Pork Hunting 101: Shredding the Pork

I love a good pulled pork sandwich. In fact, it’s one of my favorite foods. And the best damn pork sandwich I can think of is the Hog Heaven at Oklahoma Joe’s in the side of a freakin’ gas station in Kansas City, Kansas. I expect that this statement will perhaps be the most controversial statement I’ve made on this blog thus far.  Really… it’s awesome… and one of the few things I really miss about being in Kansas City.

That aside, I’ve been blogging lately about a different kind of PORK – school finance pork.  I started this pork campaign with a posting on state aid in New York after the announcement of Governor Cuomo’s proposed budget and education cuts. Despite large amounts of aid still being allocated to some of the wealthiest school districts in the nation, the good democratic Governor of New York decided it was somehow most appropriate to largely protect that aid, and instead slam the highest need, large urban, mid-sized city and poor rural districts in the state.

This post provides a primer on finding pork in state school finance formulas. It’s a two part process that begins with screening for pork, and then involves more intensive investigative research.

What is School Finance Pork? School finance pork is state aid that is currently being allocated to districts that otherwise don’t really need that aid. In this case, need is defined in terms of the needs of the students to be served AND in terms of the ability of the local public school districts and its residents and property owners to pay the cost of those services. In overly simple terms, some local public school districts can easily pay for the full cost of their needed educational programs and services on their own and with much less effort (tax effort) than others. Allocating state aid to these districts while depriving others with greater student needs and the inability to meet those needs is inexcusable. Cutting aid to needier communities who are unable to replace those lost revenues, while retaining aid to the wealthy is inexcusable. That’s PORK. And like other political pork-barrel spending, it exists because state legislators negotiate for state aid formulas that bring something home to their own districts.

How do legislators generate PORK? Pork can be generated by at least two different approaches. In the first approach, legislators actually try to manipulate the general state aid formula to find ways to argue that it’s actually more expensive to educate kids in wealthier communities, or alternatively that its cheaper to educate kids in poor communities. If legislators can raise the foundation funding targets to wealthy communities they can increase the likelihood that they can drive state support to those districts. Seems a bit of a stretch, but it’s been done by many. A second “within the formula” approach to generating pork is to adopt “minimum state aid” and/or hold harmless aid provisions that guarantee that no matter how wealthy a district is, that the state will still pick up X% of its formula funding. That is, the state will cover X% even if the district can raise double what it needs with very little tax effort. Another type of pork is Outside the Formula pork. It can be tricky (though not impossible) for legislators to sufficiently manipulate a state aid formula to provide more aid to wealthier districts. It’s relatively easy for state legislators to adopt outside the formula aid programs that allocate aid in very different ways – like flat allocations per pupil across all districts, regardless of local wealth, or even like New York’s property tax relief targeted to wealthier communities.

How do we screen for Pork? Here, I provide a few examples of screening for pork, using a national data set – the U.S. Census Bureau’s Fiscal Survey of Local Governments. As we stated in our Is School Funding Fair? A bare minimum goal of a state school finance formula would be to achieve a FLAT relationship between poverty and state and local revenue per pupil. Ideally, state school finance formulas would result in additional resources targeted to higher poverty districts – that is – systematically higher state and local revenue per pupil in higher poverty districts. One can take and state’s school finance data – here from 2007-08 – and make a graph of the a) local revenue per pupil, b) state aid per pupil and c) total revenue per pupil across districts by poverty. Here’s Texas:

I’ve dropped very small districts because they tend to scatter the pattern for a variety of legitimate cost related reasons.  Blue circles represent the state and local revenue per pupil, which on average in Texas has a slight downward slope. Red triangles are the local revenue. Clearly, the lower poverty districts are raising quite a bit in local revenue but the higher poverty districts aren’t raising much. On average the state aid in green squares is being allocated in inverse proportion to the local revenue… but not that aggresively. For example, if we look way to the upper left…. we’ve got some red triangles – local revenue per pupil – above $10,000 per pupil. That is, some of these very low poverty districts are able to raise on their own, over $10k per pupil. But look at the trajectory of the state aid allotments – those districts are still getting a significant amount of state aid – enough to still raise their totals even higher as pointed out by yellow arrows. Would it not make more sense for this aid to be allocated to the districts at the far right hand side of the picture? Amazingly, the state aid distribution slope in Texas is quite gradual – to be kind. It would appear to include significant “flat” distributions of either or both minimum aid and/or outside the formula aid which goes to lower poverty and/or higher wealth districts the expense of higher need, lower wealth districts. THAT’s PORK!

Here’s New York, when using the same data set:

And here’s Pennsylvania:

In Pennsylvania, minimum aid provisions and flat distribution of Special Education aid are partly to blame.

And here’s Illinois:

Illinois also has minimum aid provisions in the form of alternative formulas for districts otherwise too wealthy to receive aid through the primary foundation formula. And Illinois allocates numerous categorical aids outside the formula in ways that reinforce the aggregate disparities.

So, here are four states and in each one, total state and local revenue per pupil is slightly to significantly lower per pupil in higher poverty than in lower poverty districts. And in each state, the state aid is distributed in ways that guarantee the provision of at least some – sometimes significant – aid per pupil to districts that on their own are raising and spending significantly more money per pupil than their much higher need counterparts.

How do we identify the source of the Pork? This part is a bit harder, and requires much more detailed investigation of the state school finance formulas and of the “runs” of state aid programs. I hope to get a chance to provide more information on pork finding at a later point. But for those interested in exploring these issues on their own, there are two sources of information that are critical to the search – a) the documentation that  explains the calculations behind the allocation of state aid and b) much more importantly, what are called the “runs” of state aid allocations to local public school districts that are used by legislators to negotiate changes to the aid formula and/or the distribution of cuts. It’s that time of year – legislative session season. And legislators are interested to see which pieces of the aid formula will bring home pork, or how cuts will affect their districts. If you’re as warped as I am about this stuff… and actually really like digging through these numbers… contact your state legislators and find out who to get in touch with in order to get an electronic spreadsheet run of the various district by district state aid allocations. And be sure to get other basic district data, including wealth measures (property wealth and income) and enrollment characteristics (Total enrollments and student needs).  Play around with graphs of aid (divided by pupils – per pupil aid) with respect to wealth and need measures – and look for those aid programs in particular that appear to allocate systematically more aid to districts that are otherwise less needy. Feel free to e-mail me spreadsheets of those runs. If I get a chance, I’ll see what pork I can find!

Cheers.

And here’s to Pork!

Disparate thinking: The administration’s blind eye & racially disparate impact

Apparently the U.S. Department of Education has decided to take on public education policies that not only are intentionally racially discriminatory, but also state and local policies that happen to have a racially disparate impact on certain populations. Now, these are departmental regulations, not statutes and not a constitutional protection, so this doesn’t mean that advocates can start filing lawsuits on behalf of groups disparately affected by education policies (except where other state laws prohibiting disparate impact exist, like Illinois). But, it does mean that the U.S. Department of Education can use its biggest available threat – denial of funding – to pressure state and local education agencies to change policies that result in racially disparate impact.

Statistically, what disparate impact means is that the policy in question results in a disproportionate effect on one group of individuals versus another, where “groups” are defined by race, ethnicity or national origin. There are many occurrences in public education where racially disparate impact rears its ugly head. For example, racially disparate classification rates of children with disabilities, or racially disparate rates of disciplinary action. Identifying appropriate policy changes to reduce racially disparate impact in any of these areas, while not compromising other interests is indeed important – such as making sure that kids with legitimate special education needs still get identified and served, or making sure appropriate discipline is handed out where necessary.

The administration’s renewed interest in racially disparate impact was announced almost a year ago, and has apparently crept back into the conversation in the past few weeks.

