%, a decline of more than a third.

2024 resultStatesStatewide adequacy, 2023High-poverty adequacy, 2009Post-recession lowHigh-poverty adequacy, 2023Effort, 2008 → 2023NAEP 2024Leading / Close behind
Solid R (R+10 or more)240.820.630.520.624.3% → 3.5%0.002 / 3
Lean R (R+2 to 10)40.770.590.520.583.8% → 2.4%−0.050 / 0
Toss-up (margin under 2)31.130.640.560.694.8% → 4.1%+0.030 / 0
Lean D (D+2 to 10)61.311.050.881.054.5% → 3.6%+0.012 / 2
Solid D (D+10 or more)141.240.950.761.004.3% → 3.8%0.002 / 6
United States511.010.790.660.834.3% → 3.6%0.006 / 11
Adequacy = actual current spending per pupil ÷ spending required to reach national average test scores (SFID National Education Cost Model); 1.00 = exactly adequate. Group values are enrollment-weighted (pooled); high-poverty = each state’s highest-poverty fifth of districts. Post-recession low is the lowest value between 2010 and 2016. Effort = state and local school revenue as a share of personal income, median state. NAEP 2024 = average of grade 4 and 8 reading and math, in national standard deviations from the national public average, simple mean across states. Leading / Close behind = number of states in each group. Adequacy not estimated for Alaska, Hawaii or Vermont. Sources: School Finance Indicators Database (2026 release); NAEP; FEC 2024 certified results.

The pattern by political leaning is stark. In states Harris carried, by any margin, high-poverty districts are funded at or near adequate levels on average. In states Trump carried by any margin, they are funded at about 60% of adequate, and that hasn’t changed in fifteen years. The three toss-up states, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, look like their politics: adequately funded on average but with their poorest districts well short, at 0.69.

Average NAEP performance by group is close to the national average across the board. That is partly because group averages blend high and low performers, and partly because performance depends on much more than funding, including child poverty, which is higher in many red states. It’s not that funding doesn’t matter. The leading states all outperform. But money is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one.

The Education States, by name

StateStatewide adequacyHigh-poverty adequacy: 2009 → low → 2023EffortNAEPRein­vested2024 margin
Leading
Wyoming1.802.10 → 1.78 → 1.933.71%+0.15R+45.8
New Hampshire2.071.45 → 1.31 → 1.543.34%+0.16YesD+2.8
New Jersey1.691.38 → 1.10 → 1.265.16%+0.18D+5.9
Massachusetts1.541.36 → 0.99 → 1.153.23%+0.27D+25.2
North Dakota1.330.90 → 0.71 → 1.123.51%+0.09YesR+36.5
Connecticut1.571.36 → 1.13 → 1.074.07%+0.11D+14.5
Close behind
New York1.461.22 → 1.00 → 1.095.02%−0.03D+12.6
Maine1.561.11 → 0.93 → 1.093.73%−0.07D+6.9
Washington1.350.74 → 0.66 → 0.963.38%+0.04YesD+18.2
Rhode Island1.321.04 → 0.82 → 0.943.82%0.00D+13.8
Colorado1.160.73 → 0.56 → 0.923.04%+0.14YesD+11.0
Minnesota1.180.78 → 0.74 → 0.923.47%+0.10D+4.2
Kansas1.140.99 → 0.76 → 0.914.16%0.00R+16.1
Montana1.070.75 → 0.71 → 0.912.76%+0.09YesR+19.9
Nebraska1.130.92 → 0.87 → 0.893.69%+0.03R+20.5
California1.090.59 → 0.46 → 0.894.03%−0.08YesD+20.1
Illinois1.140.69 → 0.66 → 0.874.68%+0.05YesD+10.9
Adequacy and effort are for 2023; NAEP is 2024, in standard deviations from the national public average. Leading: statewide and high-poverty adequacy both at or above 1.00, and NAEP at or above the national average. Close behind: statewide adequacy at or above 1.00, high-poverty adequacy at least 0.85, and NAEP within 0.10 SD of the national average or above it. Reinvested: high-poverty adequacy gained at least 0.15 from its 2010–2016 low, had already gained at least 0.08 by 2019 (before pandemic aid), and by 2023 exceeded its 2009 level. Row shading shows 2024 presidential leaning: solid red/blue = margin of 10+ points; pale red/blue = 2 to 10 points. Sources: School Finance Indicators Database (2026 release); NAEP 2024; FEC 2024 certified results.
Scatterplot of state and local school funding effort against statewide funding adequacy in 2023, with states colored by 2024 presidential result; low-effort, low-adequacy states are mostly Republican-leaning

Effort explains a good share of the difference. Across the 47 states with estimates (excluding DC), state and local effort and statewide adequacy are correlated at about 0.40. Of the 23 states putting in less than the median effort (3.6% of personal income), 17 voted for Trump, and only 8 fund their schools adequately statewide. Of the 24 at or above the median, 18 do. Twenty-one states fall below adequacy statewide, and 19 of them voted for Trump. The exceptions run in both directions. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Washington and Colorado reach adequacy with below-median effort because they are wealthy. Georgia, South Carolina and New Mexico put in above-median effort and still fall short, because their capacity is lower and their needs are higher. But the lower-left corner of the chart, low effort and inadequate funding, belongs almost entirely to Republican-leaning states: Florida, Arizona, North Carolina, Nevada, Idaho, Tennessee and Oklahoma.

Of the 17 leading and close-behind states, 12 voted for Harris and five for Trump. The red Education States fall into two types. Wyoming and North Dakota are small, energy-rich states that can fund adequate schools without exceptional effort. Wyoming’s effort has actually fallen from 5.8% of personal income in 2008 to 3.7%, but its funding is built on decades of court-enforced adequacy under the Campbell County decisions. Kansas, Nebraska and Montana are more traditional Plains states with long-standing commitments to their public schools. Kansas, in particular, was pulled back by its courts. After deep cuts under Governor Brownback, the Gannon litigation forced a multi-year reinvestment that the Kansas Supreme Court finally approved in 2019. Its high-poverty adequacy, stuck at 0.75 as late as 2019, reached 0.91 by 2023.

Nor is being blue enough. Maryland (high-poverty adequacy 0.71), Virginia (0.68), New Mexico (0.67) and Delaware (0.98, but with NAEP well below average) are all “not there yet.” And several of the leading states have slipped. Connecticut’s high-poverty districts went from 1.36 in 2009 to 1.07, and New Jersey’s from 1.38 to 1.26. Both are still adequate, but the margin is narrower than it was.

The states that eventually reinvested

The most hopeful part of the story is the states that hit bottom after the recession and then chose to rebuild, mostly through new funding formulas, often prompted by litigation, and mostly well before federal pandemic aid arrived.

  • California adopted the Local Control Funding Formula in 2013, directing additional funding to low-income students and English learners. High-poverty adequacy rose from 0.46 in 2012 to 0.74 by 2019 and 0.89 by 2023, the largest gain of any state.
  • Washington, under the state supreme court’s 2012 McCleary decision, overhauled its funding in 2017 and 2018. High-poverty adequacy rose from 0.66 to 0.96.
  • Illinois replaced one of the nation’s most regressive systems with its Evidence-Based Funding formula in 2017, and is one of only two states whose effort is higher now than in 2008. High-poverty adequacy rose from 0.66 to 0.87.
  • Oregon passed the Student Success Act in 2019. High-poverty adequacy rose from 0.63 to 0.99 by 2019 and stood at 0.94 in 2023.
  • Colorado rose from 0.56 to 0.92 even before eliminating its “budget stabilization factor” in 2024. That change isn’t yet in these data.
  • Massachusetts and New Jersey, both already adequate, recommitted through the Student Opportunity Act (2019) and New Jersey’s 2018 school funding reform (S2), respectively, reversing post-recession erosion.

A second wave of reinvestment is too recent to show fully in data that end in 2023. Kansas is one example. Maryland’s Blueprint for Maryland’s Future, enacted in 2021, has moved high-poverty adequacy from 0.53 in 2019 to 0.71. New Mexico, responding to the 2018 Yazzie/Martinez ruling, has moved from 0.48 to 0.67. Michigan’s 2023 budgets began to fund its new Opportunity Index. Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth Court declared the state’s system unconstitutional in 2023, and the legislature has begun adding adequacy funding. Whether these states become Education States depends on whether they sustain the effort.

