The Education States that will Lead the Way

U.S. map classifying states as Leading, Close behind, or Not there yet on school funding adequacy and NAEP performance

In my last post I described the Dependent States of America: the states, mostly red, whose schools lean most heavily on federal aid, in many cases because they have chosen to underinvest in their own children. This post looks at the other end of the spectrum. These are the states that fund their schools adequately, including the schools serving the poorest children, and that perform well. And they include the states that, after letting their school funding collapse in the Great Recession, eventually chose to reinvest.

In an earlier working paper, I called these the Education States. They are states where courts have been willing to uphold and enforce education rights, where legislators and governors have funded those rights whether a court ordered them to or not, and which are now positioned to protect their own students while the federal government retreats. I noted then that the Education States are not exclusively blue or northern. The data bear that out, though not by much.

Measuring an Education State

I use three measures. The first two come from the School Finance Indicators Database (SFID), 2026 release, which covers school years through 2023. Funding adequacy compares what districts actually spend per pupil with what our National Education Cost Model estimates they would need to spend to reach national average test scores, given their students’ needs and regional costs. A ratio of 1.00 means spending is exactly adequate; 0.75 means districts spend three-quarters of what they need. I look at adequacy statewide and in each state’s highest-poverty fifth of districts, because a state can be well funded on average while its poorest districts are left behind. The third measure is performance: each state’s 2024 NAEP scores in grade 4 and grade 8 reading and math, expressed as standard deviations above or below the national public school average.

From these, I sort states into three groups:

  • Leading: adequate funding statewide and in high-poverty districts (both ratios at or above 1.00), with NAEP performance at or above the national average.
  • Close behind: adequate statewide, high-poverty districts at 85% of adequate or better, and NAEP at or above, or within 0.10 standard deviation of, the national average.
  • Not there yet: everyone else.
U.S. map classifying states as Leading, Close behind, or Not there yet on school funding adequacy and NAEP performance

Six states lead: Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Wyoming and North Dakota. Eleven more are close behind, including New York, Maine, Rhode Island, Minnesota, Washington, Colorado, California and Illinois, along with Kansas, Nebraska and Montana. The remaining 31, including nearly the entire South, are not there yet, though several of them are moving in the right direction. (Alaska, Hawaii and Vermont aren’t rated, because the cost model can’t produce reliable estimates for them.)

Funding and performance go together, though not perfectly. Across states, the correlation between statewide adequacy and NAEP performance is about 0.45. Every leading state performs above the national average, with Massachusetts (+0.27 SD) and New Jersey (+0.18) at the top.

The Great Divergence

The Great Recession hit every state’s school budget. What separates the Education States from the rest is what happened next.

Line chart of funding adequacy in high-poverty districts, 2009 to 2023, by 2024 presidential result: Democratic-leaning states recovered to about 1.0 while Republican-leaning states stayed near 0.6

Nationally, adequacy in high-poverty districts fell from 0.79 in 2009 to 0.66 by 2013. Those districts spent, on average, about two-thirds of what they needed. In the states Harris carried by 10 points or more, high-poverty adequacy dropped from 0.95 to 0.76 at its 2013 low. Then those states climbed back steadily, reaching 0.96 by 2019, before any federal pandemic aid arrived, and about 1.00 by 2023. In the states Trump carried by 10 or more, high-poverty adequacy fell from an already low 0.63 to 0.52, crept back only to 0.56 by 2019, and stood at 0.62 in 2023, still below where it was in 2009.

In other words, the gap between blue and red states’ highest-poverty districts was wide before the recession (about 0.32) and wider after the recovery (about 0.40 in 2019). Both groups cut their effort. In 48 of the 50 states with data, state and local school revenue is a smaller share of personal income today than in 2008; only Illinois and Hawaii are exceptions. But the median solidly Democratic state’s effort fell from 4.3% to 3.8%, while the median Lean R state’s fell from 3.8% to 2.4%, a decline of more than a third.

2024 resultStatesStatewide adequacy, 2023High-poverty adequacy, 2009Post-recession lowHigh-poverty adequacy, 2023Effort, 2008 → 2023NAEP 2024Leading / Close behind
Solid R (R+10 or more)240.820.630.520.624.3% → 3.5%0.002 / 3
Lean R (R+2 to 10)40.770.590.520.583.8% → 2.4%−0.050 / 0
Toss-up (margin under 2)31.130.640.560.694.8% → 4.1%+0.030 / 0
Lean D (D+2 to 10)61.311.050.881.054.5% → 3.6%+0.012 / 2
Solid D (D+10 or more)141.240.950.761.004.3% → 3.8%0.002 / 6
United States511.010.790.660.834.3% → 3.6%0.006 / 11
Adequacy = actual current spending per pupil ÷ spending required to reach national average test scores (SFID National Education Cost Model); 1.00 = exactly adequate. Group values are enrollment-weighted (pooled); high-poverty = each state’s highest-poverty fifth of districts. Post-recession low is the lowest value between 2010 and 2016. Effort = state and local school revenue as a share of personal income, median state. NAEP 2024 = average of grade 4 and 8 reading and math, in national standard deviations from the national public average, simple mean across states. Leading / Close behind = number of states in each group. Adequacy not estimated for Alaska, Hawaii or Vermont. Sources: School Finance Indicators Database (2026 release); NAEP; FEC 2024 certified results.

The pattern by political leaning is stark. In states Harris carried, by any margin, high-poverty districts are funded at or near adequate levels on average. In states Trump carried by any margin, they are funded at about 60% of adequate, and that hasn’t changed in fifteen years. The three toss-up states, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, look like their politics: adequately funded on average but with their poorest districts well short, at 0.69.

Average NAEP performance by group is close to the national average across the board. That is partly because group averages blend high and low performers, and partly because performance depends on much more than funding, including child poverty, which is higher in many red states. It’s not that funding doesn’t matter. The leading states all outperform. But money is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one.

The Education States, by name

StateStatewide adequacyHigh-poverty adequacy: 2009 → low → 2023EffortNAEPRein­vested2024 margin
Leading
Wyoming1.802.10 → 1.78 → 1.933.71%+0.15R+45.8
New Hampshire2.071.45 → 1.31 → 1.543.34%+0.16YesD+2.8
New Jersey1.691.38 → 1.10 → 1.265.16%+0.18D+5.9
Massachusetts1.541.36 → 0.99 → 1.153.23%+0.27D+25.2
North Dakota1.330.90 → 0.71 → 1.123.51%+0.09YesR+36.5
Connecticut1.571.36 → 1.13 → 1.074.07%+0.11D+14.5
Close behind
New York1.461.22 → 1.00 → 1.095.02%−0.03D+12.6
Maine1.561.11 → 0.93 → 1.093.73%−0.07D+6.9
Washington1.350.74 → 0.66 → 0.963.38%+0.04YesD+18.2
Rhode Island1.321.04 → 0.82 → 0.943.82%0.00D+13.8
Colorado1.160.73 → 0.56 → 0.923.04%+0.14YesD+11.0
Minnesota1.180.78 → 0.74 → 0.923.47%+0.10D+4.2
Kansas1.140.99 → 0.76 → 0.914.16%0.00R+16.1
Montana1.070.75 → 0.71 → 0.912.76%+0.09YesR+19.9
Nebraska1.130.92 → 0.87 → 0.893.69%+0.03R+20.5
California1.090.59 → 0.46 → 0.894.03%−0.08YesD+20.1
Illinois1.140.69 → 0.66 → 0.874.68%+0.05YesD+10.9
Adequacy and effort are for 2023; NAEP is 2024, in standard deviations from the national public average. Leading: statewide and high-poverty adequacy both at or above 1.00, and NAEP at or above the national average. Close behind: statewide adequacy at or above 1.00, high-poverty adequacy at least 0.85, and NAEP within 0.10 SD of the national average or above it. Reinvested: high-poverty adequacy gained at least 0.15 from its 2010–2016 low, had already gained at least 0.08 by 2019 (before pandemic aid), and by 2023 exceeded its 2009 level. Row shading shows 2024 presidential leaning: solid red/blue = margin of 10+ points; pale red/blue = 2 to 10 points. Sources: School Finance Indicators Database (2026 release); NAEP 2024; FEC 2024 certified results.
Scatterplot of state and local school funding effort against statewide funding adequacy in 2023, with states colored by 2024 presidential result; low-effort, low-adequacy states are mostly Republican-leaning

Effort explains a good share of the difference. Across the 47 states with estimates (excluding DC), state and local effort and statewide adequacy are correlated at about 0.40. Of the 23 states putting in less than the median effort (3.6% of personal income), 17 voted for Trump, and only 8 fund their schools adequately statewide. Of the 24 at or above the median, 18 do. Twenty-one states fall below adequacy statewide, and 19 of them voted for Trump. The exceptions run in both directions. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Washington and Colorado reach adequacy with below-median effort because they are wealthy. Georgia, South Carolina and New Mexico put in above-median effort and still fall short, because their capacity is lower and their needs are higher. But the lower-left corner of the chart, low effort and inadequate funding, belongs almost entirely to Republican-leaning states: Florida, Arizona, North Carolina, Nevada, Idaho, Tennessee and Oklahoma.

Of the 17 leading and close-behind states, 12 voted for Harris and five for Trump. The red Education States fall into two types. Wyoming and North Dakota are small, energy-rich states that can fund adequate schools without exceptional effort. Wyoming’s effort has actually fallen from 5.8% of personal income in 2008 to 3.7%, but its funding is built on decades of court-enforced adequacy under the Campbell County decisions. Kansas, Nebraska and Montana are more traditional Plains states with long-standing commitments to their public schools. Kansas, in particular, was pulled back by its courts. After deep cuts under Governor Brownback, the Gannon litigation forced a multi-year reinvestment that the Kansas Supreme Court finally approved in 2019. Its high-poverty adequacy, stuck at 0.75 as late as 2019, reached 0.91 by 2023.

Nor is being blue enough. Maryland (high-poverty adequacy 0.71), Virginia (0.68), New Mexico (0.67) and Delaware (0.98, but with NAEP well below average) are all “not there yet.” And several of the leading states have slipped. Connecticut’s high-poverty districts went from 1.36 in 2009 to 1.07, and New Jersey’s from 1.38 to 1.26. Both are still adequate, but the margin is narrower than it was.

The states that eventually reinvested

The most hopeful part of the story is the states that hit bottom after the recession and then chose to rebuild, mostly through new funding formulas, often prompted by litigation, and mostly well before federal pandemic aid arrived.

  • California adopted the Local Control Funding Formula in 2013, directing additional funding to low-income students and English learners. High-poverty adequacy rose from 0.46 in 2012 to 0.74 by 2019 and 0.89 by 2023, the largest gain of any state.
  • Washington, under the state supreme court’s 2012 McCleary decision, overhauled its funding in 2017 and 2018. High-poverty adequacy rose from 0.66 to 0.96.
  • Illinois replaced one of the nation’s most regressive systems with its Evidence-Based Funding formula in 2017, and is one of only two states whose effort is higher now than in 2008. High-poverty adequacy rose from 0.66 to 0.87.
  • Oregon passed the Student Success Act in 2019. High-poverty adequacy rose from 0.63 to 0.99 by 2019 and stood at 0.94 in 2023.
  • Colorado rose from 0.56 to 0.92 even before eliminating its “budget stabilization factor” in 2024. That change isn’t yet in these data.
  • Massachusetts and New Jersey, both already adequate, recommitted through the Student Opportunity Act (2019) and New Jersey’s 2018 school funding reform (S2), respectively, reversing post-recession erosion.