Here’s the Education Week synopsis:

At the Feb. 11 briefing, Ricardo Soto, the deputy assistant secretary for the Education Department’s office for civil rights, elaborated on the office’s new policy, saying that the Obama administration is “using all the tools at our disposal,” including “disparate-impact theory,” to ensure that schools are fairly meting out discipline to students. Some research shows, for instance, that suspension rates for African-American males in middle school can be nearly three times as high as those for their white, male peers.

So, the interest here is specifically the racially disparate distribution of disciplinary actions. That’s all well and good. We should explore these issues and resolve them appropriately if we can. Once again, the usual target is local public school districts because when it comes to any of today’s education policy issues – in the eyes of the current administration and their closest advisers – only local public districts and local administrators can be to blame (even when it comes to funding disparities?).

But, as my readers know, this a school finance blog, and that means that eventually this topic is coming back around to school finance (okay, not always). Could it possibly be that some states actually continue to operate state school finance formulas that produce “racially disparate” effects? That is, that districts serving larger shares of minority children have systematically (statistically) less state and local revenue (the revenue under control of state policy) than districts with fewer minority children? And if so, which states might those be?

Clearly, substantial disparities in the quality of education received (funding, class sizes, teacher credentials, etc.) by minority children as a function of state policies to provide, or not, sufficient financial support to their schools is at least equally relevant to rates of discipline referrals of minority versus non minority children attending the same school or district.

In our report Is School Funding Fair?, We evaluated states in terms of whether they provided for systematically more or less state and local revenue per pupil in higher versus lower poverty districts.  Now, which states did the worst on this measure? Among the big ones, the most poverty disparate states in funding were Illinois, Pennsylvania and New York! New York makes this list largely because of its Pork barrel finance policies. And believe, me, Pennsylvania and Illinois have similar pork to shred. But poverty related disparities while important, don’t fall under this racially disparate impact umbrella. The real question here is which states have the largest racial disparities in school funding?

A few years back, Robert Bifulco, now at the Maxwell School at Syracuse, did a nice quick number crunch on black-white funding disparities nationally, in the Journal of Education Finance. On average, Bob found that without any corrections for costs related to student needs, or other costs, districts with higher concentrations of black enrollments had marginally higher per pupil spending. But after correcting for costs and needs, districts with higher black enrollments had lower per pupil spending. But, these findings, while interesting and useful, look at the nation as a whole, and, if I recall, do some breakouts by region.

Just like the poverty related variation we show in the fairness report, racial disparities in funding also vary widely across states. And those disparities occur for a variety of reasons. Yes, to some extent those disparities exist because of differences in local property wealth in blacker versus whiter communities and the state’s failure to allocate sufficient aid to offset those disparities. And in many places, those disparities in property values are largely a function of carefully planned racial segregation of housing stock and distribution of other property types (Brilliant article on real estate development in the Kansas City metro: http://www.tulane.edu/~kgotham/RestrCovenants.pdf)

BUT CAN A STATE LIKE NEW YORK REALLY CLAIM THAT THERE’S  JUST NOT ENOUGH AID AVAILABLE TO FIX THE RACIAL DISPARITIES WHEN IT IS DUMPING TAX RELIEF AID AND MINIMUM FOUNDATION AID INTO THE WEALTHIEST DISTRICTS IN THE COUNTRY? Redistributing the pork might not erase the disparities entirely, but it’s a start.

Other disparities actually exist by the design of the aid formulas, and various Tricks of the Trade that create racial disparities in funding – deceptively and arguably quite intentionally. Here’s an outstanding sarcastic, critical analysis of how Kansas legislators gamed their finance system to embed racially disparate effects over time: http://www.pitch.com/2005-04-14/news/funny-math/ (after reading this, consider the role of real estate development addressed in the Kansas City article above!)

Quick side-bar – This brilliant piece of school finance journalism is written by Tony Ortega, when he was in Kansas City (written from the perspective of a KC Strip Steak… it’s a Kansas City thing). Now, Tony is editor and chief of the Village Voice in NY. He Tony, how ‘bout that New York finance stuff? Subsidies for Scarsdale, while cutting Utica and Middletown, or Mt. Vernon? (even if from the perspective of a NY Strip Steak?)

There are lots of Tricks of the Trade used to reduce aid to high minority districts. A favorite choice of state legislators is to allocate aid based on average daily attendance rather than enrollment. Higher poverty, higher minority concentration districts tend to have lower attendance rates… thus reducing their aid, compared to what they would receive if the aid was allocated on the number of enrolled pupils.

There was a brief period in the late 1990s when three separate federal court challenges were filed against racially disparate state school finance systems – in Pennsylvania (Powell v. Ridge), in New York (AALDF v. State) and in Kansas (Robinson v. Kansas). These cases were cut off by a series of related decisions in the early 2000s (which basically said that an individual does not have a right to sue over racially disparate effects, because the language of “racially disparate” effects appears only in regulations and not in the Civil Rights statutes themselves).

Interestingly, around that time, the Illinois legislature countered with state legislation that prohibits policies having racially disparate effect (Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003). And as it turns out, Illinois school districts are applying this law to challenge the Illinois school funding formula – a formula that is among the most racially disparate in the nation.

http://www.jenner.com/news/news_item.asp?id=15009924

So, what’s my point here? I’m doing a bit of rambling. Well, here’s my best shot at a synopsis.

1. Yes, it is important that the current administration explore the reasons for, and possible resolutions of racially disparate effects in such areas as discipline referrals or special education placement rates (although they appear focused on the former, not latter).

2. Yes, there exists the likelihood that local public school districts are engaged in practices that harm minority populations, ranging from the previously mentioned issues, to others such as highly tracked curricular offerings which result in significant within school and within district segregation, as well as attempts by some local boards of education to undo long running diversity plans.

3. But, I would argue, that while these issues are important, there are other at least equally important issues to be addressed – substantial racial disparities in funding and resulting programs and services – in some states far more than others. AND ILLINOIS IS ONE OF THOSE STATES!

4. And those racial disparities in funding are not entirely a result of not enough money to offset differences in local wealth, or neglect of the state aid formula (underfunding the formula) – WHICH IS BAD ENOUGH – but are largely a function of maintaining PORK in affluent communities at the expense of poor minority districts, and of Tricks of the Trade – or specific provisions in state school funding formulas that drive money to whiter districts and create or reinforce racial disparities.

READINGS

Green, P.C., Oluwole, J., Baker, B.D. (2010) Getting their hands dirty: How Alabama’s public officials may have maintained separate and unequal education. West’s Education Law Reporter 253 (2) 503‐
520

Green, P.C., Baker, B.D., Oluwole, J. (2008) Obtaining racial equal educational opportunity through school finance litigation. Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties IV (2) 283‐338

Baker, B.D., Green, P.C. (2005) Tricks of the Trade: Legislative Actions in School Finance that Disadvantage Minorities in the Post‐Brown Era American Journal of Education 111 (May) 372‐413

Baker, B.D., Green, P.C. (2003) Commentary: The Application of Section 1983 to School Finance Litigation. West’s Education Law Reporter. 173 (3) 679‐696

Green, P.C., Baker, B.D. (2002) Circumventing Rodriguez: Can plaintiffs use the Equal Protection Clause to challenge school finance disparities caused by inequitable state distribution policies? Texas
Forum on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights 7 (2) 141 – 165

Where’s the Pork? Mitigating the Damage of State Aid Cuts

This is a very long and complicated post, so I’ll give you a few take home points up front…

Equity Center Radio on School Finance Pork: http://216.246.105.5/Audio_Recordings/2011-0053_ECRadio_Bruce_Baker_02-18-2011.mp3

Take home points

  1. Crude assumptions promoted by the “new normal” pundit crowd that across the board state aid cuts are a form of shared sacrifice are misguided and dreadfully oversimplified.
  2. State aid cuts hurt some districts and the children they serve more than others, even when those aid cuts are “flat” across districts. Districts with greater capacity will readily recover their losses (and then some) with other revenue sources. Those who can’t are out of luck.
  3. State aid cuts as a proportion of state aid are particularly bad because they take the most from those who need the most.
  4. Some might find it surprising that many state school finance formulas contain special provisions that allocate relatively large sums of aid to very affluent school districts – districts that could easily pay for the difference on their own and serve relatively low need student populations. One can readily identify hundreds of millions of dollars in New York State being allocated as aid to some of the nation’s wealthiest school districts.
  5. State legislators and Governors often protect this aid – which I refer to as school finance PORK – even while slashing away disproportionately at aid for the neediest districts.
  6. That’s just wrong!