Not every state that recovered deserves the credit. Arizona, Tennessee, South Dakota and Missouri also improved high-poverty adequacy from their post-recession lows, but their effort kept falling. Arizona’s dropped from 3.7% of personal income in 2008 to 2.4%, and Tennessee’s from 3.4% to 2.7%. Their gains came from economic growth, not renewed commitment, and several are now expanding universal vouchers that will pull money away from the public districts these figures describe. Utah is the more convincing case: its high-poverty districts are now at 0.94 of adequate and its students outperform the national average by 0.15 SD.

Then there are the states that never came back. Florida’s high-poverty adequacy is lower now (0.70) than in 2009 (0.76), and its effort has fallen from 3.8% to 2.2%, the lowest in the country. North Carolina (0.61 to 0.55; effort 3.6% to 2.4%) and Texas (0.56 to 0.52) followed the same path. Iowa, whose high-poverty districts were adequately funded in 2009 (1.01), has slid to 0.82.

Leading the way

The Great Recession was a natural experiment in political will. Every state took a hit. Some states rebuilt, usually because courts insisted or because legislatures and governors decided their poorest children deserved better. Others took the opportunity to cut taxes and never looked back. Fifteen years later, the result is two countries: one where children in high-poverty districts attend schools funded at roughly the level needed to reach national average outcomes, and one where they attend schools funded at about 60% of that level.

The Education States now carry a double burden. In the short term, they must protect their own students from a federal administration that is withholding funds, dismantling the Department of Education and targeting equity itself. That means backfilling lost federal aid, building their own data capacity as NCES and IES are hollowed out, setting aside reserves (as I’ve proposed, through federally tax-exempt education endowments), and closing the door to publicly funded religious and discriminatory schooling by tightening charter oversight before the courts force it open.

In the longer term, they are the model for Project 2029. The states that reinvested after the recession show that the decline is a choice and can be reversed. They also show what reversing it takes: a cost-based formula, a commitment of state revenue, and in most cases a court willing to hold the state to its constitution. A federal foundation aid formula of the kind we’ve proposed would ask every state to do what California, Washington, Illinois and Kansas did, with federal help for states whose capacity genuinely falls short. The Education States have already shown the rest of the country the way. The question is whether the rest of the country will follow.


Data notes

  • Adequacy, effort and spending figures are from the School Finance Indicators Database, State Indicators Database, 2026 release (school years through 2023). Adequacy is actual current spending per pupil divided by required spending per pupil, estimated by the SFID National Education Cost Model to reach national average test scores. The model doesn’t produce estimates for Alaska, Hawaii, or Vermont after 2016, and SFID advises caution in interpreting New York’s estimates.
  • 2020 to 2023 spending includes some federal pandemic relief (ESSER) funds, which raise adequacy in absolute terms in those years. For that reason, the reinvestment test requires that recovery was already under way by 2019. Effort is a strictly state and local measure and is unaffected.
  • Group adequacy figures are enrollment-weighted, pooling all states in each group. Effort and NAEP group figures are median and simple mean across states, respectively. Effort is state and local school revenue as a share of aggregate personal income.
  • NAEP performance is the average of 2024 grade 4 and grade 8 reading and math scale scores, each expressed as the difference from the national public school average divided by the national standard deviation (NAEP Data Service).
  • Political leaning is based on the statewide popular-vote margin in the 2024 presidential election (FEC certified results). Solid = 10 points or more; Lean = 2 to 10 points; Toss-up = under 2 points.
  • Baker, B. D., Di Carlo, M., & Weber, M. (2026). The Adequacy and Fairness of State School Finance Systems (8th ed.). Albert Shanker Institute, University of Miami and Rutgers Graduate School of Education.

The Dependent States of America

U.S. map of federal revenue as a percent of total public school revenue by state, FY 2024. Highest: Mississippi 22.7%, Alaska 21.0%, New Mexico 19.7%. Lowest: New Jersey 6.3%. U.S. average 11.6%.

We like to think of our public schools as locally controlled and state funded, with Washington playing a bit part. Nationally, that’s roughly right. In fiscal year 2024, according to the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of School System Finances, public school systems took in about $995 billion, of which about $115 billion, or 11.6%, came from federal sources.

But that national average hides a very different country. In some states, federal aid is a rounding error in school budgets. In others, more than one of every five dollars flowing to local public schools comes from Washington. Welcome to the Dependent States of America.

Mapping dependence

The measure that matters here is dependence: federal revenue as a share of each state’s total school revenue. It tells us how much a state’s schools would be exposed if federal aid were cut, frozen, or weaponized, and how much leverage Washington has (or could have) over what happens in those schools.

U.S. map of federal revenue as a percent of total public school revenue by state, FY 2024. Highest: Mississippi 22.7%, Alaska 21.0%, New Mexico 19.7%. Lowest: New Jersey 6.3%. U.S. average 11.6%.

Mississippi tops the list, with 22.7% of school revenue coming from federal sources, followed by Alaska (21.0%), New Mexico (19.7%), South Dakota (19.4%), Louisiana (19.2%) and West Virginia (18.4%). At the other end, New Jersey’s schools draw only 6.3% of their revenue from Washington, with Utah, Minnesota, Connecticut and Massachusetts all around 8%.

The politics of dependence

It won’t surprise many readers that the Dependent States of America lean heavily red. Sorting states by the 2024 presidential result (using FEC certified state returns):

2024 presidential resultStatesFederal share of total school revenueMedian state
Trump-won3113.5%13.9%
Harris-won (incl. DC)209.7%9.6%
Solid R (R+10 or more)2413.9%15.0%
Lean R (R+2 to 10)414.8%15.5%
Toss-up (margin under 2)310.7%10.9%
Lean D (D+2 to 10)68.6%8.3%
Solid D (D+10 or more)149.9%10.3%
United States5111.6%11.8%
Group shares are pooled (group federal revenue ÷ group total revenue). Rows are shaded by 2024 presidential leaning: solid red = R+10 or more; pale red = R+2 to 10 (Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, North Carolina); pale purple = toss-up, margin under 2 points (Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin); pale blue = D+2 to 10 (Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Virginia); solid blue = D+10 or more (including DC). Sources: Census Bureau, FY 2024 Annual Survey of School System Finances; FEC 2024 certified results.

Schools in states Trump carried draw 13.5 cents of every revenue dollar from Washington, compared with 9.7 cents in states Harris carried, about 40% more reliance. Dependence rises with the margin: across states, the correlation between Trump’s 2024 margin and the federal share of school revenue is about 0.55 (excluding DC). Nine of the ten most dependent states voted for Trump (New Mexico being the exception). Nine of the ten least dependent voted for Harris (Utah being the exception).

Dependent by circumstance, or by choice?

Here’s the important part. The Dependent States of America are not dependent because Washington is especially generous to them. Federal dollars per pupil are about the same in Trump-won states ($2,403) as in Harris-won states ($2,598). What differs is the denominator. State and local revenue averages about $15,400 per pupil in Trump-won states, compared with about $24,300 in Harris-won states. A similar federal contribution simply makes up a much larger slice of a much thinner budget.

And that thinner budget is not only a function of being poorer. As I lay out in a recent working paper, state wealth and income account for about half, or less, of the variation in how adequately states fund their schools. The rest is effort, or the lack of it. Forty-one states now devote a smaller share of their economies to K-12 schools than they did before the 2007-09 recession. Some states, like Mississippi, have so little capacity that even average effort would leave them well short. Others, like Florida and Arizona, could raise enough on their own simply by exerting average effort. They choose not to.

Both kinds of states show up among the Dependent States of America. New Mexico, West Virginia and Alaska exert above-average effort and remain highly dependent anyway; they are dependent largely by circumstance. Arizona (18.1% federal), North Carolina (17.4%), Tennessee (15.9%) and Florida (15.3%) are dependent substantially by choice: very low-effort states leaning on federal aid, several of them while cutting taxes and expanding private school vouchers. And there’s a bitter irony here. Many of the states most dependent on federal aid today are the same states that, during the civil rights era, adopted “antiregulation” acts, using state aid and local tax policy to shield districts that refused federal desegregation mandates.

Low effort, high dependence

To separate circumstance from choice, the table below lists every state that both puts in below-average effort (state and local school revenue as a share of personal income) and draws an above-average share of its school revenue from Washington.