A second wave of reinvestment is too recent to show fully in data that end in 2023. Kansas is one example. Maryland’s Blueprint for Maryland’s Future, enacted in 2021, has moved high-poverty adequacy from 0.53 in 2019 to 0.71. New Mexico, responding to the 2018 Yazzie/Martinez ruling, has moved from 0.48 to 0.67. Michigan’s 2023 budgets began to fund its new Opportunity Index. Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth Court declared the state’s system unconstitutional in 2023, and the legislature has begun adding adequacy funding. Whether these states become Education States depends on whether they sustain the effort.

Not every state that recovered deserves the credit. Arizona, Tennessee, South Dakota and Missouri also improved high-poverty adequacy from their post-recession lows, but their effort kept falling. Arizona’s dropped from 3.7% of personal income in 2008 to 2.4%, and Tennessee’s from 3.4% to 2.7%. Their gains came from economic growth, not renewed commitment, and several are now expanding universal vouchers that will pull money away from the public districts these figures describe. Utah is the more convincing case: its high-poverty districts are now at 0.94 of adequate and its students outperform the national average by 0.15 SD.

Then there are the states that never came back. Florida’s high-poverty adequacy is lower now (0.70) than in 2009 (0.76), and its effort has fallen from 3.8% to 2.2%, the lowest in the country. North Carolina (0.61 to 0.55; effort 3.6% to 2.4%) and Texas (0.56 to 0.52) followed the same path. Iowa, whose high-poverty districts were adequately funded in 2009 (1.01), has slid to 0.82.

Leading the way

The Great Recession was a natural experiment in political will. Every state took a hit. Some states rebuilt, usually because courts insisted or because legislatures and governors decided their poorest children deserved better. Others took the opportunity to cut taxes and never looked back. Fifteen years later, the result is two countries: one where children in high-poverty districts attend schools funded at roughly the level needed to reach national average outcomes, and one where they attend schools funded at about 60% of that level.

The Education States now carry a double burden. In the short term, they must protect their own students from a federal administration that is withholding funds, dismantling the Department of Education and targeting equity itself. That means backfilling lost federal aid, building their own data capacity as NCES and IES are hollowed out, setting aside reserves (as I’ve proposed, through federally tax-exempt education endowments), and closing the door to publicly funded religious and discriminatory schooling by tightening charter oversight before the courts force it open.

In the longer term, they are the model for Project 2029. The states that reinvested after the recession show that the decline is a choice and can be reversed. They also show what reversing it takes: a cost-based formula, a commitment of state revenue, and in most cases a court willing to hold the state to its constitution. A federal foundation aid formula of the kind we’ve proposed would ask every state to do what California, Washington, Illinois and Kansas did, with federal help for states whose capacity genuinely falls short. The Education States have already shown the rest of the country the way. The question is whether the rest of the country will follow.


Data notes

  • Adequacy, effort and spending figures are from the School Finance Indicators Database, State Indicators Database, 2026 release (school years through 2023). Adequacy is actual current spending per pupil divided by required spending per pupil, estimated by the SFID National Education Cost Model to reach national average test scores. The model doesn’t produce estimates for Alaska, Hawaii, or Vermont after 2016, and SFID advises caution in interpreting New York’s estimates.
  • 2020 to 2023 spending includes some federal pandemic relief (ESSER) funds, which raise adequacy in absolute terms in those years. For that reason, the reinvestment test requires that recovery was already under way by 2019. Effort is a strictly state and local measure and is unaffected.
  • Group adequacy figures are enrollment-weighted, pooling all states in each group. Effort and NAEP group figures are median and simple mean across states, respectively. Effort is state and local school revenue as a share of aggregate personal income.
  • NAEP performance is the average of 2024 grade 4 and grade 8 reading and math scale scores, each expressed as the difference from the national public school average divided by the national standard deviation (NAEP Data Service).
  • Political leaning is based on the statewide popular-vote margin in the 2024 presidential election (FEC certified results). Solid = 10 points or more; Lean = 2 to 10 points; Toss-up = under 2 points.
  • Baker, B. D., Di Carlo, M., & Weber, M. (2026). The Adequacy and Fairness of State School Finance Systems (8th ed.). Albert Shanker Institute, University of Miami and Rutgers Graduate School of Education.

The Dependent States of America

U.S. map of federal revenue as a percent of total public school revenue by state, FY 2024. Highest: Mississippi 22.7%, Alaska 21.0%, New Mexico 19.7%. Lowest: New Jersey 6.3%. U.S. average 11.6%.

We like to think of our public schools as locally controlled and state funded, with Washington playing a bit part. Nationally, that’s roughly right. In fiscal year 2024, according to the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of School System Finances, public school systems took in about $995 billion, of which about $115 billion, or 11.6%, came from federal sources.

But that national average hides a very different country. In some states, federal aid is a rounding error in school budgets. In others, more than one of every five dollars flowing to local public schools comes from Washington. Welcome to the Dependent States of America.

Mapping dependence

The measure that matters here is dependence: federal revenue as a share of each state’s total school revenue. It tells us how much a state’s schools would be exposed if federal aid were cut, frozen, or weaponized, and how much leverage Washington has (or could have) over what happens in those schools.

U.S. map of federal revenue as a percent of total public school revenue by state, FY 2024. Highest: Mississippi 22.7%, Alaska 21.0%, New Mexico 19.7%. Lowest: New Jersey 6.3%. U.S. average 11.6%.

Mississippi tops the list, with 22.7% of school revenue coming from federal sources, followed by Alaska (21.0%), New Mexico (19.7%), South Dakota (19.4%), Louisiana (19.2%) and West Virginia (18.4%). At the other end, New Jersey’s schools draw only 6.3% of their revenue from Washington, with Utah, Minnesota, Connecticut and Massachusetts all around 8%.

The politics of dependence

It won’t surprise many readers that the Dependent States of America lean heavily red. Sorting states by the 2024 presidential result (using FEC certified state returns):

2024 presidential resultStatesFederal share of total school revenueMedian state
Trump-won3113.5%13.9%
Harris-won (incl. DC)209.7%9.6%
Solid R (R+10 or more)2413.9%15.0%
Lean R (R+2 to 10)414.8%15.5%
Toss-up (margin under 2)310.7%10.9%
Lean D (D+2 to 10)68.6%8.3%
Solid D (D+10 or more)149.9%10.3%
United States5111.6%11.8%
Group shares are pooled (group federal revenue ÷ group total revenue). Rows are shaded by 2024 presidential leaning: solid red = R+10 or more; pale red = R+2 to 10 (Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, North Carolina); pale purple = toss-up, margin under 2 points (Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin); pale blue = D+2 to 10 (Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Virginia); solid blue = D+10 or more (including DC). Sources: Census Bureau, FY 2024 Annual Survey of School System Finances; FEC 2024 certified results.

Schools in states Trump carried draw 13.5 cents of every revenue dollar from Washington, compared with 9.7 cents in states Harris carried, about 40% more reliance. Dependence rises with the margin: across states, the correlation between Trump’s 2024 margin and the federal share of school revenue is about 0.55 (excluding DC). Nine of the ten most dependent states voted for Trump (New Mexico being the exception). Nine of the ten least dependent voted for Harris (Utah being the exception).

Dependent by circumstance, or by choice?

Here’s the important part. The Dependent States of America are not dependent because Washington is especially generous to them. Federal dollars per pupil are about the same in Trump-won states ($2,403) as in Harris-won states ($2,598). What differs is the denominator. State and local revenue averages about $15,400 per pupil in Trump-won states, compared with about $24,300 in Harris-won states. A similar federal contribution simply makes up a much larger slice of a much thinner budget.

And that thinner budget is not only a function of being poorer. As I lay out in a recent working paper, state wealth and income account for about half, or less, of the variation in how adequately states fund their schools. The rest is effort, or the lack of it. Forty-one states now devote a smaller share of their economies to K-12 schools than they did before the 2007-09 recession. Some states, like Mississippi, have so little capacity that even average effort would leave them well short. Others, like Florida and Arizona, could raise enough on their own simply by exerting average effort. They choose not to.

Both kinds of states show up among the Dependent States of America. New Mexico, West Virginia and Alaska exert above-average effort and remain highly dependent anyway; they are dependent largely by circumstance. Arizona (18.1% federal), North Carolina (17.4%), Tennessee (15.9%) and Florida (15.3%) are dependent substantially by choice: very low-effort states leaning on federal aid, several of them while cutting taxes and expanding private school vouchers. And there’s a bitter irony here. Many of the states most dependent on federal aid today are the same states that, during the civil rights era, adopted “antiregulation” acts, using state aid and local tax policy to shield districts that refused federal desegregation mandates.

Low effort, high dependence

To separate circumstance from choice, the table below lists every state that both puts in below-average effort (state and local school revenue as a share of personal income) and draws an above-average share of its school revenue from Washington.

StateState & local effort
(% of personal income)
EffortFederal share of revenue2024 leaning (margin)
Mississippi3.49%Below avg.22.7%Solid R (R+22.9)
South Dakota2.75%Very low19.4%Solid R (R+29.2)
Louisiana3.71%Near avg.19.2%Solid R (R+22.0)
Arizona2.41%Very low18.1%Lean R (R+5.5)
Montana2.74%Very low17.8%Solid R (R+19.9)
North Carolina2.43%Very low17.4%Lean R (R+3.2)
Kentucky3.67%Near avg.17.1%Solid R (R+30.5)
Tennessee2.81%Very low15.9%Solid R (R+29.7)
Wyoming3.69%Near avg.15.5%Solid R (R+45.8)
North Dakota3.73%Near avg.15.4%Solid R (R+36.5)
Florida2.35%Very low15.3%Solid R (R+13.1)
Arkansas3.58%Below avg.14.7%Solid R (R+30.6)
Oklahoma3.26%Below avg.13.9%Solid R (R+34.3)
Nevada3.07%Below avg.13.6%Lean R (R+3.1)
Texas3.48%Below avg.13.4%Solid R (R+13.7)
Hawaii3.69%Near avg.13.1%Solid D (D+23.1)
Rhode Island3.63%Near avg.12.7%Solid D (D+13.8)
Wisconsin3.58%Below avg.11.9%Toss-up (R+0.9)
Idaho2.86%Very low11.7%Solid R (R+36.5)
United States3.73%11.6%
States with below-average effort and above-average federal share, sorted by federal share. Rows are shaded by 2024 presidential leaning: solid red = R+10 or more; pale red = R+2 to 10; pale purple = toss-up (margin under 2 points); pale blue = D+2 to 10; solid blue = D+10 or more. Effort tiers: very low = under 3.0%; below average = 3.0 to 3.59%; near average = 3.6% to the U.S. average of 3.73%. Effort = FY 2024 state and local school revenue ÷ 2023 personal income. DC excluded (see data notes). Sources: Census Bureau FY 2024 Annual Survey of School System Finances, Tables 1 and 19; FEC 2024 certified results.

Nineteen states meet both conditions, and 17 of them voted for Trump in 2024. The two Harris-won states on the list, Hawaii and Rhode Island, sit just below the national effort average. All seven states with very low effort voted for Trump: Florida (2.35%), Arizona (2.41%), North Carolina (2.43%), Montana, South Dakota, Tennessee and Idaho. Florida, Arizona and North Carolina devote only about two-thirds of the national average share of personal income to their schools, yet each draws more than 15% of its school revenue from federal sources. Mississippi is a different case. Its effort is modestly below average, but its capacity is so low that average effort alone would not get it close to adequacy.

Every state in this table falls below the 4%-of-personal-income effort floor in our federal formula simulation (described below). Under that design, each would have to raise its own effort before receiving gap-closing federal aid.

So what should federal policy do with the Dependent States of America? Two things: allocate aid toward adequacy, and attach meaningful strings.

Allocating federal aid toward adequacy

Federal aid today is layered on top of 50 separate state systems and targeted mainly on child poverty through programs like Title I and IDEA. It helps, but it does little to close either the gaps between adequately and inadequately funded states or the gaps between high- and low-need districts within states. Even during the period of elevated pandemic aid, the highest-poverty districts in southeastern states received the most federal money and the largest federal share, yet their total revenue remained woefully inadequate.