Now for the lengthy post…

It’s budget proposal and state-of-the-state time of year right now. And Governors from both parties are laying out their state budget cuts, many refusing to consider any type of “revenue enhancements” (uh… tax increases). These include New York’s Governor Cuomo suggesting a 7% cut to state aid.

There exists a baffling degree of ignorance being spouted by pundits about school budget cuts. Stuff like – NY’s Governor cut school funding by 7%… Now, school districts need to figure out how to cut their spending by 7%! Everyone, 7% less, across the board! Shared sacrifice! It will make everyone better and more efficient in the long run (especially those high poverty districts that we know are least efficient of all)! Pundits argue – Cuts have to be made. Cuomo’s cuts are a perfect example of this reality (from a Dem. Governor). Everyone will be cut. Just suck it up and learn to deal with the New Normal.

Wrong – at so many levels it’s hard to even begin explaining reality to those pundits who’ve clearly never even taken the most basic course on public finance or public school finance and have absolutely no understanding of the interplay between “local” property tax revenues and state aid, or the process of school budget planning and adoption. More on this later.

Thankfully, most readers of my blog and many in the general public actually seem to understand this stuff better than the blowhards (bloghards and tweethards) leading the “new normal” campaign from their DC think tanks. Particularly astute are those families with children who have interest in the quality of their local public schools and live in states where local school district budget setting remains at least partially an open public budgeting process.

And there a few good education writers out there who have developed a solid grip on the interplay between state and local revenues and the resulting effects of state aid cuts. Meghan Murphy, in the Hudson Valley in New York State has done some particularly nice writing on the topic: http://www.recordonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100426/NEWS/100429738

My reason for this post is to expand on a point made by Meghan Murphy in her writing on Hudson Valley Districts and by David Sciarra in this Education Week Article:

But David G. Sciarra, the executive director of the Education Law Center, argued that if states cut funding to school districts during this difficult financial period, the pain will be felt most by disadvantaged students. Impoverished districts have little local property-tax wealth to draw from, and so state aid is a lifeline, said Mr. Sciarra, whose Newark, N.J.-based group advocates for poor students and schools. He urged state officials to work cooperatively with districts in the years ahead to set budget priorities so that current inequities aren’t made worse.

State officials “have an obligation to look for better ways to spend money,” Mr. Sciarra said, but “they’ve got to be very careful in how they do this. Across-the-board cuts and freezes have a negative impact on schools in need.” Ideas about how to cut spending are often proposed at “30,000 feet,” he said, but officeholders need to “take a serious look at how [cuts] would play out in their state.”

Yes, that’s the point. Cuts don’t mean “cuts” or “across the board” uniform distribution, “shared sacrifice,” at least not as they are typically implemented. In general, cuts to state aid lead to increased inequity. They hurt some more than others. Some districts, in fact, have little problem overcoming cuts – rebalancing their budgets, while others, well, to put it simply – are screwed. In many states, those most screwed by aid cuts are those who’ve been most screwed all along.

The model underlying local school budgets is that local voter/citizen/parent/homeowners (not entirely overlapping) desire a certain level or quality of schooling, usually in tangible terms like class sizes or specific programs they wish to see in their schools. That is, the local voter may not be able to “guess” the per pupil expenditure of their district (nor is it particularly relevant if they can) and evaluate whether it’s enough, too much or too little, but the local voter can evaluate whether that per pupil dollar buys the programs and services – and class sizes that voter wants to see in his/her local school district and whether they are willing to add another dollar to that mix.

When the state cuts aid to local school districts the usual first local response is to figure out how to raise at least an equal sum of funding – plus additional funding to accommodate increased costs – so as to maintain the desired schooling (class sizes, programs, etc.). Few local voters seem to really want to cut back service quality. Depending on the state (or type of district within the state), district officials put together a budget requiring a specific amount of revenue – which in turn dictates the property tax rate required to raise that revenue – given the state aid allotted – and then the budget is approved by referendum – or other adoption (or back-up mediation) process.

Clearly some communities have much greater capacity than others to offset their state aid losses with additional local revenues!

For example, when New Jersey handed down state aid cuts to 2010-2011 school budgets and when- for the first time in a long time- the majority of local district budgets statewide failed to achieve approval from local voters, it was still the case that the vast majority (72%) of local budgets passed in affluent communities – in most cases raising sufficient local property tax resources to cover the state aid cuts. In another case, local residents in an affluent suburban community raised privately $420,000 to save full day kindergarten programs. Meghan Murphy’s analysis of Hudson Valley school districts shows that New York State districts also have attempted to counterbalance state aid cuts with property tax increases, but that the districts have widely varied capacity to pull this off.  Parents in a Kansas district are suing in federal court requesting injunctive relief to allow them to raise their taxes for their schools (they use faulty logic and legal arguments, but their desire for better schools should be acknowledged!)

Distribution of State Sharing

There’s a bit of important background to cover here. State aid formulas drive state funding – usually from income and sales tax revenues collected to the state general fund – out to local public school districts based on a number of different factors. Typically these days, state funding formulas start with a calculation of the amount of money – state and local – that should be available at a minimum in order to provide adequate public schools. That is, each district is assigned a target amount of state and local funding. That target amount usually varies by the types of students served in a district and by other factors such as regional labor costs and remote, rural locations. In any case, each district ends up with a different estimate of total funding needs.

Next, the aid formula includes a calculation of the amount of that funding target that should be paid for with local property taxes – a local fair share, per se, or local contribution. One approach is to determine how much each district would raise if each district adopted a uniform property tax rate. For those districts that raise more than their target funding with that tax rate alone, the state would kick in nothing. For those districts that implement the local fair share tax rate and still come up short of their target funding, the state would apply aid to cover the difference.

So, for example, you might have three districts in a state, where:

  • The first district has a very low need student population (almost all from affluent, educated families), and has significant taxable property wealth. That district might have a target funding per pupil of $10,000, and might be able to raise all of it with an even lower tax rate than would be required. In fact, if they put up the local fair share tax rate, they might raise $20,000 per pupil. And the school finance system might allow them to do that.
  • A second, “middle class” district that has a modest share of children in poverty in the district, leading to an estimated target funding of $12,000 per pupil. The district adopts the local fair share tax rate and raises $8,000. The state allocates the additional $4000.
  • And the third district, a high need district with weak property tax base, might end up with an estimated target funding of $15,000 per pupil and after adopting the local fair share tax rate only raises $2,000 per pupil, so the state allocates $13,000.

THAT’S THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF A ‘FOUNDATION AID’ FORMULA!!!!

Now, I should be very clear here that the relationship between student needs and tax base is not really that simple. Both parts of this puzzle are critical to the formula and don’t always move in concert. There exist districts with high value tax base and high need student population and vice versa, and for many reasons.

Here’s an example of the distribution of the basic “sharing ratio” for New York State school districts, with respect to district Income/Wealth (IWI) ratio. For the lowest income/wealth districts, the state share is about 90%. For wealthier districts, that ratio – in theory – drops to 0.