StateState & local effort
(% of personal income)
EffortFederal share of revenue2024 leaning (margin)
Mississippi3.49%Below avg.22.7%Solid R (R+22.9)
South Dakota2.75%Very low19.4%Solid R (R+29.2)
Louisiana3.71%Near avg.19.2%Solid R (R+22.0)
Arizona2.41%Very low18.1%Lean R (R+5.5)
Montana2.74%Very low17.8%Solid R (R+19.9)
North Carolina2.43%Very low17.4%Lean R (R+3.2)
Kentucky3.67%Near avg.17.1%Solid R (R+30.5)
Tennessee2.81%Very low15.9%Solid R (R+29.7)
Wyoming3.69%Near avg.15.5%Solid R (R+45.8)
North Dakota3.73%Near avg.15.4%Solid R (R+36.5)
Florida2.35%Very low15.3%Solid R (R+13.1)
Arkansas3.58%Below avg.14.7%Solid R (R+30.6)
Oklahoma3.26%Below avg.13.9%Solid R (R+34.3)
Nevada3.07%Below avg.13.6%Lean R (R+3.1)
Texas3.48%Below avg.13.4%Solid R (R+13.7)
Hawaii3.69%Near avg.13.1%Solid D (D+23.1)
Rhode Island3.63%Near avg.12.7%Solid D (D+13.8)
Wisconsin3.58%Below avg.11.9%Toss-up (R+0.9)
Idaho2.86%Very low11.7%Solid R (R+36.5)
United States3.73%11.6%
States with below-average effort and above-average federal share, sorted by federal share. Rows are shaded by 2024 presidential leaning: solid red = R+10 or more; pale red = R+2 to 10; pale purple = toss-up (margin under 2 points); pale blue = D+2 to 10; solid blue = D+10 or more. Effort tiers: very low = under 3.0%; below average = 3.0 to 3.59%; near average = 3.6% to the U.S. average of 3.73%. Effort = FY 2024 state and local school revenue ÷ 2023 personal income. DC excluded (see data notes). Sources: Census Bureau FY 2024 Annual Survey of School System Finances, Tables 1 and 19; FEC 2024 certified results.

Nineteen states meet both conditions, and 17 of them voted for Trump in 2024. The two Harris-won states on the list, Hawaii and Rhode Island, sit just below the national effort average. All seven states with very low effort voted for Trump: Florida (2.35%), Arizona (2.41%), North Carolina (2.43%), Montana, South Dakota, Tennessee and Idaho. Florida, Arizona and North Carolina devote only about two-thirds of the national average share of personal income to their schools, yet each draws more than 15% of its school revenue from federal sources. Mississippi is a different case. Its effort is modestly below average, but its capacity is so low that average effort alone would not get it close to adequacy.

Every state in this table falls below the 4%-of-personal-income effort floor in our federal formula simulation (described below). Under that design, each would have to raise its own effort before receiving gap-closing federal aid.

So what should federal policy do with the Dependent States of America? Two things: allocate aid toward adequacy, and attach meaningful strings.

Allocating federal aid toward adequacy

Federal aid today is layered on top of 50 separate state systems and targeted mainly on child poverty through programs like Title I and IDEA. It helps, but it does little to close either the gaps between adequately and inadequately funded states or the gaps between high- and low-need districts within states. Even during the period of elevated pandemic aid, the highest-poverty districts in southeastern states received the most federal money and the largest federal share, yet their total revenue remained woefully inadequate.

With my colleagues Matthew Di Carlo and Mark Weber, I’ve proposed a different approach: a new federal foundation aid formula that treats the federal government as the top layer of a national school finance system. It works much the way a good state formula works:

  1. Set an adequacy target for every district, using a national education cost model to estimate the per-pupil spending needed to reach common outcome goals (in our simulation, a modest goal: national average reading and math outcomes), adjusted for student needs and regional costs.
  2. Require a minimum state and local effort, in our simulation 3.5% of gross state product or 4% of aggregate personal income, roughly the national average.
  3. Direct that state and local revenue toward the districts furthest below adequacy.
  4. Have federal aid fill whatever gap remains, but only once a state has done its part.

In our proof-of-concept simulation, universal adequacy would require roughly $52 billion in additional federal aid per year, targeted to districts in 34 states, along with about $80 billion in additional state and local fair-share investment. Full participation would reduce the share of students in inadequately funded districts from about 55% to zero and shrink the funding gap between the highest- and lowest-poverty districts by more than 60%.

The effort requirement matters most for the Dependent States of America. Low-capacity states like Mississippi would receive substantially more help once they reach the effort floor, because their gaps genuinely exceed what they can raise. Low-effort states like Florida, Arizona, North Carolina and Tennessee would have to raise their own effort before receiving gap-closing aid. Federal dependence would stop being a subsidy for choosing not to try. And there’s no reason this logic must be limited to new money. The same framework could guide the distribution of the roughly $115 billion in federal revenue already flowing to schools.

Applying pressure where dependence is greatest

When one fifth of a state’s school revenue comes from Washington, Washington has both a stake and a lever. We’ve used that lever before. Southern states were required to adopt education articles in their constitutions as a condition for readmission to the Union after the Civil War. A century later, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 put real federal money on the table, and the threat of losing it gave teeth to desegregation enforcement. The federal government is again using that lever, but in the opposite direction, threatening to withhold aid from schools and states that pursue equity.

A future federal role should apply the lever deliberately, and most firmly where dependence is greatest. Conditions attached to federal aid should include:

  • Civil rights protections for all children. Full compliance with Title VI, Title IX, IDEA and Section 504, and with the obligation to educate every child regardless of immigration status. Any provider receiving public funds, including charter and voucher-receiving schools, must be bound by the same nondiscrimination requirements.
  • Common national goals. Shared outcome goals and measures, broader than reading and math scores and including preparation for postsecondary education, the workforce and civic life, that define what adequate funding must accomplish and drive the cost estimates behind the formula. These are national goals, not a national curriculum; achieving them would require revisiting long-standing statutory limits on federal direction of curriculum, and states would retain authority over how to meet them.
  • Minimum effort and no backsliding. States should not be able to eliminate the primary tax sources funding their schools, as Mississippi has proposed with its income tax and Florida with property taxes, or divert public funds to private schools, while drawing federal aid to backfill the hole.
  • Enforceable education rights. Every state constitution includes an education article, but enforcement by state courts has been uneven at best. Federal aid should come with pressure to make those rights real.
  • Transparent data. School-level spending and broader outcome reporting, supported by a rebuilt, not dismantled, National Center for Education Statistics and Institute of Education Sciences.

There are legal limits. Spending Clause conditions must be clearly stated, related to the purpose of the funds, and not so severe that they amount to coercion. That argues for attaching new conditions to new adequacy aid, phased in over time, rather than threatening to pull existing funds overnight. But the principle stands: the more a state’s schools depend on federal dollars, the stronger the federal interest in ensuring those schools serve every child, to common standards, under the protection of the law.

Whose rights? Children’s, not parental preferences

There’s another reason the Dependent States of America deserve federal attention. Several of them are where public money now follows parental preference with the fewest strings attached. Arizona, at 18.1% federal and among the lowest-effort states in the country, has made every school-age child eligible for an Empowerment Scholarship Account since 2022. Under its statute, a parent’s signature on the account agreement counts as compulsory school attendance. The law requires no testing and no curricular approval, and it measures no learning. Florida’s universal program requires a norm-referenced test, but funding turns on submitting the test, not on the score. Idaho’s high court has upheld that state’s private education tax credit, and Wyoming’s has cleared its education savings accounts to operate. All four states appear in the low-effort, high-dependence table above.

As I explain in Not the Mere Creature of Anyone (full working paper), for a century the Supreme Court has asked how much control parents may exercise over their children’s schooling, and almost never what the child is owed. Since 2017, the doctrine has converged on a single result: parental authority, underwritten by public money and increasingly insulated from public conditions. Carson v. Makin requires a state that funds any private option to fund religious ones. Mahmoud v. Taylor and Mirabelli v. Bonta make parental religious objection a powerful claim inside the public schools that remain. And on November 3, the Court hears St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, which asks whether states may attach neutral conditions to the money at all.