With my colleagues Matthew Di Carlo and Mark Weber, I’ve proposed a different approach: a new federal foundation aid formula that treats the federal government as the top layer of a national school finance system. It works much the way a good state formula works:

  1. Set an adequacy target for every district, using a national education cost model to estimate the per-pupil spending needed to reach common outcome goals (in our simulation, a modest goal: national average reading and math outcomes), adjusted for student needs and regional costs.
  2. Require a minimum state and local effort, in our simulation 3.5% of gross state product or 4% of aggregate personal income, roughly the national average.
  3. Direct that state and local revenue toward the districts furthest below adequacy.
  4. Have federal aid fill whatever gap remains, but only once a state has done its part.

In our proof-of-concept simulation, universal adequacy would require roughly $52 billion in additional federal aid per year, targeted to districts in 34 states, along with about $80 billion in additional state and local fair-share investment. Full participation would reduce the share of students in inadequately funded districts from about 55% to zero and shrink the funding gap between the highest- and lowest-poverty districts by more than 60%.

The effort requirement matters most for the Dependent States of America. Low-capacity states like Mississippi would receive substantially more help once they reach the effort floor, because their gaps genuinely exceed what they can raise. Low-effort states like Florida, Arizona, North Carolina and Tennessee would have to raise their own effort before receiving gap-closing aid. Federal dependence would stop being a subsidy for choosing not to try. And there’s no reason this logic must be limited to new money. The same framework could guide the distribution of the roughly $115 billion in federal revenue already flowing to schools.

Applying pressure where dependence is greatest

When one fifth of a state’s school revenue comes from Washington, Washington has both a stake and a lever. We’ve used that lever before. Southern states were required to adopt education articles in their constitutions as a condition for readmission to the Union after the Civil War. A century later, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 put real federal money on the table, and the threat of losing it gave teeth to desegregation enforcement. The federal government is again using that lever, but in the opposite direction, threatening to withhold aid from schools and states that pursue equity.

A future federal role should apply the lever deliberately, and most firmly where dependence is greatest. Conditions attached to federal aid should include:

  • Civil rights protections for all children. Full compliance with Title VI, Title IX, IDEA and Section 504, and with the obligation to educate every child regardless of immigration status. Any provider receiving public funds, including charter and voucher-receiving schools, must be bound by the same nondiscrimination requirements.
  • Common national goals. Shared outcome goals and measures, broader than reading and math scores and including preparation for postsecondary education, the workforce and civic life, that define what adequate funding must accomplish and drive the cost estimates behind the formula. These are national goals, not a national curriculum; achieving them would require revisiting long-standing statutory limits on federal direction of curriculum, and states would retain authority over how to meet them.
  • Minimum effort and no backsliding. States should not be able to eliminate the primary tax sources funding their schools, as Mississippi has proposed with its income tax and Florida with property taxes, or divert public funds to private schools, while drawing federal aid to backfill the hole.
  • Enforceable education rights. Every state constitution includes an education article, but enforcement by state courts has been uneven at best. Federal aid should come with pressure to make those rights real.
  • Transparent data. School-level spending and broader outcome reporting, supported by a rebuilt, not dismantled, National Center for Education Statistics and Institute of Education Sciences.

There are legal limits. Spending Clause conditions must be clearly stated, related to the purpose of the funds, and not so severe that they amount to coercion. That argues for attaching new conditions to new adequacy aid, phased in over time, rather than threatening to pull existing funds overnight. But the principle stands: the more a state’s schools depend on federal dollars, the stronger the federal interest in ensuring those schools serve every child, to common standards, under the protection of the law.

Whose rights? Children’s, not parental preferences

There’s another reason the Dependent States of America deserve federal attention. Several of them are where public money now follows parental preference with the fewest strings attached. Arizona, at 18.1% federal and among the lowest-effort states in the country, has made every school-age child eligible for an Empowerment Scholarship Account since 2022. Under its statute, a parent’s signature on the account agreement counts as compulsory school attendance. The law requires no testing and no curricular approval, and it measures no learning. Florida’s universal program requires a norm-referenced test, but funding turns on submitting the test, not on the score. Idaho’s high court has upheld that state’s private education tax credit, and Wyoming’s has cleared its education savings accounts to operate. All four states appear in the low-effort, high-dependence table above.

As I explain in Not the Mere Creature of Anyone (full working paper), for a century the Supreme Court has asked how much control parents may exercise over their children’s schooling, and almost never what the child is owed. Since 2017, the doctrine has converged on a single result: parental authority, underwritten by public money and increasingly insulated from public conditions. Carson v. Makin requires a state that funds any private option to fund religious ones. Mahmoud v. Taylor and Mirabelli v. Bonta make parental religious objection a powerful claim inside the public schools that remain. And on November 3, the Court hears St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, which asks whether states may attach neutral conditions to the money at all.

Consider, as I did in Experimenting With Our Children, the student in Phoenix who turns 18 having been failed by her account-funded education. She can’t sue her parents; courts have long refused to recognize a duty of care for academic outcomes. She can’t sue the state under the federal Constitution; education is not a fundamental federal right, and the state generally owes no duty to protect a child from harm by a private actor, including a parent. And state courts reviewing universal voucher and account programs have increasingly asked whether the money harms the public system, not whether any individual child is being educated. She is the one party to the arrangement with no rights of her own.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters told us that the child “is not the mere creature of the State.” True. But neither is she the mere creature of her parents. And Pierce struck a bargain that is too often forgotten: parents could leave the public schools, but the state kept the power to reasonably regulate all schools, to inspect and examine them, and to require studies essential to good citizenship. Federal aid can and should reinforce the state’s side of that bargain. Any state that spends public money, its own or Washington’s, on private schooling or home education should, as a condition of federal aid, adopt what I call Children’s Recourse:

  • Register every school-age child, in every setting, so no child disappears from public view.
  • Assess learning, not attendance or receipts, paired with remediation and, after repeated failure, a required change of educational setting.
  • Keep every child in periodic contact with a mandated reporter, such as a teacher, nurse or counselor, and review any withdrawal from school while child-protection concerns are open.
  • Attach neutral accountability conditions to every public dollar: assessment participation, public reporting of outcomes and finances, nondiscrimination in admissions, including on the basis of disability, and audits. To survive Carson and Fulton, these must apply to all providers alike, without discretionary exemptions.
  • Give older students a voice in decisions about their own schooling, the question Justice Douglas asked in his Yoder dissent and the Court has never answered.
  • End the fiction that a funding contract is an education, repealing provisions like Arizona’s that deem a signed account agreement to be school attendance.

None of these measures requires any family to profess anything, and none prescribes a culture or a creed. They ask only that someone be answerable to the child whose public education dollars are being spent. And they rest on the strongest ground available: state constitutional education clauses, which courts in Kentucky, Wyoming, New Hampshire and Washington have read as conferring an individual, even fundamental, right on each child. A right held by the child doesn’t stay behind when the child leaves the public system. It follows her, and so should the state’s duty, and the federal government’s interest, in seeing that she is actually educated.

From the Dependent States of America to Project 2029

None of this will happen under the current federal administration, which is dismantling the Department of Education, clawing back appropriated funds and greenlighting states already eroding their own public schools. In the short term, the work falls to what I’ve called the Education States, which are not exclusively blue or northern (Kansas qualifies), to protect their own students: backfilling threatened federal aid with state funds, much as southern states once used state aid to resist civil rights, and building the data capacity Washington is abandoning.

But short-term resistance is not a plan for the Dependent States of America. Children in Florida, Arizona, North Carolina and Tennessee can’t wait for their legislatures to rediscover the value of public education, and children in Mississippi can’t wait for their state to grow its way to adequacy. That requires a longer game: Project 2029.

Project 2029 is a new reconstruction. Ideally, it would include a federal constitutional amendment requiring that every child be provided, by their state with federal assistance, equal educational opportunity. At a minimum, it must include:

  1. Common national goals and standards, and measures of them, to guide what we expect our schools to accomplish and what it costs.
  2. A national cost model to drive a federal foundation aid formula targeting dollars to where they are needed most.
  3. A required minimum state and local effort, so that federal aid complements rather than substitutes for state responsibility.
  4. Rebuilt federal data and research capacity to monitor progress toward equal educational opportunity.
  5. Children as rights-holders, with federal aid reinforcing each child’s right to an adequate education wherever public money sends her, not deferring to parental preference as a proxy for the child’s interest.

What Congress would have to change

Project 2029 can’t be accomplished by executive order, nor should it be. It requires legislation, and in several places it means rewriting rules that currently get in the way. Congress would need to enact a federal foundation aid program1; replace ESEA’s maintenance-of-effort rule with an effort floor2; fix Title I’s spending factor3; revisit the prohibitions on federal involvement in standards and curriculum4; strengthen civil rights enforcement5; write Children’s Recourse into the conditions on federal aid6; ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child7; make education rights enforceable8; fully fund IDEA9; and rebuild and protect the federal education infrastructure10. The notes below spell out each change and the statutes and cases involved.

Project 2025 was years in the making, so that an administration could act on day one. Project 2029 must be just as detailed and just as ready, but with a crucial difference. It must be built on broad congressional buy-in rather than executive shows of force, and it must uphold, not subvert, our core constitutional commitments: equal protection, due process, free speech, and the balance between the free exercise of religion and the prohibition on its establishment. Over the longer run, it means revisiting the precedents that have subordinated the child to parental preference and public money, from Carson and Espinoza back toward Pierce itself, with any replacement built so it can never again be turned against minority families.

The Dependent States of America are dependent today largely because they’ve chosen to underinvest in their own children, and federal aid has quietly covered for it. Project 2029 should turn that dependence into a partnership: real federal help, toward real adequacy, in exchange for real effort and real protections for every child, protections that belong to the child, not to the adults choosing for her. If we are going to spend public money in a child’s name, someone has to be answerable to that child. Equitable and adequate funding alone won’t get us to equal educational opportunity. But we can’t get there without it.