Figure 1: NY State Sharing Ratio by District Income/Wealth


Types of Cuts

When it comes to state aid cuts, there’s really nothing for the state to cut from the first district above – that is – unless for some reason the state is giving other money to that district that can raise double it’s need target with the same local tax rate and no state support. But that would be silly, right? More later on that. Here are the two most common approaches to handing out cuts:

Option 1: Cut state aid proportionately across the board

This is actually usually the worst option and most regressive. Let’s take our districts above. A 5% cut to state aid for our first district is, of course, nothing. A 5% cut for our middle class district is $200 per pupil. A 5% cut to state aid for our high need district is $650 per pupil. Yes – the biggest cut comes down on the highest need district.

This distribution of cuts is problematic for two reasons. First, the biggest cut falls on the neediest kids. Second, the biggest cut falls on the district with the least capacity to offset that cut. I’m assuming here that these districts have all adopted the local fair share property tax rate. That rate only raises $2,000 per pupil in revenue for the high need district whereas the same rate raises 4X as much in the middle class district. Clearly for this reason alone, even if the cuts were in equal amounts per pupil, the middle class district would have a much easier time replacing the aid cut with local resources. Further, there a plethora of additional factors that increase the likelihood that the middle class district can offset the cut more easily than the high need, low-income district.

Option 2: Cut funding targets proportionately across the board

A better, though still problematic approach is for the state to recalculate the funding targets – – to reduce that level by just enough to result in the same state aid savings. Taking this approach leads to a constant per pupil cut in state aid across districts, for those districts receiving at least as much state aid per pupil as is being cut.

This too is of no consequence for our district that needs no foundation aid. Let’s say this approach leads to a $400 per pupil across the board reduction in target funding. If we still assume that districts are to raise the same amount of local revenue (local fair share of the fully funded target amount, as opposed to raising the local share of the lowered amount), this would result in a 10% aid cut to the middle class district ($400/$4000) and a 3.1% cut to the high need district. The per pupil target funding change would be the same. But the middle class district would certainly complain that their cut as percent of aid is much larger. But again, that district has 4X the local revenue raising capacity on a dollar per pupil basis, and in this case, they still got less than 4X the per pupil cut.

Even this approach is likely to lead to larger average budget reductions in higher need districts.

Again, there are tons of additional factors involved, and various ways that states might cut aid differently to yield different distributional effects across districts.

State Aid Formulas have Lots of Parts! Some better than others!

The state aid cut scenarios presented above assume a logical and oversimplified world of state aid and local district budgets in many ways. The cut scenarios presented above adopt one really big assumption about state aid to local schools – an assumption that may not be and usually isn’t entirely true:

That the only state aid available to cut is aid that is allocated in proportion to wealth and need across districts. That because state aid is allocated in greater proportion – if not almost in its entirety to poor and need school districts, then those districts must necessarily suffer most from the cuts! As a result, the best you can do is to spread evenly those cuts across wealthy and poor, higher and lower need districts and live with the fact that some will bounce back easier than others.

The fact is that state aid formulas may at their core be built on a seemingly logical foundation funding structure with state and local sharing as described above.  But rarely these days does a state aid formula make it into law without a multitude of adjustments and other PORK added on. Yes, Pork! School finance pork and lots of it. Clearly state reps from those towns that would otherwise get nothing from the general aid formula are going to search for a way to bring home some pork.

Here are a few examples of school finance pork from the New York State school finance formula:

1) Minimum Foundation Aid: Like many state funding formulas, even though the first (and most logical) iteration of calculations for estimating the district state share of funding would end up providing 0% state aid to many districts, those formulas include a floor of funding – a minimum guarantee of state aid. That’s right, even our district above that could raise double their target funding by applying the local fair share tax rate would get something. Perhaps this is a reasonable tradeoff when the money is there. But do we really want to keep allocating that money to a district that’s a) fine on its own and b) could easily replace the money with modest increases to local taxes – and would do so.

Here, for example, is the effect of New York State’s minimum threshold factor on foundation aid. The red diamonds indicate the foundation state aid that would be received if districts got what is initially calculated to be their state share. State share hits 0 at an income/wealth index around 1.0 in the basic calculation. But, the actual calculation of state share includes a few adjustments shown in blue squares. First, between income/wealth ratios of about 1.0 to 2.0, the actual state share cuts the corner providing more gradually declining aid rather than going straight to 0. Then, above IWI of 2.0 it never hits 0, but rather levels off providing a minimum allotment of several hundred to about $1,000 per pupil to even the wealthiest districts in the state (which, by the way, are among the wealthiest in the nation!).

Figure 2: Application of Original Calculation and Adjusted Calculation for State Aid Share


Altogether, the adjustments – which also yield additional aid for New York City  – add up to nearly $3.8 billion dollars. That’s right… $3.8 billion (where’s that NY Mega Millions guy when you need him?). Now, assuming that it’s hard to get the sharing ratio correct for NYC to begin with and that it is a very high need district that in fact needs this aid, it’s really just over $2.0 billion in potential excess allocation that could be redistributed. That ain’t chump change.

But let’s go really conservative here, and just look at the minimum aid being shuffled out to the richest communities. That alone is still $134 million dollars.

At the very least, if you’re going to cut state aid, cut this first! If you’re not going to cut, consider redistributing this.

2) School Tax Relief Aid: Many state aid formulas include a variety of other types of aid, some which are distributed in flat amounts across all districts regardless of need, and some which may be even allocated in inverse proportion to what most would consider needs – either local capacity related needs or educational programming and student needs. Such is the politics of school finance. For those really interested in this stuff, see the following two articles:

Baker, B.D., Green, P.C. (2005) Tricks of the Trade: Legislative Actions in School Finance that Disadvantage Minorities in the Post-Brown Era American Journal of Education 111 (May) 372-413

Baker, B.D., Duncombe, W.D. (2004) Balancing District Needs and Student Needs: The Role of Economies of Scale Adjustments and Pupil Need Weights in School Finance Formulas. Journal of Education Finance 29 (2) 97-124

New York State’s piece de resistance is a program called STAR, or School Tax Relief program. In simple terms, STAR provides state aid in disproportionate amounts to wealthy communities to support property tax relief. Here’s the distribution of STAR aid with respect to district income/wealth ratios:

Figure 3: STAR Aid per pupil and District Income/Wealth Ratio


Excluding STAR aid to NYC, the aid program in 2008-09 provided $642 million in aid to districts with an income/wealth ratio over 1.0! Even in New York State, that’s not chump change. It’s over $150 million to the wealthiest districts. Add these hundreds of millions to those above and we’re getting somewhere.

Once again, at the very least, if you’re going to cut state aid, cut this first! If you’re not going to cut, consider redistributing this.

For more information on the equity consequences of STAR (as well as simulated solutions), see: http://eus.sagepub.com/content/40/1/36.abstract

A closer look at aid to the wealthy in New York State

Here’s a closer look at minimum foundation aid and STAR aid received by several of the state’s wealthier communities (at least statistically wealthier). Note that our recent report on school funding fairness (www.schoolfundingfairness.org) identified New York State (along with Illinois and Pennsylvania) as having one of the most regressively financed systems in the nation. On average, low poverty districts have greater state and local revenue than high poverty ones, yet the state is still allocating significant sums of aid to low poverty districts!

Table 1: Aid to the Wealthy in New York

This table shows that many of these wealthier communities are picking up millions in STAR aid and upwards to a thousand dollars per pupil in basic foundation aid. Yes, the state is subsidizing the spending – quite significantly – of some of the wealthiest districts in the nation, while maintaining a regressive system as a whole. And now, while cutting aid disproportionately from poor districts.

The distribution of proposed aid cuts

Here is the distribution of the Governor’s proposed cuts in foundation aid to NY State school districts, on a per pupil basis, with respect to Income/Wealth Ratios of school districts:

Figure 4: Governor’s proposed cuts to foundation aid and income/wealth ratios


The income/wealth ratio is along the horizontal axis. The per pupil cuts in aid are on the vertical axis. Here, I’ve represented district size by the size of the “bubble” in the graph. New York City is the bowling ball here! And NYC gets a larger per pupil cut than many much wealthier districts – wealthy districts that actually receive aid! Excuse me, PORK!