Consider, as I did in Experimenting With Our Children, the student in Phoenix who turns 18 having been failed by her account-funded education. She can’t sue her parents; courts have long refused to recognize a duty of care for academic outcomes. She can’t sue the state under the federal Constitution; education is not a fundamental federal right, and the state generally owes no duty to protect a child from harm by a private actor, including a parent. And state courts reviewing universal voucher and account programs have increasingly asked whether the money harms the public system, not whether any individual child is being educated. She is the one party to the arrangement with no rights of her own.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters told us that the child “is not the mere creature of the State.” True. But neither is she the mere creature of her parents. And Pierce struck a bargain that is too often forgotten: parents could leave the public schools, but the state kept the power to reasonably regulate all schools, to inspect and examine them, and to require studies essential to good citizenship. Federal aid can and should reinforce the state’s side of that bargain. Any state that spends public money, its own or Washington’s, on private schooling or home education should, as a condition of federal aid, adopt what I call Children’s Recourse:

  • Register every school-age child, in every setting, so no child disappears from public view.
  • Assess learning, not attendance or receipts, paired with remediation and, after repeated failure, a required change of educational setting.
  • Keep every child in periodic contact with a mandated reporter, such as a teacher, nurse or counselor, and review any withdrawal from school while child-protection concerns are open.
  • Attach neutral accountability conditions to every public dollar: assessment participation, public reporting of outcomes and finances, nondiscrimination in admissions, including on the basis of disability, and audits. To survive Carson and Fulton, these must apply to all providers alike, without discretionary exemptions.
  • Give older students a voice in decisions about their own schooling, the question Justice Douglas asked in his Yoder dissent and the Court has never answered.
  • End the fiction that a funding contract is an education, repealing provisions like Arizona’s that deem a signed account agreement to be school attendance.

None of these measures requires any family to profess anything, and none prescribes a culture or a creed. They ask only that someone be answerable to the child whose public education dollars are being spent. And they rest on the strongest ground available: state constitutional education clauses, which courts in Kentucky, Wyoming, New Hampshire and Washington have read as conferring an individual, even fundamental, right on each child. A right held by the child doesn’t stay behind when the child leaves the public system. It follows her, and so should the state’s duty, and the federal government’s interest, in seeing that she is actually educated.

From the Dependent States of America to Project 2029

None of this will happen under the current federal administration, which is dismantling the Department of Education, clawing back appropriated funds and greenlighting states already eroding their own public schools. In the short term, the work falls to what I’ve called the Education States, which are not exclusively blue or northern (Kansas qualifies), to protect their own students: backfilling threatened federal aid with state funds, much as southern states once used state aid to resist civil rights, and building the data capacity Washington is abandoning.

But short-term resistance is not a plan for the Dependent States of America. Children in Florida, Arizona, North Carolina and Tennessee can’t wait for their legislatures to rediscover the value of public education, and children in Mississippi can’t wait for their state to grow its way to adequacy. That requires a longer game: Project 2029.

Project 2029 is a new reconstruction. Ideally, it would include a federal constitutional amendment requiring that every child be provided, by their state with federal assistance, equal educational opportunity. At a minimum, it must include:

  1. Common national goals and standards, and measures of them, to guide what we expect our schools to accomplish and what it costs.
  2. A national cost model to drive a federal foundation aid formula targeting dollars to where they are needed most.
  3. A required minimum state and local effort, so that federal aid complements rather than substitutes for state responsibility.
  4. Rebuilt federal data and research capacity to monitor progress toward equal educational opportunity.
  5. Children as rights-holders, with federal aid reinforcing each child’s right to an adequate education wherever public money sends her, not deferring to parental preference as a proxy for the child’s interest.

What Congress would have to change

Project 2029 can’t be accomplished by executive order, nor should it be. It requires legislation, and in several places it means rewriting rules that currently get in the way. Congress would need to enact a federal foundation aid program1; replace ESEA’s maintenance-of-effort rule with an effort floor2; fix Title I’s spending factor3; revisit the prohibitions on federal involvement in standards and curriculum4; strengthen civil rights enforcement5; write Children’s Recourse into the conditions on federal aid6; ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child7; make education rights enforceable8; fully fund IDEA9; and rebuild and protect the federal education infrastructure10. The notes below spell out each change and the statutes and cases involved.

Project 2025 was years in the making, so that an administration could act on day one. Project 2029 must be just as detailed and just as ready, but with a crucial difference. It must be built on broad congressional buy-in rather than executive shows of force, and it must uphold, not subvert, our core constitutional commitments: equal protection, due process, free speech, and the balance between the free exercise of religion and the prohibition on its establishment. Over the longer run, it means revisiting the precedents that have subordinated the child to parental preference and public money, from Carson and Espinoza back toward Pierce itself, with any replacement built so it can never again be turned against minority families.

The Dependent States of America are dependent today largely because they’ve chosen to underinvest in their own children, and federal aid has quietly covered for it. Project 2029 should turn that dependence into a partnership: real federal help, toward real adequacy, in exchange for real effort and real protections for every child, protections that belong to the child, not to the adults choosing for her. If we are going to spend public money in a child’s name, someone has to be answerable to that child. Equitable and adequate funding alone won’t get us to equal educational opportunity. But we can’t get there without it.

  1. Enact a federal foundation aid program. A new title of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) authorizing adequacy-based aid driven by a national cost model, with a minimum state and local effort requirement (for example, 4% of personal income or 3.5% of gross state product) and a multi-year phase-in for states below the floor. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (2015), 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. The effort benchmarks follow Baker, Di Carlo & Weber (2022). ↩︎
  2. Replace the maintenance-of-effort rule with an effort floor. ESEA’s current maintenance-of-effort requirement asks only that a state spend at least 90% of what it spent the year before. A state can stay at very low effort forever and remain compliant. The test should be effort relative to capacity, and states should not be able to cut taxes or divert public funds to private schools below that floor while drawing federal foundation aid. ESEA § 8521, 20 U.S.C. § 7901 (maintenance of effort: combined fiscal effort or aggregate expenditures of at least 90 percent of the prior year). ↩︎
  3. Fix Title I’s spending factor. Title I’s formulas use a state per-pupil expenditure factor that sends more aid per poor child to states that already spend more, regardless of capacity or effort. Allocations should instead reflect adequacy gaps and effort. ESEA §§ 1124–1125A, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6333–6337. Under the Basic Grant formula, the state expenditure factor is 40 percent of the state’s average per-pupil expenditure, bounded at 80 to 120 percent of the national average. ↩︎
  4. Revisit the prohibitions on federal involvement in standards and curriculum. The General Education Provisions Act and provisions the Every Student Succeeds Act added to ESEA bar federal direction of curriculum and federal incentives for particular standards. These should be amended to permit common national outcome goals and measures, including an expanded NAEP, while leaving curriculum and instruction to states and districts. General Education Provisions Act § 103, 20 U.S.C. § 1232a; ESEA § 1111(e), 20 U.S.C. § 6311(e); ESEA § 8526A, 20 U.S.C. § 7906a. ↩︎
  5. Strengthen civil rights enforcement. Restore private enforcement of Title VI disparate-impact protections, which the Supreme Court closed off in Alexander v. Sandoval (2001). Codify the guarantee of Plyler v. Doe that every child, regardless of immigration status, is entitled to a public education. And as a condition of federal aid, require states that fund private providers, through vouchers, education savings accounts, tax-credit scholarships or charters, to hold them to the same nondiscrimination, special education and transparency requirements as public schools. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). ↩︎
  6. Write Children’s Recourse into the conditions on federal aid. Require any state that spends public funds on private schooling, education savings accounts or home education to register every child, assess learning rather than receipts, keep children in contact with mandated reporters, apply neutral accountability conditions uniformly to every provider, give older students a voice, and drop any rule deeming a funding agreement to be school attendance. Drafted as neutral, generally applicable conditions, these stand the best chance of surviving whatever the Court decides in St. Mary. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-2402(I); Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767 (2022); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021); St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, No. 25-581 (U.S., argued Nov. 3, 2026). See Baker (2026), Part VII. ↩︎
  7. Ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It recognizes parents’ primary responsibility for their children, exercised consistent with the child’s evolving capacities, while guaranteeing the child a voice in matters affecting her and subjecting private schools to minimum standards. The United States signed it in 1995 and is the only UN member that is not a party. Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts. 5, 12, 18, 29, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (signed by the United States Feb. 16, 1995). Ratification requires the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. ↩︎
  8. Make education rights enforceable. Condition foundation aid on each state guaranteeing, in law, a judicially enforceable right to an adequate education. In the longer run, pursue a federal constitutional amendment so that this right no longer depends on the willingness of 50 state courts. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (no federal fundamental right to education); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (leaving open whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right). ↩︎
  9. Fully fund IDEA. Congress authorized federal funding of up to 40% of the excess cost of educating students with disabilities in 1975, and it has never come close. Closing that gap is among the most direct ways to relieve pressure on low-capacity states. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2) (maximum grant of 40 percent of the national average per-pupil expenditure times the number of children served). ↩︎
  10. Rebuild and protect the federal education infrastructure. Reauthorize the Education Sciences Reform Act with statutory independence and stable funding for NCES and IES. Codify the Census school finance survey and school-level spending reporting. Fund the cost modeling a national formula requires, and protect the Department of Education’s statutory functions from administrative dismantling. Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002, 20 U.S.C. § 9501 et seq.; Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.; ESEA § 1111(h)(1)(C)(x), 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(x) (school-level per-pupil expenditure reporting). ↩︎