  1. Enact a federal foundation aid program. A new title of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) authorizing adequacy-based aid driven by a national cost model, with a minimum state and local effort requirement (for example, 4% of personal income or 3.5% of gross state product) and a multi-year phase-in for states below the floor. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (2015), 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. The effort benchmarks follow Baker, Di Carlo & Weber (2022). ↩︎
  2. Replace the maintenance-of-effort rule with an effort floor. ESEA’s current maintenance-of-effort requirement asks only that a state spend at least 90% of what it spent the year before. A state can stay at very low effort forever and remain compliant. The test should be effort relative to capacity, and states should not be able to cut taxes or divert public funds to private schools below that floor while drawing federal foundation aid. ESEA § 8521, 20 U.S.C. § 7901 (maintenance of effort: combined fiscal effort or aggregate expenditures of at least 90 percent of the prior year). ↩︎
  3. Fix Title I’s spending factor. Title I’s formulas use a state per-pupil expenditure factor that sends more aid per poor child to states that already spend more, regardless of capacity or effort. Allocations should instead reflect adequacy gaps and effort. ESEA §§ 1124–1125A, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6333–6337. Under the Basic Grant formula, the state expenditure factor is 40 percent of the state’s average per-pupil expenditure, bounded at 80 to 120 percent of the national average. ↩︎
  4. Revisit the prohibitions on federal involvement in standards and curriculum. The General Education Provisions Act and provisions the Every Student Succeeds Act added to ESEA bar federal direction of curriculum and federal incentives for particular standards. These should be amended to permit common national outcome goals and measures, including an expanded NAEP, while leaving curriculum and instruction to states and districts. General Education Provisions Act § 103, 20 U.S.C. § 1232a; ESEA § 1111(e), 20 U.S.C. § 6311(e); ESEA § 8526A, 20 U.S.C. § 7906a. ↩︎
  5. Strengthen civil rights enforcement. Restore private enforcement of Title VI disparate-impact protections, which the Supreme Court closed off in Alexander v. Sandoval (2001). Codify the guarantee of Plyler v. Doe that every child, regardless of immigration status, is entitled to a public education. And as a condition of federal aid, require states that fund private providers, through vouchers, education savings accounts, tax-credit scholarships or charters, to hold them to the same nondiscrimination, special education and transparency requirements as public schools. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). ↩︎
  6. Write Children’s Recourse into the conditions on federal aid. Require any state that spends public funds on private schooling, education savings accounts or home education to register every child, assess learning rather than receipts, keep children in contact with mandated reporters, apply neutral accountability conditions uniformly to every provider, give older students a voice, and drop any rule deeming a funding agreement to be school attendance. Drafted as neutral, generally applicable conditions, these stand the best chance of surviving whatever the Court decides in St. Mary. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-2402(I); Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767 (2022); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021); St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, No. 25-581 (U.S., argued Nov. 3, 2026). See Baker (2026), Part VII. ↩︎
  7. Ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It recognizes parents’ primary responsibility for their children, exercised consistent with the child’s evolving capacities, while guaranteeing the child a voice in matters affecting her and subjecting private schools to minimum standards. The United States signed it in 1995 and is the only UN member that is not a party. Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts. 5, 12, 18, 29, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (signed by the United States Feb. 16, 1995). Ratification requires the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. ↩︎
  8. Make education rights enforceable. Condition foundation aid on each state guaranteeing, in law, a judicially enforceable right to an adequate education. In the longer run, pursue a federal constitutional amendment so that this right no longer depends on the willingness of 50 state courts. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (no federal fundamental right to education); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (leaving open whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right). ↩︎
  9. Fully fund IDEA. Congress authorized federal funding of up to 40% of the excess cost of educating students with disabilities in 1975, and it has never come close. Closing that gap is among the most direct ways to relieve pressure on low-capacity states. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2) (maximum grant of 40 percent of the national average per-pupil expenditure times the number of children served). ↩︎
  10. Rebuild and protect the federal education infrastructure. Reauthorize the Education Sciences Reform Act with statutory independence and stable funding for NCES and IES. Codify the Census school finance survey and school-level spending reporting. Fund the cost modeling a national formula requires, and protect the Department of Education’s statutory functions from administrative dismantling. Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002, 20 U.S.C. § 9501 et seq.; Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.; ESEA § 1111(h)(1)(C)(x), 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(x) (school-level per-pupil expenditure reporting). ↩︎

Data notes

Abbott Elementary Is Entertaining. The Damage Is Real.

Actual vs. required spending per pupil, Philadelphia and suburbs, 2009–2023

Abbott Elementary plays it for laughs. Janine Teagues hunts for a working rug, a functioning copier, a single extra aide. Barbara Howard has seen every reform come and go. Gregory Eddie inherits a classroom with no curriculum. Melissa Schemmenti knows a guy who can get the supplies the district can’t.

The show is entertaining. The damage is real. Behind every running gag is a funding gap that has been measurable, year after year, for at least fifteen years, and that has landed on real children in real Philadelphia classrooms.

Philadelphia’s district schools have spent between a third and a half less than what it would cost to get their students to national-average outcomes in every year from 2009 to 2023. Over the same years, the 61 suburban districts in Bucks, Chester, Delaware and Montgomery counties spent between half again and twice what their own students needed. We laugh at the broken boilers, missing counselors and teachers buying their own supplies. The kids living it don’t get a laugh track.

What follows walks from the money to the classroom: first the adequacy gap, then the simple “screwed city” picture, then teachers per child, teacher pay, and finally who is actually standing in front of the kids.

Fifteen years below the line

In 2022-23, the School District of Philadelphia spent $18,329 per pupil. Our National Education Cost Model estimates it would have needed $28,187 to give its students a shot at national-average test scores. That is a gap of $9,858 per child, or roughly $1.2 billion across 118,000 students, in a single year.

The suburbs face the mirror image. Their enrollment-weighted average spending was $20,059 against a required $13,298, a surplus of $6,761 per child. Same metro, same labor market, same state constitution.

Actual vs. required spending per pupil, Philadelphia and suburbs, 2009–2023

This is not a recent dip. Philadelphia sat 33% below its adequacy target in 2009, sank to 50% below in 2015 in the wake of the “doomsday” budgets, and was still 35% short in 2023, even with federal pandemic aid in the mix. The suburbs started out spending more than double their target and have drifted down to about 51% above it. The rest of Pennsylvania sits in between, about a third above.

Percent above or below adequacy, Philadelphia, suburbs, and rest of Pennsylvania

The outcome side tells the same story. Philadelphia’s students scored roughly 0.8 standard deviations below the national average in 2022-23, while suburban students scored about 0.2 above. Abbott’s students are not falling short because nobody cares. They are falling short where the money falls short.

The simple version: a “screwed city”

You don’t need a cost model to see the problem. Divide Philadelphia by its suburbs. In 2022-23, the city had 3.2 times the suburban child poverty rate. Under the NECM, that translates into 2.1 times the cost of reaching national-average outcomes. And the city spent 0.91 times what the suburbs spent.

Philadelphia as a multiple of its suburbs: poverty, required spending, actual spending

That pattern has held every year since 2009. Philly’s poverty rate has run 3 to 5 times the suburban rate, its costs 2 to 2.7 times, and its spending has never once caught up to the suburbs, let alone exceeded them.

That is what it means to be a screwed city. Not just underfunded relative to need, but outspent outright by the comfortable districts a short SEPTA ride away.

Even in Pennsylvania, Philadelphia is not alone

Philadelphia is the biggest case, not the only one. Reading spent 46% below its adequacy target in 2022-23, while the rest of the Reading metro spent 53% above. Allentown was 17% short while its Lehigh Valley neighbors were 47% over. Harrisburg, York, Lebanon, Erie, Wilkes-Barre and Chester Upland tell the same story.

High-poverty Pennsylvania districts vs. the rest of their metro areas, percent above or below adequacy

The pattern reaches into Philly’s own suburbs. Chester Upland, Upper Darby, William Penn, Norristown and Pottstown are all below adequacy, surrounded by districts in the same four counties that spend about 71% above theirs.

Across the state, 56 of 497 districts spent below their adequacy targets in 2022-23. They enroll 23% of Pennsylvania’s students, but 67% of its Black students and 49% of its Hispanic students, compared to 8% of its white students. Philadelphia accounts for about a third of the students in those districts. Fixing Philly alone would not fix Pennsylvania.

This is the system the Commonwealth Court found unconstitutional in William Penn School District v. Pennsylvania Department of Education in February 2023. The state has since begun phasing in adequacy aid, including $565 million statewide in the 2025-26 budget (WHYY). The gaps above are what that aid is chasing.

From dollars to classrooms: fewer adults per child

School money is mostly people. When a district is short a third of what it needs, the shortfall shows up as fewer teachers, larger classes and missing specialists.

Philadelphia reported 11,103 teachers in 2009-10. By 2013-14 it had 7,645, a 31% cut, while enrollment fell only 17%. From 2012 through 2020, the district ran between 12% and 29% fewer teachers per 100 pupils than its suburbs. That is Gregory Eddie’s world: a full roster of kids, and not enough colleagues to share them with.

Teachers per 100 pupils, Philadelphia vs. suburbs, 2009–2024

The gap has nearly closed since 2021, to 7.3 teachers per 100 pupils in Philadelphia vs. 7.5 in the suburbs in 2023-24, helped by federal pandemic aid and new state money. But parity is not adequacy. A district whose students cost twice as much to serve, by the NECM’s estimate, does not get there with the same staffing ratio as Lower Merion.

Across Philadelphia and its suburbs, adequacy and staffing move together. Districts further above their adequacy targets employ more teachers per child (r = 0.49 in 2022-23). The fitted line implies that if Philadelphia were funded like the average suburb, it would have roughly 0.45 more teachers per 100 pupils, or about 500 more teachers, before accounting for its higher needs at all.

Adequacy vs. teachers per 100 pupils, Philadelphia and suburban districts, 2022-23

Teacher pay: same labor market, different paychecks

Philadelphia and its suburbs hire from the same pool of teachers, often the same graduating classes. So pay comparisons here need no regional cost adjustment. They are apples to apples.

In 2012-13, the average full-time Philadelphia district teacher earned $71,407, about 96% of the suburban average. Then came four years without a contract. By 2016-17, Philly’s average had actually fallen to $67,479 while the suburbs rose to $78,598, a gap of more than $11,000. The district has climbed back since, to $86,664 in 2025-26, but that is still about $7,200 behind the suburbs. Teachers in the city’s charter schools averaged $71,644, roughly three quarters of the suburban figure.

Average teacher salary, Philadelphia SD, Philadelphia charters, and suburbs, 2012-13 to 2025-26

The averages hide where the gap bites. Philadelphia’s current salary scale is competitive in the middle years. Teachers with 5 to 14 years of experience actually earn more than their suburban peers. But the scale flattens at $99,534 after about 15 years. Suburban veterans keep climbing, to a median of about $112,000. A 25-year Philly veteran makes roughly $12,500 less than one in the suburbs.

Median teacher salary by years of experience, 2024-25

That matters for who stays. Philadelphia district teachers average 13.7 years of experience, vs. 15.6 in the suburbs. Charter teachers average 8.9. Every school needs its Barbara Howards. An underfunded system has the hardest time keeping them.

Inside the building: who is actually in front of the kids

Pennsylvania’s own staff records let us look at who is actually in the classroom, through 2024-25. Janine is not the exception at Abbott. In 2024-25, 13.3% of district teachers were in their first or second year in education, vs. 8.8% in the suburbs. In the city’s charters it was 16.4%, and more than a third of charter teachers had been with their school system for two years or less.

The starkest gap is certification. Pennsylvania lets districts fill vacancies with long-term substitutes on emergency permits when they can’t hire a certified teacher. In 2024-25 the School District of Philadelphia held 22.5 of those permits for every 100 classroom teachers. Philly charters held 28.5. The suburbs held 2.7, and the rest of the state 4.3. Philadelphia’s rate jumped from about 2 to 19 per 100 between 2015-16 and 2017-18, during and right after the contract freeze, and has never come back down.

Long-term emergency permits per 100 classroom teachers, 2015-16 to 2024-25

Support staff tell a more complicated story. After the 2013 layoffs left many schools without counselors or nurses, the district rebuilt. In 2024-25 it reported more nurses and psychologists per 1,000 pupils than the suburbs, and nearly as many counselors (3.0 vs. 3.3). That is what recent money bought. But it is rough parity for students with three times the poverty, and some positions never came back. The district reported 9 social worker FTE and 1 librarian for about 120,000 students. The suburbs had about 148 social workers and 342 librarians for 325,000.

Novice teachers, emergency permits, and support staffing, 2024-25: Philadelphia district, Philadelphia charters, suburbs

Teachers are also absent more. In the most recent federal data with that measure, 2017-18, 46% of district teachers missed 10 or more days, vs. 38% in the suburbs.

The show is entertaining. The damage is real.

Abbott Elementary works because its teachers are heroic and funny and stubborn. Real Philadelphia teachers are too. But heroism is not a funding formula. Year after year, the data show the same chain: Pennsylvania’s system leaves Philadelphia, Reading, Allentown, Harrisburg and their peers far below what their students need. That shortfall becomes fewer teachers per child, a pay scale that stops rewarding veterans, more novices and uncertified teachers, and libraries with no librarians.

The Commonwealth Court said in 2023 that this system violates the state constitution. The new adequacy aid is a start, and the recent staffing gains show money does show up in classrooms when it arrives. But a district still roughly $10,000 per child short of adequacy in 2022-23 will not close that gap with a few hundred million dollars spread across the state.