Yes, districts with very high income/wealth ratios will experience little cut at all. $100 per pupil or so will look like a big cut of their $1000 per pupil in foundation aid, but some low wealth districts will actually see their foundation aid cut by $1000 per pupil.

And with respect to the Pupil/Need Index:

Figure 5: Governor’s proposed cuts to foundation aid and pupil need index


In this figure, as student needs increase, per pupil cuts in aid increase. Yep, that’s right, districts that NY State itself identifies as having higher needs receive larger per pupil cuts in aid, even while the PORK… yes PORK is retained in the system! All the while, the state continues to allocate minimum foundation aid and STAR funding to wealthy districts.

Summing it up

Yes, it may suck for legislators or the Governor to tell Scarsdale, Pocantico Hills or Locust Valley that there’s just not enough aid to continue to subsidize their “tax relief” (PORK)  or to subsidize their very small class sizes and rich array of elective courses and special programs with add-ons such as minimum foundation aid. But aid programs for these districts are merely the bells and whistles – or PORK – of state school finance policies, the political tradeoffs which are often needed to get a formula passed. It’s not a politically easy task, but it’s time to collect that pork and redistribute it to where it’s actually needed.

Further, it is highly unlikely that these districts will actually go without those bells and whistles – that they will forgo their furs and Ferraris. Yes, we all know that school finance formulas are a complicated mix of political tradeoffs. The goal of this post is to make that painfully clear. Let’s call it what it is – school finance Pork. And let’s take that pork and make better use of it. And let’s make it absolutely clear that protecting the pork while slashing basic needs is entirely unacceptable.

There may not be enough pork in the system to either cover all of the proposed cuts, or to be redistributed to fully resolve the funding deficits of higher need districts. But in New York State and many others, there’s quite a bit – quite a bit of aid that could be either used to make the formula fairer to begin with or to buffer the neediest districts and children they serve from suffering the most harmful and real funding cuts.

Note: On Cuts and Caps

Now, some of what I discuss herein is complicated by the current bipartisan political preference to show affluent communities that we’re not going to push these costs off onto them in the form of property tax increases – or backhanded property tax increases through state aid cuts. Instead, we’ll tell them they simply can’t raise their property taxes to cover the difference. That’ll learn ’em!

Capping property taxes while cutting state aid, is simply lying about the true cost of the programs and services desired by local citizens, who invariably have supported tax increases for their local schools and have reverted to major private giving when tax increases were not feasible. There are legitimate reasons to control local spending variation – a topic for another day – and states need to have such policy tools available. But slash-and-cap policies are generally shortsighted and ill-conceived.

Cutting and limiting property taxes merely shifts the burden in yet a different direction – increased fees, private fundraising, volunteering etc. All of which increase inequities in access to quality schooling.

Yeah, I know… all of the pundity types are saying that voters are fed up… they totally underestimate what’s being spent on their schools and they’re totally fed up with paying higher taxes. They don’t want any more of this school spending – bloated bureaucracy, etc. I might buy that if the local voter behavior in affluent communities with preferences for high quality schooling actually supported that argument. But it doesn’t!

Understanding Education Costs versus “Inflation”

We often see pundits arguing that education spending has doubled over a 30 year period, when adjusted for inflation, and we’ve gotten nothing for it. We’ve got modest growth in NAEP scores and huge growth in spending. And those international comparisons… wow!

The assertion is therefore that our public education system is less cost-effective now than it was 30 years ago. But this assumption is based on layers of flawed reasoning, on both sides of the equation.

Here’s a bit of School Finance 101 on this topic:

First, what are the two sides of the equation, or at least the two parts of the fraction? The numerator here is education spending and how we measure it now compared to previously. The major flaw in the usual reasoning is that we are making our comparison of the education dollar now to then by simply adjusting the value of that dollar for the average changes in the prices of goods purchased by a typical consumer (food, fuel, etc.), or the Consumer Price Index.

Unfortunately, the consumer price index is relatively unhelpful (okay, useless) for comparing current education spending to past education spending, unless we are considering how many loaves of bread or gallons of gas can be purchased with the education dollar.

If we wanted to maintain constant quality education over time, the main thing we’d have to do is maintain a constant quality workforce in schools – mainly a teacher workforce, but also administrators, etc. At the very least, if quality lagged behind we’d have to be able to offset the quality losses with additional workers, but the trade-offs are hard to estimate.

The quality of the teacher workforce is influenced much more by the competitiveness of the wages for teachers, compared to other professions, than to changes in the price of a loaf of bread or gallon of gas. If we want to get good teachers, teaching must be perceived as a desirable profession with a competitive wage. That is, to maintain teacher quality we must maintain the competitiveness of teacher wages (which we have not over time) and to improve teacher quality, we must make teacher wages (or working conditions) more competitive. On average, non-teacher wage growth has far outpaced the CPI over time and on average, teacher wages have lagged behind non-teacher wages, even in New Jersey!

Now to the denominator or the outcomes of our education system. First of all, if we allow for a decline in the quality of the key input – teachers – we can expect a decline in the outcomes however we choose to measure them. But, it is also important to understand that if we wish to achieve either higher outcomes, or to achieve a broader array of outcomes, or to achieve higher outcomes in key areas without sacrificing the broader array of outcomes, costs will rise. In really simple terms, the cost of doing more is more, not less. And yes, a substantial body of rigorous peer-reviewed empirical literature supports this contention (a few examples below).

So, as we ask our schools to accomplish more we can expect the costs of those accomplishments to be greater. If we expect our children to compete in a 21st century economy, develop technology skills and still have access to physical education and arts, it will likely cost more, not less, than achieving the skills of 1970. But, we must also make sure we are adequately measuring the full range of outcomes we expect schools to accomplish. If we are expecting schools to produce engaged civic participants, we may or may not see the measured effects in elementary reading and math test scores.

An additional factor that affects the costs of achieving educational outcomes is the student inputs – or who is showing up at the schoolhouse door (or logging in to the virtual school). A substantial body of research (see chapter by Duncombe and Yinger, here) explains how child poverty, limited English proficiency, unplanned mobility and even school racial composition may influence the costs of achieving any given level of student outcomes. Differences in the ways children are sorted across districts and schools create large differences in the costs of achieving comparable outcomes and so too do changes in the overall demography of the student population over time. Escalating poverty, and mobility induced by housing disruptions, increased numbers of children not speaking English proficiently all lead to increases of the cost of achieving even the same level of outcomes achieved in prior years. This is not an excuse. It’s reality. It costs more to achieve the same outcomes with some students than with others.

In short, the “cost” of education rises as a function of at least 3 major factors:

  1. Changes in the incoming student populations over time
  2. Changes in the desired outcomes for those students, including more rigorous core content area goals or increased breadth of outcome goals
  3. Changes in the competitive wage of the desired quality of school personnel

And the interaction of all three of these! For example, changing student populations making teaching more difficult (a working condition), meaning that a higher wage might be required to simply offset this change. Increasing the complexity of outcome goals might require a more skilled teaching workforce, requiring higher wages.

The combination of these forces often leads to an increase in education spending that far outpaces the consumer price index, and it should. Cost rise as we ask more of our schools, as we ask them to produce a citizenry that can compete in the future rather than the past. Costs rise as the student population inputs to our public schooling system change over time. Increased poverty, language barriers and other factors make even the current outcomes more costly to achieve. And costs of maintaining the quality of the teacher workforce change as competitive wages in other occupations and industries change, which they have.

Typically, state school finance systems have not kept up with the true increased costs of maintaining teacher quality, increased outcome demands or changing student demography. Nor have states sufficiently targeted resources to districts facing the highest costs of achieving desired outcomes. See www.schoolfundingfairness.org. And many states, with significantly changing demography including Arizona, California and Colorado have merely maintained or even cut current spending levels for decades (despite what would be increased costs of even maintaining current outcome levels).