Data notes

Abbott Elementary Is Entertaining. The Damage Is Real.

Actual vs. required spending per pupil, Philadelphia and suburbs, 2009–2023

Abbott Elementary plays it for laughs. Janine Teagues hunts for a working rug, a functioning copier, a single extra aide. Barbara Howard has seen every reform come and go. Gregory Eddie inherits a classroom with no curriculum. Melissa Schemmenti knows a guy who can get the supplies the district can’t.

The show is entertaining. The damage is real. Behind every running gag is a funding gap that has been measurable, year after year, for at least fifteen years, and that has landed on real children in real Philadelphia classrooms.

Philadelphia’s district schools have spent between a third and a half less than what it would cost to get their students to national-average outcomes in every year from 2009 to 2023. Over the same years, the 61 suburban districts in Bucks, Chester, Delaware and Montgomery counties spent between half again and twice what their own students needed. We laugh at the broken boilers, missing counselors and teachers buying their own supplies. The kids living it don’t get a laugh track.

What follows walks from the money to the classroom: first the adequacy gap, then the simple “screwed city” picture, then teachers per child, teacher pay, and finally who is actually standing in front of the kids.

Fifteen years below the line

In 2022-23, the School District of Philadelphia spent $18,329 per pupil. Our National Education Cost Model estimates it would have needed $28,187 to give its students a shot at national-average test scores. That is a gap of $9,858 per child, or roughly $1.2 billion across 118,000 students, in a single year.

The suburbs face the mirror image. Their enrollment-weighted average spending was $20,059 against a required $13,298, a surplus of $6,761 per child. Same metro, same labor market, same state constitution.

Actual vs. required spending per pupil, Philadelphia and suburbs, 2009–2023

This is not a recent dip. Philadelphia sat 33% below its adequacy target in 2009, sank to 50% below in 2015 in the wake of the “doomsday” budgets, and was still 35% short in 2023, even with federal pandemic aid in the mix. The suburbs started out spending more than double their target and have drifted down to about 51% above it. The rest of Pennsylvania sits in between, about a third above.

Percent above or below adequacy, Philadelphia, suburbs, and rest of Pennsylvania

The outcome side tells the same story. Philadelphia’s students scored roughly 0.8 standard deviations below the national average in 2022-23, while suburban students scored about 0.2 above. Abbott’s students are not falling short because nobody cares. They are falling short where the money falls short.

The simple version: a “screwed city”

You don’t need a cost model to see the problem. Divide Philadelphia by its suburbs. In 2022-23, the city had 3.2 times the suburban child poverty rate. Under the NECM, that translates into 2.1 times the cost of reaching national-average outcomes. And the city spent 0.91 times what the suburbs spent.

Philadelphia as a multiple of its suburbs: poverty, required spending, actual spending

That pattern has held every year since 2009. Philly’s poverty rate has run 3 to 5 times the suburban rate, its costs 2 to 2.7 times, and its spending has never once caught up to the suburbs, let alone exceeded them.

That is what it means to be a screwed city. Not just underfunded relative to need, but outspent outright by the comfortable districts a short SEPTA ride away.

Even in Pennsylvania, Philadelphia is not alone

Philadelphia is the biggest case, not the only one. Reading spent 46% below its adequacy target in 2022-23, while the rest of the Reading metro spent 53% above. Allentown was 17% short while its Lehigh Valley neighbors were 47% over. Harrisburg, York, Lebanon, Erie, Wilkes-Barre and Chester Upland tell the same story.

High-poverty Pennsylvania districts vs. the rest of their metro areas, percent above or below adequacy

The pattern reaches into Philly’s own suburbs. Chester Upland, Upper Darby, William Penn, Norristown and Pottstown are all below adequacy, surrounded by districts in the same four counties that spend about 71% above theirs.

Across the state, 56 of 497 districts spent below their adequacy targets in 2022-23. They enroll 23% of Pennsylvania’s students, but 67% of its Black students and 49% of its Hispanic students, compared to 8% of its white students. Philadelphia accounts for about a third of the students in those districts. Fixing Philly alone would not fix Pennsylvania.

This is the system the Commonwealth Court found unconstitutional in William Penn School District v. Pennsylvania Department of Education in February 2023. The state has since begun phasing in adequacy aid, including $565 million statewide in the 2025-26 budget (WHYY). The gaps above are what that aid is chasing.

From dollars to classrooms: fewer adults per child

School money is mostly people. When a district is short a third of what it needs, the shortfall shows up as fewer teachers, larger classes and missing specialists.

Philadelphia reported 11,103 teachers in 2009-10. By 2013-14 it had 7,645, a 31% cut, while enrollment fell only 17%. From 2012 through 2020, the district ran between 12% and 29% fewer teachers per 100 pupils than its suburbs. That is Gregory Eddie’s world: a full roster of kids, and not enough colleagues to share them with.

Teachers per 100 pupils, Philadelphia vs. suburbs, 2009–2024

The gap has nearly closed since 2021, to 7.3 teachers per 100 pupils in Philadelphia vs. 7.5 in the suburbs in 2023-24, helped by federal pandemic aid and new state money. But parity is not adequacy. A district whose students cost twice as much to serve, by the NECM’s estimate, does not get there with the same staffing ratio as Lower Merion.

Across Philadelphia and its suburbs, adequacy and staffing move together. Districts further above their adequacy targets employ more teachers per child (r = 0.49 in 2022-23). The fitted line implies that if Philadelphia were funded like the average suburb, it would have roughly 0.45 more teachers per 100 pupils, or about 500 more teachers, before accounting for its higher needs at all.

Adequacy vs. teachers per 100 pupils, Philadelphia and suburban districts, 2022-23

Teacher pay: same labor market, different paychecks

Philadelphia and its suburbs hire from the same pool of teachers, often the same graduating classes. So pay comparisons here need no regional cost adjustment. They are apples to apples.

In 2012-13, the average full-time Philadelphia district teacher earned $71,407, about 96% of the suburban average. Then came four years without a contract. By 2016-17, Philly’s average had actually fallen to $67,479 while the suburbs rose to $78,598, a gap of more than $11,000. The district has climbed back since, to $86,664 in 2025-26, but that is still about $7,200 behind the suburbs. Teachers in the city’s charter schools averaged $71,644, roughly three quarters of the suburban figure.

Average teacher salary, Philadelphia SD, Philadelphia charters, and suburbs, 2012-13 to 2025-26

The averages hide where the gap bites. Philadelphia’s current salary scale is competitive in the middle years. Teachers with 5 to 14 years of experience actually earn more than their suburban peers. But the scale flattens at $99,534 after about 15 years. Suburban veterans keep climbing, to a median of about $112,000. A 25-year Philly veteran makes roughly $12,500 less than one in the suburbs.

Median teacher salary by years of experience, 2024-25

That matters for who stays. Philadelphia district teachers average 13.7 years of experience, vs. 15.6 in the suburbs. Charter teachers average 8.9. Every school needs its Barbara Howards. An underfunded system has the hardest time keeping them.