Janine shouldn’t have to fix the copier herself. And the kids in her class shouldn’t have to be in a sitcom for anyone to notice.

Data notes and sources

  • Adequacy: School Finance Indicators Database, District Cost Database 2026 (v6), National Education Cost Model estimates of required spending to reach national-average outcomes. Spending is current spending per pupil, direct to elementary and secondary education, in current dollars. Years are school years (2023 = 2022-23).
  • Suburbs: the 61 regular school districts in Bucks, Chester, Delaware and Montgomery counties, enrollment-weighted unless noted. Metro comparisons for other Pennsylvania cities use Census CBSAs from the NCES Common Core of Data.
  • Staffing: teachers per pupil from the NCES Common Core of Data LEA universe; teacher absences from the Civil Rights Data Collection; both via the Urban Institute Education Data Portal. Philadelphia SD figures cover district-run schools; charters report separately.
  • Classroom staffing and certification: Pennsylvania Department of Education Professional Personnel Individual Staff Report 2024-25 (teacher experience; counselors, psychologists, nurses, social workers and librarians by FTE) and Detailed Emergency Permits by LEA, 2015-16 to 2024-25. Permit-rate method from Research for Action (2025).
  • Teacher pay: Pennsylvania Department of Education, Professional Staff Summary and Professional Personnel Individual Staff reports, full-time classroom teachers.
  • Caveats: NECM estimates are model-based and benchmarked to grade 3–8 math and reading outcomes. Emergency permit rates count long-term substitute permits (Types 01 and 04) per full-time classroom teacher, following Research for Action (2025); a permit is not an FTE, so read them as rates of reliance, not exact shares of classrooms. Teacher absences come from the 2017-18 Civil Rights Data Collection, the latest year with that item.
  • Related: Rachel Wessler’s earlier Shanker Institute reflection on the show, Heartwarming or Heartbreaking; state budget coverage from WHYY.

Transcript of Video Critiquing Edunomics Graphs

“Make it stop! Please!” — Video debunking of Edunomics intentionally deceitful school funding/outcome graphs

Source: School Finance 101 (Bruce Baker), published June 16, 2026

schoolfinance101.com — Make it stop! Please!

Transcribed from the post’s auto-generated captions (video runtime ≈ 20 minutes) and lightly cleaned up for readability; screenshots below are frames pulled from the same video at the points the graphs are shown on screen. A few short passages were unintelligible in the source captions and are marked accordingly.

Greetings, folks. Let’s talk. I need to vent a little bit, because after all these years, the same BS continues to roll out, continues to emerge in the school finance conversation — something I’ve been writing and talking about for years.

I put this report out last year, this new version of Does Money Matter in Education? — summarizing a whole bunch of rigorous, peer-reviewed studies applying different approaches and using different data that show us how and why money matters for improving student outcomes.

I talked about this years ago — for a decade, really. This is actually a little less than a decade old, in this book and in other sources on my blog going back more than a decade: basically the dumbest, most facile, simple-minded, intentionally deceitful versions of arguments that try to say, well, money doesn’t really matter. You can do great — you can be awesome with very little money — and you can suck with lots of money. Money’s gone up and test scores have gone down. There are really about four or five different versions of this argument that have been thrown out over the years, but there are two common ones — pretending to be empirical analyses — that are repeatedly used, and that I’ve repeatedly debunked, that just continue to find their way back.

At this point, anyone who’s putting these kinds of graphs out there is doing so knowingly and intentionally to deceive policymakers, courts, judges — whatever. Most of this stuff doesn’t make its way these days into judicial debates over school funding, but I had to face this again over a year ago, and then I’ve seen these graphs re-emerging for every state continuously over the past year — and even again recently on Twitter/Bluesky, where one of my colleagues, thankfully, also took a shot at just how stupid and intentionally deceitful these graphs are.

So let’s jump into it. If you’re a policymaker in a state — or if you know one, or if you’re on a commission in a state and people have been invited in and are putting this stuff in front of you — stop it right there. Kick them out of the room. This is not credible. It shouldn’t be part of the discussion. Just look at the graph.

Graph #1: The “long-term trend” graph

Here’s one of the graphs — this is the new version of what I call the long-term trend graph. The Edunomics Lab at Georgetown University — I’ll call them out by name — and Marguerite Roza have put out data visualization tools that let you make this graph for every state, and then the next graph I’ll talk about.

Let’s take a look at this. First of all — and I’ll explain why this is part of the intentional deceit — they picked 2013 as the starting year. Second, you get two totally different kinds of measures put on a common y-axis, a common vertical axis, with different units for the test scores than for the spending, and both of them stretched out to make it look like these trends are wildly diverging.

Edunomics-style “long-term trend” graph for Oregon: spending, NAEP math/reading, and inflation all plotted on a common stretched axis since 2013 (“BS of the Hour” slide).

And even the construction of the measures is a problem. We’ve got per-pupil spending, not even adjusted for inflation, and then a separate line for some inflation adjustment — maybe a Consumer Price Index — which isn’t even the right adjustment to use for per-pupil spending. I’ll show you what it looks like adjusted correctly in a few minutes.

They’ve got per-pupil spending skyrocketing. I’m using Oregon here because it’s the last place I was faced with having to waste an exorbitant amount of time debunking this garbage. So we’ve got per-pupil spending — not adjusted for inflation, just nominal per-pupil spending — seemingly skyrocketing, which you can do by stretching out the y-axis. And we’ve got NAEP (National Assessment of Educational Progress) test scores taking a dive from 2013 forward to 2024. Then there’s a separate, gratuitous inflation measure thrown in on yet another scale. My head explodes just looking at this. And most people who’ve encountered this graph and have any knowledge of how to do actual research and empirical analysis, and how to measure a school dollar — their heads have exploded too.

Why 2013 is the tell

Let’s talk about 2013 for a second. First, 2013 is well understood to be the point at which NAEP scores level off and/or start to decline. They go up for all the years before that, and then they hit a plateau and start to decline. So picking 2013 is intentionally picking the point at which, in almost any state, you can show test scores leveling off or going down while money is going up or staying the same — which, of course, looks bad. It implies money couldn’t possibly relate to test scores. Better research says otherwise, even for this period.

NAEP Grade 4 Reading and Grade 8 Math scores over time for all states, with Oregon highlighted — scores plateau/decline for nearly every state starting around 2013.

Here’s NAEP scores over time for all states, with Oregon highlighted — and, like the others, it just drifts downward from that point, more or less within the pattern of other states (a bit more so for the fourth-grade scores). But picking 2013 was intentionally picking the year at which NAEP scores level off or turn downward.

On the spending side: per-pupil spending for public school districts took a real hit starting around 2008–09. 2008 was about the best year for public school expenditures. From about 2008–09 to about 2011–12 is when spending really took a hit. It had drifted upward through 2008, then dips, and hits its bottom — leveling off and maybe starting to creep back upward a little around 2013.

Oregon per-pupil spending by fiscal year, adjusted for labor costs, compared to other states — spending bottoms out around 2013 after the Great Recession before drifting back up.

So if you pick 2013 as your starting point, what you’re actually picking is the year when the cuts to funding had hit bottom and test scores had hit their peak. Track it forward from there for almost any state, and you’ll get this apparent divergence — especially once you consider that spending should really be adjusted for the cost of recruiting and retaining a comparable-quality teacher workforce, given that private-sector and other wages have been rising faster than wages for teachers and public school employees. Adjusted that way, spending clearly does not skyrocket the way it does in their graph. Again, 2013 is right where spending per pupil bottoms out and levels off (maybe starts to climb a little) — stretch the axis and don’t adjust for anything, and you can make it look like it’s climbing a lot.

Interesting side note: there’s a really good empirical study by Jackson and coauthors (published via EducationNext) that shows the detrimental effects of recessionary cuts on student outcomes during that exact same period.

“Could the Disappointing 2017 NAEP Scores Be Due to the Great Recession?” (EducationNext) — Figure 1: NAEP scores and cumulative per-pupil spending, zoomed in on 2000–2015.

Zooming in on just the 2000–2015 period the way this study does, test scores actually rose when spending rose, leveled off when spending leveled off, and dipped when spending dipped — the opposite pattern from what’s implied by stretching the axes the way Edunomics does. That study’s authors go on to run solid, causal empirical analyses of this relationship — including, later, a study with more than 30 causal estimates of the returns to a $1,000 increase in public school expenditure, which I summarize along with a ton of other studies in my report.

And yet the graph still persists. It’s still thrown at us in the most absurd ways.

A properly adjusted version

Here’s another version of the graph — the blue line is roughly their version of per-pupil expenditures, though not as exaggerated as showing it as a percent change since 2013 on a stretched y-axis. Just unadjusted per-pupil spending: it went up. Adjusted for changes in labor costs, per-pupil spending is only ever so slightly higher in 2024 than it was in 2009 — that’s adjusting for what it costs to recruit and retain teachers of comparable qualifications.

Now, if we adjust for all of the other cost changes — the student populations to be served, and everything else that goes into achieving a common set of outcomes, using our National Education Cost Model at schoolfinancedata.org — spending actually declined precipitously during and in the years immediately following the fiscal-austerity period after the Great Recession, then levels off, and may even continue drifting down slightly relative to what the dollar was worth toward achieving 2009-level outcomes.

“Permanent disinvestment” — spending with respect to the cost of achieving common outcome goals (nominal vs. labor-cost-adjusted vs. fully cost-of-outcomes-adjusted); the cost-adjusted line never rebounds after the Great Recession.

That’s what fully cost-adjusted spending looks like over time, in many if not most states.

Graph #2: The cross-sectional “spending vs. proficiency” scatterplot

Now for graph number two — another mind-bogglingly, intentionally deceitful graph. The idea: take a whole bunch of schools across a state, regardless of differences in cost from one place to another or the students being served — schools of different grade levels and everything — and plot their per-pupil spending on the horizontal axis and their percent proficiency on state tests on the vertical axis.

The “Clouds of Doubt” graph: Oregon FY22–23 per-pupil expenditure vs. SY23–24 all-grades combined proficiency, with no cost adjustment — no visible relationship between spending and outcomes.

That lets you show that some schools do awesome with very little money, and some schools do crappy with a whole lot of money — so clearly, money doesn’t matter. That low-spending, high-scoring school just needs everyone else to learn from its awesomeness, and everyone can be awesome with whatever they have. Inequity doesn’t matter, adequacy is irrelevant — just get the better outcome, and if you don’t, it’s because you suck.

The layers of problems with this graph are mind-boggling. The main issue is the complete failure to adjust for the value of the school dollar toward achieving these outcomes from one place to the next — to look at the dollar adjusted for its value, or for whether it’s sufficient to achieve a given target given those outcomes.

What it looks like adjusted for cost

I can give a couple of examples of what happens when you do that adjustment. First, I put Oregon in the context of the nation for 2023. If you look at that unadjusted, the overall pattern looks downward — the more money you have, the worse you do, as if you just don’t know how to use it well, and need to be squeezed harder to perform like the districts in the upper-left corner.

But if instead you responsibly use methods that have been in the peer-reviewed literature going back to about 1971 — and extensively since about 1998–99, in the “modern era” starting with a piece by Downes and Pogue in the early 1990s — and look at each district’s spending relative to what it would cost that district to achieve national-average outcomes, and then look at their actual outcomes relative to the national average, districts that spend more (relative to their cost of achieving average outcomes) achieve more, on average.

“Actual (cost adjusted) Spending & Outcomes” — Oregon districts (red) against the national distribution (gray): funding gap to the cost of national mean outcomes vs. outcome index. A clear, strong, positive relationship.