Evaluating education spending solely on the basis of changes in the price of a loaf of bread and/or gallon of gasoline is, well, silly.

Notably, we may identify new “efficiencies” that allow us to produce comparable outcomes, with comparable kids at lower cost. We may find some of those efficiencies through existing variation across schools and districts, or through new experimentation. But it is downright foolish to pretend that those efficiencies are simply out there (even if we can’t see them, or don’t know them) and we can simply squeeze the current system into achieving comparable or better outcomes at lower cost.

Readings

Baker, B.D., Taylor, L., Vedlitz, A. (2008) Adequacy Estimates and the Implications of Common Standards for the Cost of Instruction. National Research Council.  http://www7.nationalacademies.org/CFE/Taylor%20Paper.pdf

Duncombe, W., Lukemeyer, A., Yinger, J. (2006) The No Child Left Behind Act: Have Federal Funds been Left Behind? http://cpr.maxwell.syr.edu/efap/Publications/costing_out.pdf

This second one is a really fun article showing the vast differences in the costs of achieving NCLB proficiency targets in two neighboring states which happen to have very different testing standards. In really simple terms, Missouri has a hard test with low proficiency rates and Kansas and easy test with high proficiency rates. The authors show the cost implications of achieving the lower, versus higher tested achievement standards.

Thinking through cost-benefit analysis and layoff policies


If you’re running a school district or a private school and you are deciding on what to keep in your budget and what to discard, you are making trade-offs. You are making trade-offs as to whether you want to spend money on X or on Y, or perhaps a more complicated mix of many options. How you come to your decision depends on a number of factors:

  1. The cost – the total costs of the various ingredients that go into providing X and providing Y. That is, how many people, at what salary and benefits, how much space at what overhead cost (per time used) and how much stuff (materials, supplies and equipment) and at what market prices?
  2. The benefits – the potential dollar return to doing X versus doing Y. For example, how much dollar savings might be generated in operating cost savings from reorganizing our staffing and use of space, if we spend up front (capital expenses) to reorganize and consolidate our elementary schools where they have become significantly imbalanced over time?
  3. The effects – the relative effectiveness of doing X versus doing Y. For example, in the simplest case, if we are choosing between two reading programs, what are the reading achievement gains, or effects, from each program? Or, more pertinent to the current conversation (but far more complex to estimates), what are the relative effects of reducing class size by 2 students when compared to keeping a “high quality” teacher.
  4. The utility – The utility of each option refers to the extent that the option in question addresses a preferred outcome goal. Utility is about preferences, or tastes. For example, in the current accountability context, one might be pressured to place greater “utility” on improving math or reading outcomes in grades 3 through 8. If the costs of a preferred program are comparable to the costs of a less preferred program… well… the preferred program wins. There are many ways to determine what’s “preferred,” and more often than not, public input plays a key role especially in smaller, more affluent suburban school districts. As noted above, federal and state policy have played a significant role in defining utility in the past decade (and arguably, distorting resource allocation to a point of significant imbalance in resource-constrained districts)

This basic cost analysis framework laid out by Henry Levin back in 1983 and revisited by Levin and McEwan since should provide the basis for important trade-off decisions in school budgeting and should provide the conceptual basis for arguments like those made by Petrilli and Roza in their recent policy brief. But such a framework is noticeably absent and likely so because most of the proposals made by Petrilli and Roza:

  1. are not sufficiently precise to apply such a framework  largely because little is known about the likely outcomes (which may in fact be quite harmful); and
  2. because they have failed entirely to consider in detail the related costs of proposed options, especially up-front costs of many of the options (like school reorganization or developing teacher evaluation systems). Note that the full length book (from which the brief comes) is no more thoughtful or rigorous.

Back of the Napkin Application to Layoff Options

Allow me to provide a back-of-the-napkin example of some of the pieces that might go into determining the savings and/or benefits from the BIG suggestion made by Pettrilli and Roza – which is to use quality based layoffs in place of seniority based layoffs when cutting budgets. This one would seem to be a no-brainer. Clearly, if we layoff based on quality, we’ll have better teachers left (greater effectiveness) and we’ll have saved a ton money or a ton of teachers. That is, if we are determined to layoff X teachers, it will save more money to lay off more senior, more expensive teachers than to lay off novice teachers. However, that’s not the likely what-if scenario. More likely is that we are faced with cutting X% of our staffing budget, so the difference will be in the number of teachers we need to lay off in order to achieve that X%, and the benefit difference might be measured in terms of the change in average class size resulting from laying off teachers by “quality” measures and laying off teachers by seniority.

Let’s lay out some of the pieces of this cost benefit analysis to show its complexity.

First of all, let’s consider how to evaluate the distribution of the different layoff policies.

Option 1 – Layoffs based on seniority

This one is relatively easy and involves starting from the bottom in terms of experience and laying off as many junior teachers as necessary to achieve 5% savings to our staffing budget.

Option 2 – Layoffs based on quality

Here’s the tricky part. Budget cuts and layoffs are here and now. Most districts do not have in place rigorous teacher evaluation systems that would allow them to make high stakes decisions based on teacher quality metrics. AND, existing teacher quality metrics where they do exist (NY, DC, LA) are very problematic. So, on the one hand, if districts rush to immediately implement “quality” based layoffs, districts will likely revert to relying heavily on some form of student test score driven teacher effectiveness rating, modeled crudely (like the LA Times model).  Recall that even in better models of this type, we are looking at a 35% chance of identifying an average teacher as “bad” and 20% chance of identifying a good teacher as “bad.”

In general, the good and bad value-added ratings fall somewhat randomly across the experience distribution. So, for simplicity in this example, I will assume that quality based firings are essentially random. That is, they would result in dismissals randomly distributed across the experience range. Arguably, value-added based layoffs are little more than random, given that a) there is huge year to year error even when comparing on the same test and b) there are huge differences when rating teachers using one test, versus using another.

Testing this out with Newark Public Schools – Elementary Classroom Teachers 2009-10

At the very least, one would think that randomly firing our way to a 5% personnel budget cut would create a huge difference when compared to firing our way to a 5% personnel budget cut by eliminating the newest and cheapest teachers. I’m going to run these numbers using salaries only, for illustrative purposes (one can make many fun arguments about how to parse out fixed vs. variable benefits costs, or deferred benefits vs. short run cost differences for pensions and deferred sick pay, etc.).

We start with just over 1,000 elementary classroom teachers in Newark Public Schools, and assume an average class size of 25 for simplicity. The number of teachers is real (at least according to state data) but the class sizes are artificially simplified. We are also assuming all students and classroom space to be interchangeable.  A 5% cut is about $3.7 million. Let’s assume we’ve already done our best to cut elsewhere in the district budget, perhaps more than 5% across other areas, but we are left with the painful reality of cutting 5% from core classroom teachers in grades K-8. In any case, we’re hoping for some dramatic saving here – or at least benefits revealed in terms of keeping class sizes in check.

Figure 1: Staffing Cut Scenarios for Newark Public Schools using 2009-10 Data

If we layoff only the least experienced teachers to achieve the 5% cut, we layoff only teachers with 3 or fewer years of experience when using the Newark data.  The average experience of those laid off is 1.8 years. And we end up laying off 72 teachers (a sucky reality no matter how you cut it).

If we use a random number generator to determine layoffs (really, a small difference from using Value-added modeling), we end up laying off only 54 teachers instead of 72. We save 18 teachers, or 1.7% of our elementary classroom teacher workforce.

What’s the class size effect of saving these 18 teachers? Well, under the seniority based layoff policy, class size rises from 25 to 26.86. Under the random layoff policy, class size rises from 25 to 26.37. That is, class size is affected by about half a student per class. This may be important, but it still seems like a relatively small effect for a BIG policy change. This option necessarily assumes no downside to the random loss of experienced teachers. Of course, the argument is that more of those classes now have a good teacher in front of them. But again, doing this here and now with the type of information available means relying not even on the “best” of teacher effectiveness models, but relying on expedited, particularly sloppy, not thoroughly vetted models. I would have continued concerns even with richer models, like those explored in the recent Gates/Kane report, which still prove insufficient.