Inside the building: who is actually in front of the kids

Pennsylvania’s own staff records let us look at who is actually in the classroom, through 2024-25. Janine is not the exception at Abbott. In 2024-25, 13.3% of district teachers were in their first or second year in education, vs. 8.8% in the suburbs. In the city’s charters it was 16.4%, and more than a third of charter teachers had been with their school system for two years or less.

The starkest gap is certification. Pennsylvania lets districts fill vacancies with long-term substitutes on emergency permits when they can’t hire a certified teacher. In 2024-25 the School District of Philadelphia held 22.5 of those permits for every 100 classroom teachers. Philly charters held 28.5. The suburbs held 2.7, and the rest of the state 4.3. Philadelphia’s rate jumped from about 2 to 19 per 100 between 2015-16 and 2017-18, during and right after the contract freeze, and has never come back down.

Long-term emergency permits per 100 classroom teachers, 2015-16 to 2024-25

Support staff tell a more complicated story. After the 2013 layoffs left many schools without counselors or nurses, the district rebuilt. In 2024-25 it reported more nurses and psychologists per 1,000 pupils than the suburbs, and nearly as many counselors (3.0 vs. 3.3). That is what recent money bought. But it is rough parity for students with three times the poverty, and some positions never came back. The district reported 9 social worker FTE and 1 librarian for about 120,000 students. The suburbs had about 148 social workers and 342 librarians for 325,000.

Novice teachers, emergency permits, and support staffing, 2024-25: Philadelphia district, Philadelphia charters, suburbs

Teachers are also absent more. In the most recent federal data with that measure, 2017-18, 46% of district teachers missed 10 or more days, vs. 38% in the suburbs.

The show is entertaining. The damage is real.

Abbott Elementary works because its teachers are heroic and funny and stubborn. Real Philadelphia teachers are too. But heroism is not a funding formula. Year after year, the data show the same chain: Pennsylvania’s system leaves Philadelphia, Reading, Allentown, Harrisburg and their peers far below what their students need. That shortfall becomes fewer teachers per child, a pay scale that stops rewarding veterans, more novices and uncertified teachers, and libraries with no librarians.

The Commonwealth Court said in 2023 that this system violates the state constitution. The new adequacy aid is a start, and the recent staffing gains show money does show up in classrooms when it arrives. But a district still roughly $10,000 per child short of adequacy in 2022-23 will not close that gap with a few hundred million dollars spread across the state.

Janine shouldn’t have to fix the copier herself. And the kids in her class shouldn’t have to be in a sitcom for anyone to notice.

Data notes and sources

  • Adequacy: School Finance Indicators Database, District Cost Database 2026 (v6), National Education Cost Model estimates of required spending to reach national-average outcomes. Spending is current spending per pupil, direct to elementary and secondary education, in current dollars. Years are school years (2023 = 2022-23).
  • Suburbs: the 61 regular school districts in Bucks, Chester, Delaware and Montgomery counties, enrollment-weighted unless noted. Metro comparisons for other Pennsylvania cities use Census CBSAs from the NCES Common Core of Data.
  • Staffing: teachers per pupil from the NCES Common Core of Data LEA universe; teacher absences from the Civil Rights Data Collection; both via the Urban Institute Education Data Portal. Philadelphia SD figures cover district-run schools; charters report separately.
  • Classroom staffing and certification: Pennsylvania Department of Education Professional Personnel Individual Staff Report 2024-25 (teacher experience; counselors, psychologists, nurses, social workers and librarians by FTE) and Detailed Emergency Permits by LEA, 2015-16 to 2024-25. Permit-rate method from Research for Action (2025).
  • Teacher pay: Pennsylvania Department of Education, Professional Staff Summary and Professional Personnel Individual Staff reports, full-time classroom teachers.
  • Caveats: NECM estimates are model-based and benchmarked to grade 3–8 math and reading outcomes. Emergency permit rates count long-term substitute permits (Types 01 and 04) per full-time classroom teacher, following Research for Action (2025); a permit is not an FTE, so read them as rates of reliance, not exact shares of classrooms. Teacher absences come from the 2017-18 Civil Rights Data Collection, the latest year with that item.
  • Related: Rachel Wessler’s earlier Shanker Institute reflection on the show, Heartwarming or Heartbreaking; state budget coverage from WHYY.

Human Capital Pays, If You Count the Cost: School Funding, State Growth, and a Diverging America

Three scatterplots of states with rising fitted lines: adequacy 2009-13 against 2019 grade 8 NAEP (+2.1 points per SD); 2003 grade 8 NAEP against the share of adults with a BA (+1.75 points per SD); BA share in 2009 against real income growth 1997-2024 (+0.21 points a year per SD). All adjusted for 1997 income.

Economists around the world treat schooling as an investment in human capital: the skills and knowledge that make people, and economies, productive. The international evidence that this investment pays is about as settled as anything in the field. Yet here in the U.S., we keep having the same argument about whether school money matters.

Here’s what I find across the 50 states. Count the school dollar the usual way, adjusted only for teacher wages, and it tells you nothing useful about economic growth since the 1990s. If anything, it points the wrong way. Count it against what it actually costs to build skills, given the kids a state serves, and the human capital chain appears: adequate funding goes with higher 8th-grade scores, higher scores with more college-educated adults, and more college-educated adults with faster income and GDP growth.

The numbers, per standard deviation across states, holding 1997 income constant:

  • Funding → skills: about +2 NAEP points in 8th grade (2019), +1.2 for low-income students, and a 1.5-point smaller gap between them and their peers.
  • Skills → degrees: +1.75 points more adults with a BA in states that scored higher in 2003.
  • Degrees → growth: +0.21 points a year faster real income growth and +0.43 points a year faster GDP per capita growth over 1997–2024.

Put the wage-adjusted dollar and the cost-adjusted dollar in the same model and they split: adequacy predicts +0.39 points a year faster income growth, wage-adjusted spending −0.31. Same states, same years, opposite answers. The difference is whether you counted cost.

Full policy paper (PDF, 24 pages), with complete data sources, variable definitions, model specifications and results: Investing in Human Capital: Does Long-Run K-12 Investment Fuel State Economic Growth?

Schools are a human capital investment, and the world knows it pays

Years of school pay. Harry Patrinos and George Psacharopoulos have spent decades compiling returns to schooling. Their 2018 review pulls together 1,120 estimates from 139 countries and finds an average private return of about 9% per year of schooling (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2018). Their 2025 follow-up looks only at causal estimates, 182 of them from 55 countries, and the return goes up, to 9.7%, about 38% higher than the correlational estimates (Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 2025).

Learning pays more. One standard deviation higher test scores raises earnings about 15%, roughly one and a half times the value of an extra year of school (Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 2025). Among adults in 23 countries, a standard deviation of numeracy is worth 18% in wages, and the U.S. pays the most for skills, at 28% (Hanushek et al., 2015). With harmonized learning data for 164 countries, human capital explains one-fifth to one-half of income differences across countries (Angrist, Djankov, Goldberg & Patrinos, 2021).

Skills drive growth. Across countries, a standard deviation higher achievement goes with 1.3 to nearly 2 points faster annual growth over decades (Hanushek & Woessmann; Heller-Sahlgren & Jordahl, 2021). Across U.S. states, knowledge capital explains 20–30% of differences in GDP per capita (Hanushek, Ruhose & Woessmann, 2017).

And it can be lost. Pandemic closures cost students about 0.17 of a standard deviation, half a year of learning (Patrinos, Vegas & Carter-Rau, 2022). The World Bank’s new Human Capital Index Plus puts the U.S. at 252 out of 325, below the high-income average and well behind Australia’s 270 (World Bank, 2026).

Here’s the gap. This literature measures human capital outputs with great care. Its school inputs are usually just spending per pupil, adjusted at most for prices. If schooling is an investment, the right question is whether a state spends enough to produce a given level of skills with the students it actually has. That is a cost question.

Four ways to count a school dollar

There are four common ways to count a school dollar, each correcting for more than the last: nominal; inflation-adjusted; labor-cost-adjusted, using a wage index like NCES’s CWIFT; and fully cost-adjusted, comparing spending with what it would cost to reach a common outcome goal given wages, scale and, above all, student needs. Only the fourth asks whether the money is enough for the job. That is what the School Finance Indicators Database’s National Education Cost Model measures. I’ve made this case in Why “Cost” Matters and Efficiently Mediocre.