Districts on the right-hand side of this picture are ones spending more than they’d need to achieve national-average outcomes, and the districts in the upper-right quadrant are mostly achieving above-average outcomes. Districts in the lower left have less funding than needed to achieve national-average outcomes — and guess what, they’re achieving below-average outcomes.

There’s still variation around that trend line — more adequate funding (controlling for costs) generally means better outcomes, but there’s variation worth exploring further, which my colleagues and I have done in individual states. For example, a report on Colorado compares districts and schools that get better outcomes than would be expected given their spending. Sometimes what we find is that there was simply something our model didn’t fully capture about that school or district; sometimes we get real insight into what they’re doing differently. That’s what real efficiency analysis looks like — not making a judgment with no consideration at all for the value of the school dollar.

This other stuff — the raw scatterplot — is garbage. Just say it bluntly: it’s garbage. It’s intentionally deceitful. It has no place in a real policy conversation about how to help schools improve, or how to equitably and adequately fund schools. It shouldn’t be part of the conversation, and neither should the long-term trend graph. It’s utterly ridiculous.

A side-by-side, nationwide comparison

Here’s a side-by-side comparison. If I take districts across the whole country and just look at their per-pupil spending relative to the average for their labor market (i.e., adjusted for regional cost differences in the labor market — from Kansas City to El Paso to New York) — districts spending more than their labor-market average versus less — and plot that against an outcome index combining reading and math scores for grades three through eight, it looks a lot like the Edunomics-style graph: overall, the higher-spending districts don’t appear to be doing any better.

“What a competent comparison looks like” — left: spending/labor-market mean vs. outcomes with no cost control; right: current spending as % of adequate spending (cost) vs. outcomes, with cost control. The relationship only emerges once cost is controlled for.

But if you instead adjust properly for the full cost of achieving a given outcome goal and then plot it, districts with more adequate spending relative to that cost have higher outcomes, and districts with less adequate spending have lower outcomes. Then you can start to explore what explains the variation among districts at similar levels of spending and outcomes — but you can’t make any judgment at all from the unadjusted version. Putting that unadjusted version in front of policymakers or any audience — or, for that matter, using it to teach and train people in a school finance certificate program — is reckless, irresponsible, and needs to stop.

Oregon, school level

Here’s what it looks like in Oregon with school-level data, based on a report I produced with colleagues at the American Institutes for Research.

AIR’s “Understanding the Cost of Providing Adequate Educational Opportunity in Oregon” (Feb. 2025) — Exhibit 18: funding gaps by outcome gaps for statewide-average and +1 SD target outcome standards, school year 2022–23.

It’s a messy graph, but it generally trends upward, and the statistical analyses in the report show that schools with more adequate funding tend to have higher outcomes, and schools with less adequate funding tend to have lower outcomes. And when you set a higher outcome goal, it costs more to reach it. That’s the punchline.

Closing

This isn’t new, and it shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone. I called graphs like the second one “clouds of doubt” in my 2018 book — clouds of doubt and the long-term trend were two of the most deceitful ways people tried to argue that schools just need to do better with what they’ve got, that more money doesn’t matter, that we should stop “throwing money” at schools because outcomes are declining anyway. All of that is garbage, and it’s well understood to be garbage. These particular empirical representations of it are an absolute joke.

Stop it now. Shut the door on it. Kick it out of the room. It has no place here, period.

Thank you, and have a wonderful day — I’ve enjoyed this pleasant time chatting with you.

Referenced reports

Baker, Bruce D. (2025). Does Money Matter in Education? (Third Edition). Albert Shanker Institute. shankerinstitute.org/resource/does-money-matter-in-education — PDF: moneymatters3rdedition_final.pdf

Baker, Bruce D., & Losen, Daniel J. (2026). Unpacking Racial Disparities in School Spending: Why “progressiveness” and “comparability” are not enough. EdWorkingPaper ai26-1558, Annenberg Institute at Brown University. edworkingpapers.com/ai26-1558

Brooks, Christopher D., Levin, Jesse, Salvato, Brad, & Baker, Bruce D. (2025). Understanding the Cost of Providing Adequate Educational Opportunity in Oregon. American Institutes for Research, prepared for the Oregon Legislative Policy and Research Office. air.org PDF

Florida School Finance Update: Here’s your manageable standard, now fund it!

I’ve had the pleasure of running some new models with updated data in the past few days. I recently produced a lengthy report on school funding in Florida.

I’ve pointed out on several occasions recently that Florida schools have continued their rapid decline in 8th grade outcomes in reading and math. Florida is one of the reasons why Mississippi’s overall rank improves on national assessments. Yay for Florida.

The thing about Florida is that the state, over the past decade and more, has uniformly crushed the public schooling system and the outcomes it produces. Here’s the distribution of district average performance on reading and math for all FL districts compared to national average outcomes (0- horizontal red line). The vast majority of Florida kids are now below – well below that line.

Not shockingly, relating back to my report linked above, there’s a connection between these performance declines and the inadequacy of funding provided to Florida public schools over the past decade. As I explained in my report – and in several other reports and peer reviewed articles – I have a model based on data for every school district in the U.S. which generates predictions of the spending needed in each school district to achieve different levels of student outcomes (standardized reading/math outcomes).

Here’s where Florida districts stand when comparing their current spending as a ratio to the estimated need for achieving a) national average and b) 1 standard deviation above national average outcomes in reading and math. I actually had to cut off the top part of these graphs to focus in on the bottom and show the spread of Florida districts which are now almost entirely packed into the bottom half.

Now, in my report, I explained how the Florida Supreme Court said there’s really no way to set a manageable standard for what’s adequate anyway, so the legislature should just do whatever it wants. Well, those red horizontal lines aren’t just manageable standards, they are reasonable empirical predictions that could be directly used in guiding the state school finance formula. But, silly me, with my data and models (courts in other states have relied heavily on such evidence for setting such standards).

Florida’s constitution (education article), ratified/revised by Florida’s citizens in 1998 and 2002, requires provision of a high quality system of public schools. We can quibble over whether national averages in reading and math are “high quality,” or merely average. I’d say the latter. What’s clear is that Florida’s school finance system, for MOST OF FLORIDA’S CHILDREN falls short of providing sufficient financing for even that goal – and as a result – most Florida children no longer meet even that modest goal?

This figure shows the distribution of a) current spending with respect to differences in child poverty rate and b) cost estimates for the low (national average) and high (+1 standard deviation) outcome goals. Florida specifically falls well short of providing sufficient funding for children in higher poverty communities to achieve even the modest outcome goal – national average.

Over time, the reality of Florida school funding – actual spending – has slid further and further below these targets – things weren’t actually so bad in 2009 (kinda “meh” but not like they are now).

Here’s another view of the problem. A self-inflicted – excuse me – legislatively inflicted problem. After all, the adequacy of school funding in every state is a responsibility of state elected officials. When it’s good, that’s their accomplishment. When it’s not so good? That’s on them too!

Here, we see the overall relationship, across the US, in 2023, between the relative adequacy of funding to achieve national average outcomes (current spending / spending needed), and, their actual outcomes! Shockingly, or perhaps not, districts (each dot is a district – beige are all districts nationally) with more adequate funding have higher outcomes in reading and math. Districts to the right of the vertical red line spend more than their cost estimate (to achieve national average outcomes). Districts to the left of the vertical red line spend less than their need estimate. Districts above the horizontal red line perform above national average outcomes and districts below the horizontal red line perform below national average outcomes. The worst place to be is in the lower left quadrant – not enough money and poor outcomes. And that’s exactly where most Florida school districts presently sit – with better funded districts performing better and worse funded districts performing, well, worse.

One upside for Florida districts is that they generally sit on or above the diagonal line which might be interpreted as representing average efficiency in producing outcomes. Florida school districts are efficiently producing the outcomes they produce – getting better than expected outcomes. By the way, that’s what actual efficiency analysis looks like – not the DOGEY BS we keep hearing about. It’s about rigorously evaluating the quality of output of a business or government entity, given the inputs, and NOT about creating faux outrage over some anecdotal line item on an expense sheet.

Florida school districts just don’t have the resources to do much better, and as a result, aren’t doing better. The solution one can derive from this image is to push Florida districts up that slide – that diagonal – from lower left to upper right! That is – to provide more adequate funding, and particularly to those furthest in the lower left – which tend to be districts serving higher poverty student populations.

But, rather than push districts from the lower left to the upper right, the state has instead, let districts slide from the middle/upper right to the lower left. This is a problem that can be fixed. And the solution is rather transparent – Adequate funding. And funding progressively distributed to schools and districts serving higher need student populations.

The solution is adequate funding. At least for Florida – here and now. And yes, Florida can afford that solution. Florida is near last in the country on the share of its economic capacity spent on K12 schooling. As a result, Florida school districts actually spend less, in adjusted dollars, per pupil than they did in 1993 and now spend less than Mississippi. Woohooo. Yay for Florida again. As I point out in my report linked above, even if Florida merely spent the same share of state GDP on public ed now as in the mid 2000s, the state would spend nearly 30% more than it does now. That would close a significant portion of the funding gap toward moving the state back to average outcomes. Still not high. But not falling off the cliff they have been for the past several years.

Time to start having the right conversation about school finance in Florida to ensure that all children in Florida have access to “a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education…”

Short term plan to Un-Florida Florida’s Public Schools

A Two-Year Plan for Reforming Florida Public Education Finance & Governance

In a recent report on public education in Florida, I made the following recommendations:[1]

  • Recommendation 1 –Financing a Uniform System of High Quality Public Schools
    • Phase 1: Engage in the work of setting a manageable standard of “high quality” public schooling for Florida’s children by engaging in analyses of the costs associated with providing each and every child in Florida with equal educational opportunity to achieve high education outcomes.
      • Establish a statewide commission on school funding.
      • Engage stakeholders in setting standards of excellence for Florida children.
      • Engage experts to estimate the costs associated with meeting those standards, applying appropriately rigorous methods.
    • Phase 2: Guided by those estimates, reform the school finance formula and increase state aid to schools so as to provide them with the necessary resources for all children to have equal educational opportunity to achieve high education outcomes. That is, meet the constitutional standard ratified by Florida voters in 1998 and 2002. This should include estimates of commensurate funding for charter schools, based on needs and costs.
      • Take eliminating or reducing property taxes off the table. The most effective form of property tax relief is increased state aid, as would occur under implementation of this recommendation.
  • Recommendation 2 – Charter School Reset
    • Part 1: Impose a moratorium on charter school expansion, including the Schools of Hope Program. The existing charter school sector in Florida is compromising equity, eroding efficiency and producing poor educational outcomes for those it serves.
    • Part 2: Establish new regulations for evaluating existing charter operators and vetting new charter operators to ensure improved equity in the distribution of students by their needs across schools. Adopt and enforce stricter regulations pertaining to student outcomes.
    • Part 3: Adopt updated charter school legislation to ensure that charter schools are sufficiently “public,” required to operate as if “state actors,” protecting children’s constitutional rights and abiding by all relevant federal statutes.
  • Recommendation 3 – Voucher Freeze & Reallocate
    • Freeze expansion of the voucher program to free up state resources to support a fully funded, overhauled public school finance formula, to provide a uniform system of free public schools.

The justification for each of these recommendations is thoroughly documented in the cited report. The next step is to lay out an action plan for policy advocacy for the next two years, and next two Florida legislative cycles.

Two year Plan

Following are my recommendations for that two -year action plan:

Year 1 (2026 Session, fy2027) – Pause, Reset & Evaluate

  • Repeal and rethink Schools of Hope (SoH)

    The Schools of Hope legislation and regulations which have been fast tracked over the past year are an ill-conceived patchwork with little potential to solve systemic problems in Florida public education. But, conversations around that program have revealed three key issues worthy of consideration.