Perhaps most importantly, how does this new policy affect the future teacher workforce in Newark – the desirability for up-and-coming teachers to pursue a teaching career in Newark, where their career might be cut off at any point, by random statistical error? And how does that tradeoff balance with a net difference of about half a student per classroom?

What about other costs?

Petrilli and Roza, among others, ignore entirely any potential downside to the teacher workforce – those who might choose to enter that workforce if school districts or states al-of-the-sudden decide to rely heavily on error prone and biased measures of teacher effectiveness to implement layoff policies.  This downside might be counterbalanced by increased salaries, on average and especially on the front end. That is, to achieve equal incoming teacher quality over time, given the new uncertainty, might require higher front end salaries. This cost is ignored entirely (or simply assumed to come from somewhere else, like cutting benefits… simply negating step increments, or supplements for master’s degrees, each of which have other unmeasured consequences).

I have assumed above that districts would rely heavily on available student testing data, creating error-prone, largely random layoffs, while ignoring the cost of applying the evaluation system to achieve the layoffs. Arguably, even contracting an outside statistician to run the models and identifying the teachers to be laid off would cost another $50,000 to $75,000, leading to reduction of at least one more teacher position under the “quality based” layoff model.

And then there are the legal costs of fighting the due process claims that the dismissals were arbitrary and the potential legal claims over racially disparate firings. Forthcoming law review article to be posted soon.

Alternatively, developing a more rigorous teacher evaluation system that might more legitimately guide layoff policies requires significant up-front costs, ignored entirely in the current overly simplistic, misguided rhetoric.

How can we implement quality based layoffs when we’re supposed to be laying off teachers NOT teaching math and reading in elementary grades?

Here’s another issue that Petrilli, Roza and others seem to totally ignore. They argue that we must a) dismiss teachers based on quality and b) must make sure we don’t compromise class sizes in core instructional areas, like reading and math in the elementary grades.

Let’s ponder this for a moment. The only teachers to whom we can readily assign (albeit deeply flawed) effectiveness ratings are those teaching math and reading between grades 3 and 8. So, the only teachers who we could conceivably layoff based on preferred “reformy” quality metrics are teachers who are directly responsible for teaching math and reading between grades 3 and 8.

That is, in order to implement quality based layoffs, as reformers suggest, we must be laying off math and reading teachers between grades 3 and 8, except that we are supposed to be laying off other teachers, not those teachers. WOW… didn’t think that one through very well… did they?

Am I saying seniority layoffs are great?

No. Clearly seniority layoffs are imperfect and arguably there is no perfect answer to layoff policies. Layoffs suck and sometimes that sucky option has to be implemented. Sometimes that that sucky option has to be implemented with a blunt and convenient instrument and one that is easily defined, such as years of service. It is foolish to argue that teaching is the only profession where those who’ve been around for a while – those who’ve done their time – have greater protection when the axe comes down. Might I suggest that paying one’s dues even plays a significant role in many private sector jobs? Really? And it is equally foolish to argue that every other profession EXCEPT TEACHING necessarily makes precise quality decisions regarding employees when that axe comes down.

The tradeoff being made in this case is a tradeoff  NOT between “keeping quality teachers” versus “keeping old, dead wood” as Petrilli, Roza and others would argue, but rather the tradeoff between laying off teachers on the unfortunately crude basis of seniority only, versus laying off teachers on a marginally-better-than-random, roll-of-the-dice basis. I would argue the latter may actually be more problematic for the future quality of the teaching workforce!  Yes, pundits seem to think that destabilizing the teaching workforce can only make it better. How could it possibly get worse, they argue? Substantially increasing the uncertainty of career earnings for teachers can certainly make it worse.

Bad Teachers Hurt Kids, but Salary Cuts Have no Down Side?

The assumption constantly thrown around in these policy briefs is that putting a bad teacher in front of the kids is the worst possible thing you could do. We have to fire those teachers. They are bad for kids. They hurt kids.

But, the same pundits argue that we should cut pay for the teachers in any number of ways (including paying for benefits) and subject teachers to layoff policies that are little more than random. Since so many teachers are bad teachers – and simply bad people – these policies are, of course, not offensive. Right? Kids good. Teachers bad. Treat kids well. Take it out on teachers. No harm to kids. Easy!

I’m having a hard time swallowing that. That’s just not a reasonable way to treat a workforce (if you want a good workforce), no less a reasonable way to treat a workforce charged with educating children. In fact, it’s bad for the kids, and just plain ignorant to assert that one can treat the teachers badly, lower their pay, morale and ultimately the quality of the teacher workforce and expect there to be no downside for the kids.

Petrilli and Roza make the assumption that there is big savings to be found from cutting teacher salaries directly and also indirectly by passing along benefits costs to teachers.  That’s a salary cut! Or at least a cut to the total compensation package and it’s a package deal! This argument seems to be coupled with an assumption that there is absolutely no loss of benefit or effectiveness from pursuing this cost-cutting approach (because we’ll be firing all of the sucky teachers anyway). That is, teacher quality will remain constant even if teacher salaries are cut substantially.  A substantial body of research questions that assumption:

  • Murnane and Olson (1989) find that salaries affect the decision to enter teaching and the duration of the teaching career;
  • Figlio (1997, 2002) and Ferguson (1991) find that higher salaries are associated with better qualified teachers;
  • Figlio and Reuben (2001) “find that tax limits systematically reduce the average quality of education majors, as well as new public school teachers in states that have passed these limits;”
  • Ondrich, Pas and Yinger (2008) “find that teachers in districts with higher salaries relative to non-teaching salaries in the same county are less likely to leave teaching and that a teacher is less likely to change districts when he or she teaches in a district near the top of the teacher salary distribution in that county.”

To mention a few.

That is, in the aggregate, higher salaries (and better working conditions) can attract a stronger teacher workforce, and at a local level, having more competitive teaching salaries compared either to non-teaching jobs in the same labor market or compared to teaching jobs in other districts in the same labor market can help attract and especially retain teachers.

Allegretto, Corcoran and Mishel, among others, have shown that teacher wages have lagged over time – fallen behind non-teaching professions. AND, they have shown that the benefits differences are smaller than many others argue and certainly do not make up the difference in the wage deficit over time. I have shown previously on my blog that teacher wages in New Jersey have similarly lagged behind!

So, let’s assume we believe that teacher quality necessarily trumps reduced class size, for the same dollar spent. Sadly, this has been a really difficult trade-off to untangle in empirical research and while reformers boldly assume this, the evidence is not clear. But let’s accept that assumption. But let’s also accept the evidence that overall wages and local wage advantages lead to a stronger teacher workforce.

If that’s the case, then the appropriate decision to make at the district level would be to lay off teachers and marginally increase class sizes, while making sure to keep salaries competitive. After all, the aggregate data seem to suggest that over the past few decades we’ve increased the number of personnel more than we’ve increased the salaries of those personnel. That is, cut numbers of staff before cutting or freezing salaries. In fact, one might even choose to cut more staff and pay even higher salaries to gain competitive advantage in tough economic times. Some have suggested as much.  I’m not sold on that either, especially when we start talking about increasing class sizes to 30, 35 or even 50.  Note that class size may also affect the competitive wage that must be paid to a teacher in order to recruit and retain teachers of constant quality. Nonetheless, it is important to understand the role of teacher compensation in ensuring the overall quality of the teacher workforce and it is absurd to assume no negative consequences of slashing teacher pay across-the-board.

Take home point!

In summary, we should be providing thoughtful decision frameworks for local public school administrators to make cost-effective decisions regarding resource allocation rather than spewing laundry lists of reformy strategies for which no thoughtful cost-effectiveness analysis has ever been conducted.