Brookings’s state-level report (Reber & Goodman, 2025) stops at number three. Student need goes in as a control variable, not as a cost. That treats a dollar spent on a high-poverty student body as worth the same as a dollar spent on a low-poverty one, then controls away the very poverty that makes those dollars unequal. (See Mark Weber’s NEPC review.)

Animated scatterplot of 48 states: against 2019 grade 8 NAEP, wage-adjusted spending shows a flat line (+0.5 points per SD, not significant); measured against the cost of U.S.-average outcomes, the line steepens to +2.1 points per SD.
Same states, same scores. Change how the dollar is counted. Both axes adjusted for 1997 income.

The human capital chain: investment → skills → degrees → growth

The setup is simple. Take state economic outcomes over 1997–2024 from BEA, and compare them with K-12 conditions earlier in the period: wage-adjusted spending from 1993–2002, NECM adequacy from 2009–13, NAEP from 2003, and adult BA attainment. Control for each state’s real income in 1997 so rich states don’t win just for starting rich. Everything is per standard deviation across states, with robust standard errors.

Link 1: investment → skills. A standard deviation of adequacy goes with about 2.1 NAEP points on the 2019 state average, +1.2 for low-income students, and a 1.5-point smaller gap. Wage-adjusted spending: +0.5, not significant. The adequacy link holds with the Northeast dropped (+2.2).

Link 2: skills → degrees. States whose 8th graders scored a standard deviation higher in 2003 have 1.75 points more adults with a BA today, and they added about half a point more BA holders between 2009 and 2024 as those kids grew up.

Link 3: human capital → growth. A standard deviation more BA holders in 2009 goes with 0.21 points a year faster real income growth and 0.43 points faster GDP per capita growth. Higher 2003 NAEP goes with +0.12 and +0.23. Low-income students’ scores predict growth just as well (+0.14 and +0.21), and those estimates survive dropping the energy and resource states.

Three scatterplots of states with rising fitted lines: adequacy against 2019 NAEP (+2.1 points per SD); 2003 NAEP against BA attainment (+1.75 points per SD); BA share in 2009 against real income growth 1997-2024 (+0.21 points a year per SD).
Each dot is a state. Both axes adjusted for 1997 income; lines are OLS fits.

How the state numbers stack up against the world

States differ far less than students do. A standard deviation across states on 2003 NAEP is 6.5 points, about a sixth (0.17) of a student-level standard deviation. Scale the international estimates by that and the state results land right where you’d expect:

Global benchmark, per student SDImplied for 1 state SDWhat I find
Skills → GDP per capita growth+1.3 to +1.86 pts/yr+0.22 to +0.31 pts/yr+0.23 pts/yr
Skills → earnings+15% (Patrinos & Psacharopoulos); +28% in the U.S. (Hanushek et al.)+2.5% to +4.6%About +3.3% higher real income after 27 years
Dollars → skills+0.032 SD per $1,000 for four years (Jackson & Mackevicius, 2024)—About +0.012 SD per $1,000 of adequacy

The growth estimate sits inside the range the cross-country studies predict; +0.23 points a year compounds to a GDP per capita level about 6% higher over 27 years. The funding estimate, per dollar, is about a third of the causal estimate from U.S. school finance evaluations: modest, not inflated. These are rough conversions across different tests, but nothing here is out of line with what the human capital literature would lead you to expect.

Diverging states, diverging futures

Here’s where I want to be blunt. The United States does not have one human capital system. It has fifty, and they are sorting into leaders and laggards.

  • Attainment is diverging. States with more college graduates in 2009 added more of them by 2024. The five most-educated states went from 36% to 46% of adults with a BA; the five least-educated went from 20% to 27%. The gap widened from 16 to 19 points.
  • The economic extremes are pulling apart. Massachusetts’s GDP per capita was 1.6 times Mississippi’s in 1997 and 2.2 times in 2024. For most of the twentieth century, poorer states caught up with richer ones; Ganong and Shoag show that convergence has slowed dramatically over the past three decades.
  • The skills gap between states is an international-scale gap. In the most recent state-by-country comparison, the 2011 NAEP–TIMSS linking study, Massachusetts’s 8th graders scored 561 in math, behind only five of 47 education systems, the closest being Japan. Alabama scored 466, statistically tied with Turkey and Armenia. That 95-point spread is close to a full international standard deviation, a gap that across countries goes with 1.3 to 1.9 points of annual growth.
  • The funding gaps behind it are persistent. States’ adequacy positions barely move over a decade (correlation 0.92). Mississippi spent about half of what its students needed in 2009–13 and was still $9,300 per pupil short in 2021–23, and $25,100 short in its highest-poverty districts.
Tile-grid map of states colored by spending as a share of the cost of reaching U.S.-average outcomes, 2009-13. The Northeast is dark blue (Connecticut 174%, New Jersey 170%, Massachusetts 157%, New York 150%); the South is mostly red (Mississippi 51%, Texas and California 69%, Florida 80%).
Actual spending as a share of the cost of reaching U.S.-average outcomes, 2009–13 (SFID National Education Cost Model).

The knowledge economy concentrates where human capital is. Research universities, technology industries and scientific talent cluster in states with deep pools of skilled workers, and those states draw more of them. If current funding patterns hold, the leading states will keep compounding that advantage. The lagging states will keep producing fewer skilled workers, attracting fewer knowledge industries, and losing many of the graduates they do produce.

Let me be precise about how far this goes. No state is about to become a developing country in income. Mississippi’s GDP per capita, $41,300 in 2024, is far above most of the world’s, propped up by a national labor market and federal transfers. But on skills, our lowest-performing states already score alongside upper-middle-income countries such as Turkey and Armenia, while our highest-performing states compete with Japan. Skills set the ceiling on what an economy can become. A country that draws its scientists, engineers and entrepreneurs from a handful of states is leaving most of its human capital on the table. Because states and localities supply most K-12 funding, the path forward for American economic and scientific development runs through state investment in human capital, measured against what it actually costs to build it.

A note on California. California sits near the bottom of the map above, which shows 2009–13, and it still falls short of adequate funding today, especially in its highest-poverty districts. But in my analyses, no state has improved more since 2009. As I showed in The Red State Miracle That Wasn’t, California’s highest-poverty districts went from 65% to 79% of adequate funding between 2009 and 2024, most of it after the Local Control Funding Formula began phasing in after 2013, though they remain about $5,600 per pupil short. In the state data behind this post, California climbed from 45th of 48 states on adequacy in 2009–13 to the middle of the pack by 2021–23. California is digging out of a very deep hole. The 1978 tax revolt, Proposition 13, capped property taxes at 1% of assessed value and gutted the local revenue that had supplied about two-thirds of school funding.

What this does and doesn’t show

These are cross-state associations, not causal estimates. College graduates move, so a state’s BA share partly reflects whom it attracts. Adequacy is measured in 2009–13, inside the growth window, so faster-growing states may simply have afforded better-funded schools. And required cost reflects student need, which also lowers scores. The paper documents each of these and the robustness checks behind them.

But the stronger designs point the same way. Jackson and Mackevicius (2024) pool U.S. school finance evaluations and find that $1,000 more per pupil for four years raises test scores by 0.032 SD and college-going by 2.8 points. Jackson, Johnson and Persico find that sustained spending increases raise adult wages. And the international lesson from Patrinos and Psacharopoulos is that causal returns to education run higher than correlational ones. If anything, cross-state associations like mine are more likely to understate the human capital return than to invent it.

The bottom line

Around the world, nobody serious doubts that human capital pays. A year of school is worth about 9–10% in earnings, a standard deviation of learning about 15%, and a country’s skills go a long way toward explaining its growth. The U.S. debate gets stuck because it measures the investment badly. Measure it against the cost of building skills, and the return shows up across the states just as it does across countries: funding to skills, skills to degrees, degrees to growth.

The states are not converging; at the top and bottom they are pulling apart. Whether America remains an economic and scientific leader depends on whether every state invests in the human capital of all its children, and especially the children who rely most on public schools, or whether we settle for a few states that lead and many that fall further behind.

Read the full policy paper (PDF): Investing in Human Capital: Does Long-Run K-12 Investment Fuel State Economic Growth? It includes all data sources, variable definitions, model specifications, robustness checks, a full table of results and replication details.