    • First, the SoH plan acknowledges that Florida’s existing charter sector is not strong and that recruiting proven providers from other states might be necessary.
    • Second, the SoH plan includes substantial additional funding (nearly $5k) per pupil to ensure that designated schools could be successful.
    • Third, the SoH plan acknowledges the importance of and costs related to operations and maintenance of capital – land and buildings needed for providing quality education.

    Presumptively, a taxpayer financed school of choice shouldn’t exist to begin with unless it provides some element of “hope.” Hope for better student academic outcomes, while maintaining children’s and taxpayers’ rights. Empirical evidence in my report indicates that the charter sector on average in Florida, does not advance “hope” for better academic outcomes for Florida’s children. The purported need to create a special class of charter schools (ones that do offer “hope”), requiring access to free capital and substantial additional funding in order to be “successful” is indicative of the systemic problem state legislators have failed to address.

    My report explains that Florida public schools, inclusive of charter schools lack the funding needed to achieve high performance. Still, they perform quite efficiently with the funding they have. Florida public district AND charter schools would benefit from that same boost in funding (approximately 50% increase to annual operating expenditures). But the proposed SoH plan instead, taps into the operating expenses of district schools to offset costs for charter schools (for operations and maintenance of facilities), giving district officials little control over that allocation, while also boosting revenues for designated SoH charter operators. This plan is grossly inequitable, applying non-uniform treatment across schools and usurping constitutional authority of local boards of education to efficiently operate a system of high-quality schools. The plan as currently proposed must be repealed. 

    • Revisit charter schools and charter sector statutes and regulations

    The U.S. Supreme Court may soon rule that charter schools under most state charter school laws do not operate as “state actors” and thus are not compelled recognize children’s constitutional rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, due process in cases of disciplinary action, or equal protection. Thus, it will fall on states to rewrite their charter school legislation to ensure that the protections available to children in charter schools are equal to those attending public district schools.[2]

    A second issue that must be addressed is the evaluation of a) current charter operators and their reauthorization and b) the vetting of potential outside providers. The state must tighten statutory and regulatory requirements – and apply existing ones – to ensure that providers of schools of choice are a) not having detrimental economic or demographic segregative impact on local neighborhoods and schools and b) are provided quality education as measured by relevant outcomes compared against schools serving similar student populations and with equitable resources. Outside providers wishing to be authorized should validate that they have been successful serving a representative population with respect to the spaces in which they plan to operate locally.

    A third issue that must be addressed is the equitable distribution of and cost-sharing for capital space. The SoH plan essentially provides squatters rights to recognized charter operators and then pushes the costs onto local districts. My previous writings have asserted that it may be reasonable to provide access to publicly owned and maintained capital for charter operators, rather than have them use tax dollars to acquire land and buildings for private ownership.[3] Publicly owned and operated schools are governed under the constitutional authority (in Florida) of local boards of education. The state may develop guidance for local boards of education to collaborate with charter operators for access to under-used district capital. Local boards can/should submit plans for such collaboration. This approach is favorable over selling those assets to affiliates of charter operators via 3rd party transactions wherein tax dollars are used to buy – via revenue bond debt, a facility that the public owns – and after buying that facility a second time, the public no longer owns it.[4]

    A fourth issue is the equitable financing of district and charter schools according to reasonable estimates of the costs associated with differences in student populations served, and with separate consideration of equitable cost sharing for capital space. On the first, point, a study conducted for the State of Maryland provides insights on the complexities of “commensurate” funding (e.g. “uniform” in a Florida context) for district and charter schools. [5]

    A final issue that must be addressed is transparency and thoroughness of financial reporting including reporting on and regulation of related party transactions of contractual services and for capital acquisition.[6] The latter can be mitigated by public oversight of access to publicly owned capital. Recent reporting by CBS News exposed the complex web of financial relationships between charter management companies and contracted service providers, most of which under current law, remain permissible, however suspect and opaque.[7] These issues can be fixed.[8]

    • Equal Opportunity for High Quality Schooling Commission

    The tacit acknowledgment in the SoH proposal that schools in Florida need more money – a lot more money – if we expect them to succeed, at high levels, while serving the state’s most disadvantaged communities – is a good starting point. As I noted in my report, funding matters for the quality of student outcomes that can be achieved. [9] Funding matters more in higher poverty, previously lower spending settings. Further, well designed state school finance policies are guided by outcome goals, wherein funding levels are calibrated with respect to the costs to achieve the desired outcome goals. Those costs vary across children and settings, to achieve comparable outcome goals.[10]

    The legislature should establish commission and engage the public in setting those goals and then working with qualified experts in determining the costs to achieve those goals across children and educational settings in Florida. Those analyses may guide a comprehensive reform of school funding for Year 2 of this plan.

    The back of the napkin spending increases proposed for Schools of Hope may be a useful guidepost for year 1 increases for the state’s highest poverty schools and districts, where those increases are just under $5,000 per pupil. Figure 26 of my report shows that if the state were to recapture even 70% of the budgeted school voucher funds for the current year, per pupil funding could be increased by just under $5,000 per pupil for the highest poverty quintile of school districts and $2,000 per pupil in the second highest poverty quintile. Per the relevant research on return on investment of education spending, this would be a far more productive and efficient allocation of those same dollars. District and charter schools would equally/uniformly benefit.

    • Resist any and all reductions or limitations on major tax revenue sources

    On average, tax and expenditure limits have long run detrimental effects on public service quality including the quality of public schooling measured by students’ outcomes or by the quality of inputs to schooling including class sizes and teacher compensation.[11] Florida district and charter schools are already suffering a lack of sufficient funding to produce high outcomes. As illustrated in my report, Florida’s local public school districts are highly efficient at producing outcomes with the resources available.

    At the same time, Florida school districts have become more dependent on local property tax revenues to maintain current levels of service. While the share of revenue from property taxes has increased over the past 30 years, current spending per pupil has remained stagnant. Eliminating, cutting or capping property taxes either inclusive of school property taxes or not will place undue strain on local county and municipal budgets that will either directly or indirectly squeeze public and charter school resources for both operations and capital. The appropriate approach would be for the state to identify new tax revenue sources and use those sources to increase state aid to municipalities and school districts, taking pressure off local property taxes. State aid is the best form of property tax relief, permitting the services to be provided at the level of quality desired with less burden on local taxation to cover the costs of those services.[12]

    Year 2 (2027 Session, fy2028) – Overhaul School Funding Formula & related Governance

    • Overhaul (replace) the School Finance Formula

    Adopt a comprehensive school finance formula designed to cover all annual operating costs of schools, with the exception of transportation and capital. That school finance formula, unlike the present formula, should be calibrated to ensure that every district and school statewide has the resources necessary for all children to have equal opportunity to achieve the desired outcomes (as vetted through the public engagement process in year 1).

    • That formula must include appropriate adjustments for the costs of serving children from different backgrounds and attending school across different settings. This includes but may not be limited to a) children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, b) English learners, c) children with disabilities. Geographic and location factors should include but may not be limited to a) very small schools in remote, sparsely populated locations, b) differences in labor costs (associated with recruiting/retaining teachers of comparable qualifications across locations).
    • That formula should be inclusive of uniform funding for charter schooling, with potential exclusions (or charges applied) for services provided to charter students through the host district.
    • Separate, equitable formulas must be developed for a) the financing and allocation of capital (educational spaces) for district and charter enrolled students, and b) the financing centralized planning of transportation services.
    • Phase down (and out) funding of any new cohorts of voucher students

    This should free up substantial resources to support the first recommendation above, but additional revenues will likely still be needed.

    • Reorganize/reconstitute charter operators that do not contribute positively to equity or efficiency

    Florida has far too many charter operators that underserve children with disabilities, English learners and children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, and yield poor academic outcomes for those they do serve when compared to district regular and magnet schools serving similar student populations.

    Using policy tools (legislation and regulations) developed in year 1, the state should begin the process of reconstituting these schools. Decisions should be based both on whether a school (or operator of many schools) contributes to or erodes equity with respect to students served versus those served in surrounding schools and residing in surrounding neighborhoods, in addition to performance metrics based on the population served. Any changes to or closures of schools should consider the least disruptive option for those currently enrolled. 

    NOTES


    [1]Baker, B.D. (2025) Financing a High-Quality System of Free Public Schools for Florida’s Children https://schoolfinance101.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/florida_school_finance_12.02.25.pdf

    [2] Green III, P. C., & Eckes, S. E. (2024). All Aboard!: Making Charter School Boards All-Purpose State Actors under the Supreme Court’s Amtrak Case. Drake L. Rev., 71, 562.

    [3] Baker, B. D. (2016). Exploring the Consequences of Charter School Expansion in US Cities. Economic Policy Institute. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED588750.pdf

    Baker, B., & Miron, G. (2015). The Business of Charter Schooling: Understanding the Policies That Charter Operators Use for Financial Benefit. National Education Policy Center. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED574733.pdf

    [4] Baker, B.D. (2015) We bought it twice but we nolonger own it. School Finance 101. https://schoolfinance101.com/2015/07/21/we-bought-it-twice-but-we-no-longer-own-it-is-co-location-the-better-option/

    [5] Levin, J., Baker, B., Atchison, D., Brodziak, I., Boyle, A., Hall, A., & Becker, J. (2016). Study of funding provided to public schools and public charter schools in Maryland. American Institutes for Research. https://marylandpublicschools.org/stateboard/Documents/01242017/TabG-CharterPublicSchoolFundingStudy.pdf

    [6] Green III, P. C., Baker, B. D., & Oluwole, J. O. (2018). Are charter schools the second coming of Enron: An examination of the gatekeepers that protect against dangerous related-party transactions in the charter school sector. Ind. LJ, 93, 1121.

    [7] https://www.cbsnews.com/video/florida-charter-school-company-gop-figure-parents-frustrated/

    [8] https://theconversation.com/charter-schools-exploit-lucrative-loophole-that-would-be-easy-to-close-111792

    [9] Baker, B. D., & Knight, D. (2025). Does money matter in education? Albert Shanker Institute. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED671888.pdf

    [10]Atchison, D., Levin, S., Levin, J., Kolar, A., Blair, D., Srikanth, A., & Salvato, B. (2024). Equity and Adequacy of Colorado School Funding: A Cost-Modeling Approach. https://www.cde.state.co.us/cdedepcom/schoolfinancecostmodelingadequacystudyreport

    D. Atchison, B.D. Baker, J. Levin, S. Fatima, A. Trauth, A. Srikanth, C. Herberle, N. Gannon-Slater, L. Junk, K., Wallace, L., & Baker, B. (2023) Assessment of Delaware Public School Funding. https://education.delaware.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/23-22933_1_Delaware_Full_Report-FMT-ed103023-Version-2.pdf

    Atchison, D., Baker, B.D., Levin, J., Kearns, C. (2020) New Hampshire Commission to Study School Funding, Final Report. https://carsey.unh.edu/sites/default/files/media/2020/09/20-12685_nh_final_report_v10.pdf

    Brooks, C., Levin, J., Baker, B., & Salvato, B. (2025). Understanding the Cost of Providing Adequate Educational Opportunity in Oregon. https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2025R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/291280

    [11] Downes, T. A., & Figlio, D. N. (2012). Tax and expenditure limits, school finance and school quality. In Handbook of research in education finance and policy (pp. 395-410). Routledge.

    [12] Baker, B. D., Di Carlo, M., & Oberfield, Z. W. (2023). The Source Code: Revenue Composition and the Adequacy, Equity, and Stability of K-12 School Spending. Albert Shanker Institute.