Data: BEA via FRED; School Finance Indicators Database (2026); NCES ACS-CWIFT; NAEP Data Service; ACS. International sources are listed in the paper.

Misinform, Not Inform: The Edunomics Graphs Have No Place in New Jersey’s School Funding Debate

New Jersey edition. Download the full brief: Misinform, Not Inform (PDF).

Two graphics from Marguerite Roza’s Edunomics Lab at Georgetown have been showing up in one state after another. Edunomics publishes a version of each for every state. One shows spending rising and NAEP scores falling since 2013. The other scatters every district by spending and test scores and finds no pattern. Wherever they land, they deliver the same message: the state has poured money into its schools and gotten nothing for it.

It’s only a matter of time before they show up in New Jersey. The New Jersey versions are already sitting on Edunomics’ website, ready to be dropped into testimony, op-eds and budget hearings. So here, in advance, is what’s wrong with them, using New Jersey’s own data.

Let me be blunt. Neither graph belongs in a serious policy conversation. Both are built so they cannot show anything other than “money doesn’t matter.” They are far more likely to misinform legislators, judges, school board members and the public than to inform them. Anyone who puts them in front of New Jersey policymakers as evidence about SFRA should be challenged, directly and publicly.

And none of this is new. I’ve been documenting the same moves in Roza’s work since 2009 (Seventeen Years of Roza-Tinted Glasses). New logo. Same tricks.

Exhibit A: the “long-term trend”

Here’s Edunomics’ New Jersey trend graph (source). Spending up 44% to about $26,300 per pupil. Math and reading down.

Edunomics Lab graph: New Jersey change in spending and NAEP scores since 2013
Edunomics Lab, “New Jersey: Change in Spending and Scores since 2013.” Reproduced for purposes of critique.

Every design choice in this graph pushes in one direction:

  1. The starting year. The clock starts in 2013, the one year that all but guarantees spending up and scores down. More on why that’s deliberate in a moment.
  2. Nominal dollars. The 44% is nominal. The graph’s own inflation line is up 35%. That leaves roughly 7% real growth over a decade, well under 1% a year, and spending tracks inflation almost exactly until the federal pandemic relief years of 2021–2023.
  3. The wrong deflator, and no cost. The CPI is not the price of teachers in New Jersey’s labor market. Nothing here asks who the kids are or what their outcomes cost.
  4. Mismatched years and scales. Spending stops in 2023, scores run through 2024, and percent growth and NAEP points share one axis at an arbitrary exchange rate. Rescale either one and the “divergence” grows or shrinks at will.
  5. No comparison. NAEP fell nationwide after 2019, overwhelmingly in the pandemic years. One state’s spending next to a national decline tells you nothing about whether New Jersey’s dollars mattered.

Why 2013 is intentionally deceitful

“Deceitful” is a strong word. Here’s why it fits.

  1. 2013 is where the scores topped out. Anyone who works with NAEP knows 2013 is the point where scores nationally leveled off and started to turn down. Start there and almost any state shows flat or falling scores afterward, no matter what it spent.
  2. 2013 is where the spending cuts hit bottom. By 2013 the recession-era cuts had run their course and per-pupil spending sat near the bottom of the trough. Start there and almost any state shows spending “rising,” even when it’s just recovering lost ground and keeping up with inflation.
  3. Put those together and the conclusion is built in. Top of the scores, bottom of the spending: the divergence is manufactured by the baseline. Edunomics’ tool makes this graph for every state, and it shows the same picture in nearly all of them. That’s the tell. The conclusion comes from the starting year, not from anything about New Jersey.
  4. Earlier years were available and left out. State NAEP in reading and math goes back to 2003 for every state. Start in 2009 or 2011 and you’d see what happened first in New Jersey: spending fell from 132% to 111% of the estimated cost of Massachusetts-average outcomes in two years. A baseline that hides the cuts is a choice.
  5. They’ve been told, repeatedly and in public. I’ve laid this out on social media, on this blog and in a video critique. The 2013 start stays. A misleading choice made once can be a mistake. Keeping it after being told exactly why it misleads is not.

Measure spending against what outcomes actually cost and the story flips. New Jersey’s spending fell from 115% of the estimated cost of Massachusetts-average outcomes in 2013 to 98% in 2024, and from 172% to 147% of the cost of national-average outcomes. The system got less progressive too: districts with 30% child poverty went from 18% more state and local revenue per pupil than districts with none to 9% more, and from 9% more teachers per pupil to 17% fewer.

New Jersey spending as a percent of the NECM estimated cost of national- and Massachusetts-average outcomes, 2009 to 2024, with 2013 marked
School Finance Indicators Database, NECM district data merged with SEDA outcomes, 449 New Jersey districts.

Exhibit B: the “clouds of doubt”

Edunomics’ New Jersey scatter plots each district’s 2024–25 per-pupil expenditure against 2024–25 NJSLA proficiency, crosshairs at the averages (source). Their companion worksheet tells users to go find the schools that spend more but get lower outcomes than similar peers.

Edunomics Lab scatterplot of New Jersey districts, FY24-25 expenditure vs. 4th grade proficiency
Edunomics Lab, “New Jersey Districts FY24-25 Expenditure vs SY24-25 4th Grade Proficiency” (Tableau Public). Reproduced for purposes of critique, with attribution as Edunomics requests.

Look at their own colors. The highest-poverty districts, in red and orange, cluster below average proficiency, many of them to the right of average spending. The graph literally displays the pattern that cost explains, then invites you to read it as waste.

Spending is what a school spends. Cost is what it would take to reach a given outcome with the kids it actually serves, in the labor market it actually hires from. Efficiency is the gap between the two. No cost, no efficiency claim. A raw scatter can’t tell you anything about waste (Efficiently Mediocre). What it does do is take the districts furthest below what their kids need and paint a target on them.

Nationally, same districts, same scores: raw spending and outcomes correlate at −0.08. Spending relative to the cost of national-average outcomes correlates at +0.59.

National districts: raw spending vs scores r = -0.08; spending relative to cost vs scores r = +0.59
National Education Cost Model, 8,000+ districts in 38 states, 2022–2024.

New Jersey’s own school-level cost model shows the same reversal. In 2024, raw spending correlates with outcomes at −0.17. Spending relative to the cost of current statewide average outcomes correlates at +0.39.

New Jersey schools, 2024: raw spending vs outcomes and spending relative to cost vs outcomes
New Jersey state-specific school cost model, 2,310 schools, 2024. Blue: highest-poverty fifth of schools.

Here’s why. The highest-poverty fifth of New Jersey schools does spend the most per pupil, about $22,600 at the median. But getting those kids to today’s statewide average outcomes would cost about $28,000. They’re at 82% of cost. The lowest-poverty fifth spends about $20,400 against a cost of $17,700: 114%. Of the schools sitting in Edunomics’ “spends more, scores lower” corner, two-thirds spend less than their outcomes would cost, and their median low-income share is 55%, against 24% statewide.

What New Jersey’s evidence actually says

New Jersey's 449 districts, 2024: spending relative to the cost of Massachusetts-average outcomes vs outcomes, correlation 0.67
School Finance Indicators Database, NECM district data merged with SEDA outcomes, 2024.
  • Across New Jersey’s 449 districts, spending relative to cost and outcomes move together (r = 0.67).
  • Money buys more in New Jersey, not less: within states, the payoff to spending relative to cost is about 1.2 in New Jersey, Connecticut and Massachusetts, against 0.44 in Florida and 0.70 in Texas.
  • The highest-poverty fifth of districts spent 72% of the cost of Massachusetts-average outcomes in 2024, down from 91% in 2009. The lowest-poverty fifth spent 122%.
  • Two independent cost models, the NECM and New Jersey’s own school-level model (NJPP, 2025), agree at 0.72 on spending relative to cost and 0.95 on outcomes. Neither shows high-poverty districts swimming in excess resources.

Bottom line

These graphs do not inform New Jersey’s SFRA debate. They misinform it. They shouldn’t be cited in testimony, budget hearings, litigation or school board training. If someone puts them in front of you, ask two questions out loud: Why 2013? And where is the cost adjustment?

Further reading: Seventeen Years of Roza-Tinted Glasses · Efficiently Mediocre (and the full paper) · Transcript of Video Critiquing Edunomics Graphs

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