    Preserving an Educated Future for America (Short Term Plan)

    Draft excerpt from forthcoming work:

    The short-term plans presented here are focused primarily on mitigating damages inflicted by the current federal administration, focusing on states likely to fight back and pursue educational equity and excellence on their own. I have less short-term hope for other states that have been green-lighted and even incentivized to engage in additional erosion of public schooling. Mississippi is presently proposing elimination of its income tax, the primary source of funding for public education and Florida is discussing elimination of property taxes, the primary source of that state’s funding for public schools, meanwhile diverting substantial funds to voucher programs (Baker et al., 2025). Neither state’s high court has previously affirmed their own constitutional requirements to be enforceable, however strong or recent the constitutional language. Other low spending, generally low performing states are taking similar steps to erode their public education systems.[1] At the same time, federal aid is at risk and those same states are the most reliant on federal aid (Baker, 2025c). The short-term prospects for children in these states are bleak.

    It may be that the best we can do for the next few years, while facing a federal administration hostile to public education and seeking actively to undermine it, is to work with states that remain committed to providing quality public schooling, such that they may be beacons as we emerge from these times.  Southern states resisted federal policies a) during reconstruction and b) during the civil rights era, adopting state policies to undermine the provision of more equitable and adequate education to all. The Education States (not exclusively “blue” or northern) as I will call them here, might use similar strategies this time around to advance education equity and equal opportunity, including racial equality, in the face of a federal administration which seeks to ban these very things and even the words that describe them. We might be wise to focus on those states where state courts have been willing to uphold AND enforce education quality and access standards, those states where legislators and governors have done so, whether court ordered or not and those that have already refused compliance with anti-equity demands of the current administration.

    We are in an era where efforts to advance educational progress depend on states, state legislatures, governors and states’ own constitutional requirements (Corbin, 2025). Unfortunately, the current federal administration has not merely deferred to state’s own preferences but has chosen to weaponize federal aid to coerce states to oppose principles of equity and inclusiveness. As noted previously, the recent shift in federal policy has been a green-light for some states to go even further. Thus, the following short-term efforts might best focus on states: 1) that have maintained or reinstated effort to fund schools (or shown willingness to do so); 2) that have maintained or reinstated progressive funding (funding targeted to areas of greater need); and 3) where state high courts have enforced education rights in recent decades (and where legislatures have been responsive). Kansas, for example, despite being a “red” state, meets all three of these goals (Baker, 2022).

    Antiregulations for the Modern Era

    During the civil rights era in the 1960s, when the first significant direct federal aid to local public schools was introduced (under ESEA) and regulations adopted to enforce school integration, southern states adopted state aid adjustments, local tax policy changes and other resistance policies to support districts refusing desegregate (Bagley, 2018; Baker & Green, 2005; Milligan, 2018). These aid provisions were part of antiregulations acts, referring to opposition to federal regulations requiring desegregation.  Ironically, these are the states that are now most dependent on federal aid. By the time of this writing, several states and local district officials have responded to the current administration’s threats to withhold federal aid for any school or state promoting equity with a hard “NO.” These states should consider adopting into law, provisions that protect the revenues of their local public school districts by filling any temporary or permanent losses with additional state funds. The same strategy used during the civil rights era, to oppose civil rights, should now be used to protect them.

    Federally tax-exempt state education endowments

    Many if not most of the Education States are higher income and high GDP states which over the years have contributed more in federal taxes than they receive from the federal government in aid, programs and services. Taxpayers in northeastern states with strong public education systems, are subsidizing underfunded, increasingly oppressive, discriminatory (removing undocumented children), increasingly Christian nationalist (via voucher programs, religious charter schools and bibles in public district schools) school systems in states like Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi and Oklahoma. These same taxpayers took an additional hit when the Federal tax code was revised to place caps on the deduction of state and local taxes (SALT deduction). Admittedly, these are equity-oriented tax provisions. These provisions lead to more progressive taxation and redistribution from wealthier to poorer states. That should be a good thing and would be necessary under my long-term plan (a later post, but also, earlier version here). But in the present times, these provisions are a) penalizing the Education States for having higher taxes and spending on schools and other state and local services and b) subsidizing the expansion of Christian Nationalist and other religious (and racially) exclusionary schooling in other states, through what has been proposed as a national voucher program .

    Under the circumstances, to preserve public education in the national interest, I propose that the Education States establish federally tax-exempt Endowments for the Future of Education in which to hoard (yes, hoard, sadly, hoard) significant war-chests of (1 to 2% of GSP for the next 5 years) to stabilize elementary and secondary education funding in future years. The goal is to convince as many individual and corporate taxpayers to contribute as much as possible to these funds (reducing their federal taxable income) in support of their state’s education and economic future. That is, I am encouraging the Education States to be Harvard in this moment. It’s a substantial uphill climb to build an endowment of such magnitude. But in these states where so much personal and corporate wealth have been accumulated over time, it is not infeasible to build endowments that can, in four to five years’ time, generate hundreds to thousands of dollars per pupil to be directed toward the highest need schools and districts, and buffer the state’s schools from future economic uncertainty.[2]  

    Significant public school endowment funds are not an unprecedented concept. For example: “The Texas Permanent School Fund (PSF) was created by Texas’ first Constitution in 1845 as a perpetual fund to support the state’s public schools and was seeded with $2 million in 1854. Since that time, the PSF has grown to comprise over $57 billion in assets and will distribute over $2.4 billion annually to Texas K-12 schools.”[3] Texas PSF is 57.3 billion in 2024 which is about 2.2% of GSP. It yields 2.4 billion per year to support the available school fund. Other states, including Alaska have similar funds.[4]

    Expanding & Improving State Data Capacity

    As continued collections of federal data erode, have gaps or are at risk of elimination, Education States should take steps to improve the quality of their own data and research capacity, including continuing and improving upon collections of statewide school level expenditure data and collections of a wider array of student outcomes, from assessments across additional content areas to more detailed measures of completion and dropout rates, chronic absence and more. Many states have already engaged with outside consultants to compile their data, construct comprehensive outcome measures, set goals and standards, and estimate statewide school level models of the costs of meeting those standards. The findings from these models have been increasingly consistent in recent years (Atchison et al., 2023; Atchison et al., 2025; Brooks et al., 2025).

    Interstate consortia for the improvement of education data and evaluation could lead to improved data collections on measures including school revenue and spending and greater consistency on student outcome collections across states. These efforts may lead to improved federal data collections in the future (as those data collections typically occur through states, presently, with federal guidance and vetting of data), including improved methods for harmonizing and cross-walking revenue and spending measures across states.

    Unblurring the Lines between Public and Private

    I close here with a bleak foreshadowing of our Supreme Court’s next possible move in further dismantling church/state separation in public schooling in the United States. Chief Justice Roberts in Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue explained that if and only if a state does provide funding for private, non-state-actors to provide education, then that state cannot exclude religious providers. But, that’s only if the state chooses to provide funds to private providers. In his dissent in Espinoza, Justice Breyer pointed asked “what about charter schools?” noting the ambiguity of their status under widely varied state charter statutes.

    The court is now considering this public/private status question in a case where an Oklahoma charter school wishes to operate openly as a religious school. If the court determines it to be private (non-state-actor), then a) it most certainly can, and b) other religious operators cannot be denied similar opportunity to apply for and run charter schools. As I’ve previously written, this opens the door to these same schools refusing (likely succeeding at the Supreme Court) to comply with any/all regulations they claim conflict with their religious views, including racial discrimination (Green, Eckes & Baker, 2024).

    We are at a point where there is only one way to shut this down in states that wish to preserve strong, accessible, public education systems. Voucher programs are rare or small in what I have referred to here as the Education States. That is no coincidence. But charter schools have a significant presence in the Education States, and these states must either substantially tighten state charter school laws, allowing only government authorization and oversight, defining governing boards and board members of charter schools to be public officials (subject to all laws pertaining to public officials) and making all employees of those institutions public employees, perhaps under the contract of the local host district. While these changes may seem restrictive and unappealing to existing charter operators in those states (like New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts and Connecticut), the alternative is to eliminate charter schooling altogether, to ensure that religious and discriminatory charter schools cannot make their way into the state.

    This also means that states like Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire and Connecticut which have long been home to “town academies,” many formed by private citizens and benefactors as centralized secondary schools in the early to mid-1800s to serve surrounding communities, will have to take steps to change the status of those schools. In Carson v. Makin, the court decided that these academies were enough of a crack in the door to require states to provide similar funding for religious alternatives. States that are home to these town academies will need to either eliminate funding for them or require academies to be sold to and/or absorbed by their local public school districts or the state. Unfortunately, the courts have left us with no alternative but to seal off that crack in the door as well.


    [1] https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/tracking-the-fallout-from-state-tax-cuts

    [2] We understand that it is likely that the current federal administration would seek to deny tax exempt status for these state created, privately governed endowment funds. That said, they are quite similar to pass through organizations used in state tuition tax credit and voucher programs. One strategy to counter this move is to declare these endowments to be religious organizations – Endowment for the Church of the Educated Public – wherein their mission is to support the provision of public schooling to all across their state. More details to be provided as needed in future writings. 

    [3] https://texaspsf.org/

    [4] https://pfd.alaska.gov/

    Defining Productivity, Cost, and Efficiency

    Recycled material here…

    The central problem with US public schools is often characterized as an efficiency problem. We spend a lot and don’t get much for it; and over time we’ve spent more and more but our outcomes have remained virtually flat. Yet rarely are these claims accompanied by thorough analysis or empirical evidence of cost-effectiveness or efficiency.[i]

    We must not get too caught up in the possibility of identifying the perfectly efficient school or district or the absolute minimum that might possibly be spent to achieve a given level of outcomes with x children under y conditions. Measuring such hypothetical extremes is impractical. That said, much can be learned by better understanding the average efficiency at which existing schools and districts produce certain outcome measures for their students and the deviations around those averages.

    Some basic definitions are in order:

    • productivity: The output of our system of schooling, measured in terms of quantity of output or quality of output, or both. Quantity measures often include total numbers of students served or graduated; quality measures are often reduced to measures derived from standardized tests, usually of reading and mathematics achievement between grades 3 and 8. Increasingly, the quality of outcomes produced is measured in terms of changes in assessment scores over time associated with students’ time of attendance in a particular school or district (value-added estimates). Outcomes may also include longer-term outcomes, such as income or civic participation.
    • spending: Expenses (current and deferred) associated with the provision of educational programs and services and related supports (food, transportation, overhead), regardless of outcomes
    • cost: The minimum amount that would need to be spent to achieve a specific level of student outcomes, given the backgrounds of the students served and other potential contextual constraints (variations in the competitive wages for qualified employees, remoteness and population sparsity, economies scale, etc.). Cost necessarily connects spending with outcomes.
    • efficiency: Given the previous two definitions it is possible to spend more than would be needed to achieve a given level of outcomes. That margin of difference is inefficiency.

    spending – inefficiency = cost

    or

    cost + inefficiency = spending

    The margin of spending above cost is labeled inefficiency; but when we discuss measurable inefficiency of schools, the term takes on broad meaning, including spending on programs and services that may be valued but not measured as primary goals/objectives. For example, institutional expenditures may include expenditures on community-based programs and events, athletics, and arts that may marginally, if at all, contribute to student test scores. This is not to suggest, however, that these expenditures are unnecessary or inappropriate. Rather, they are simply not captured by the outcomes being measured because they serve a different, but still valued, purpose.

    Often, when pundits talk about “cost-cutting” measures, they are really talking about spending reductions, whether they result in declining outcomes or whether outcomes remain constant. Actual cost cutting that holds outcomes constant—doing the same with less—would, theoretically, be efficiency improvement. By contrast, less spending leading to lower outcomes is a break-even on efficiency.


    [i] Bruce D. Baker and Kevin G. Welner, “Evidence and Rigor: Scrutinizing the Rhetorical Embrace of Evidence-Based Decision Making,” Educational Researcher 41, no. 3 (2012): 98–101; Bruce D. Baker and K. G. Welner, Productivity Research, the US Department of Education, and High-Quality Evidence (Boulder, CO: National Education Policy Center, 2011), http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/productivity-research.