Further, now is not the time to act in panic and haste to adopt these unfounded strategies without appropriate consideration of the up-front costs of making truly effective reforms.

A few references

Richard J. Murnane and Randall Olsen (1989) The effects of salaries and opportunity costs on length of state in teaching. Evidence from Michigan. Review of Economics and Statistics 71 (2) 347-352

David N. Figlio (1997) Teacher Salaries and Teacher Quality. Economics Letters 55 267-271.

David N. Figlio (2002) Can Public Schools Buy Better-Qualified Teachers?” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55, 686-699.

Figlio (1997, 2002) and Ferguson (1991) find that higher salaries are associated with better qualified teachers

Ronald Ferguson (1991) Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters. Harvard Journal on Legislation. 28 (2) 465-498.

Figlio, D.N., Reuben, K. (2001) Tax limits and the qualifications of new teachers Journal of Public Economics 80 (1) 49-71

Ondrich, J., Pas, E., Yinger, J. (2008) The Determinants of Teacher Attrition in Upstate New York.  Public Finance Review 36 (1) 112-144

Introducing the Reform-Inator!

Introducing the Coolest New Gadget of the Year – just in time for last-day shopping! The Reform-inator!

  1. Can be used to instantly fire and/or de-tenurize teachers. However, in order to use the reform-inator for these purposes you must line up 100 teachers including all of the good, bad and average ones. The reforminator is a bit touchy… and misfires quite frequently … hitting an average teacher instead of a truly bad one about 35% of the time, and hitting a good teacher instead of a truly bad one about 20% of the time. But what the heck… go for it. Thin the herd. Probabilities are in your favor, if only marginally. And besides, there will be plenty more teachers willing to step up and face the firing line next year.
  2. Can be used to instantly replicate (or new reformy term: scalify, or scalification) only the upper half of charter schools, because we all know that the upper half of charter schools are … well… better than average ones, and well… good charters are good… and bad ones bad (but no need to talk about those, just as there’s no need to talk about the good traditional public schools)… so we really want to replicate and expand only those good charters (primarily by reduced regulation, increased numbers of authorizers and reduced oversight requirements, even though the track record to date hasn’t really shown that to be easily accomplished).
  3. Can be used to take anything that is presently about 7% smaller than it was in the past, and make it disappear entirely – GONE… ALL GONE… just like all of the money for public schools. It’s not just recessed – temporarily diminished – It’s just gone. Vanished. Time to shut it all down! No more sweetheart deals (especially in those really crazy overspending states like Arizona and Utah)!
  4. Can instantly make value-added estimates of teacher effectiveness the “true” measure of teacher effectiveness, and further, can make value-added estimates of teacher effectiveness a stronger predictor of themselves… which of course, are the true measure of effectiveness (stronger than a weak to moderate correlation, that is). Use the special self-validation trigger for this particular effect. Also works for low self-esteem.
  5. Can be used to locate Superman (‘cuz I sure can’t find him in these scatterplots of NYC charter school performance compared to traditional public schools, or these from Jersey either).
  6. Will eliminate entirely anything that might be labeled as Status Quo! Because we all know that if it’s status quo – it’s got to go (or at the very least, the first reformy role of logic: “anything is better than the status quo”)
  7. Most importantly, like any good REFORMY tool, it’s got a Trigger!

Other ideas?

Is it the “New Normal” or the “New Stupid?”

I’ll admit from the start that I’m recycling some arguments here (okay… all of the arguments) … but this stuff needs to be reinforced, over and over again. Quite honestly, to me, from a school finance perspective, this is the most important issue that has surfaced in the past year, and potentially the most dangerous and damaging for the future of American public education.

Robert Reich of Berkeley recently wrote of the Attack on American Education:

http://wallstreetpit.com/54502-the-attack-on-american-education

Specifically, Reich pointed to substantial budget cuts across states as evidence of our de-investment in public schooling. Here are the first three states (by alphabetical order), and the education spending cuts mentioned by Reich in his blog post:

  • Arizona has eliminated preschool for 4,328 children, funding for schools to provide additional support to disadvantaged children from preschool to third grade, aid to charter schools, and funding for books, computers, and other classroom supplies. The state also halved funding for kindergarten, leaving school districts and parents to shoulder the cost of keeping their children in school beyond a half-day schedule.
  • California has reduced K-12 aid to local school districts by billions of dollars and is cutting a variety of programs, including adult literacy instruction and help for high-needs students.
  • Colorado has reduced public school spending in FY 2011 by $260 million, nearly a 5 percent decline from the previous year. The cut amounts to more than $400 per student.

As I have mentioned on numerous previous occasions, even the assumption that these cuts represent “de-investment” (suggesting cutting back on something that has been scaled up over time) is flawed, because it accepts that these states actually invested to begin with. Reich points out that current attack is a seemingly unprecedented attack on public education budgets across states, in both K-12 and higher education and arguably an attack on promoting an educated society more generally:

Have we gone collectively out of our minds? Our young people — their capacities to think, understand, investigate, and innovate — are America’s future. In the name of fiscal prudence we’re endangering that future.

But even Reich’s arguments fail to point out that in many of these states, the attack on education and de-investment (if there ever was significant investment, or scale up) has been occurring for decades. In good times, and in bad… Bad economic times just provide a more convenient excuse. Couple that with all of the new rhetoric about the “New Normal” and the excuses to slash-and-burn public school funding are at an all time high.

Let’s review:

First, here’s where the above three states fit into comparisons of state and local education revenue per pupil. Yes, some of the higher spending states are cutting back as well, if you read down Reich’s list of education spending cuts, but these three states have a particularly rich history of low spending and education cutbacks (including year after year mid-year funding recisions, even in good economic times in Colorado) .

Figure 1

Okay,so who cares if they aren’t spending that much. Maybe it’s because they’ve been taxing themselves to death… like we all have, obviously… we all know that… and that education spending is simply eating away at their economies. It’s just not sustainable!

So, here are direct expenditures on education (k-12 and higher ed) as a percent of aggregate personal income for each state. California has been flat, and low for over 30 years and Colorado and Arizona which were once relatively high, have decreased their effort consistently for about 30 years, in a race to the bottom.

Figure 2

Total Direct Education Spending as a Percent of Personal Income

Yeah but… yeah but….yeah but… it’s because their total taxes are so darn high. This is just education. Well then:

Figure 3

Yes, even on these, California is perhaps somewhat above average, whereas Colorado in recent years has been sitting near the bottom. Arizona jumped up in recent years, but is by no means high, compared with other states or trended, over time, out of control.

But even then, we know they’ve all gone wild on teacher hiring… bloating that teacher workforce, reducing class sizes and pupil teacher ratios to inefficiently low levels:

Figure 4

Pupil to Teacher Ratios over Time

Okay, well maybe not California, Arizona or Colorado (or Utah… in Gray at the top of the figure). California did increase teacher numbers in the late 1990s with class size reduction, but that flattened out and increased since, with lack of financial support.

But we all know that none of this matters anyway, right?

In fact, REFORMY logic dictates that it’s those states which have been spending like crazy, wasting their effort and paying for way too many teachers that are a real drag on our national test scores AND our economy.

The problem is not states like California, Arizona or reformy standouts like Colorado (or Tennessee or Lousiana), but rather, those over-educated curmudgeonly high spending non-reformy, low pupil teacher ratio states like Vermont, Massachusetts and New Jersey.

They – yes they – with their gold-plated schools are the shame of our nation (and why we can’t be Finland, right?)!  Our national education emergency (if there is one) is certainly not the fault of those states exercising consistent and appropriate fiscal austerity in good times or in bad.

Well:

Figure 5

Relationship Between State & Local Revenue per Pupil (for high poverty districts) & NAEP Mean Scale Scores

www.schoolfundingfairness.org

On average, states like Arizona and California which have high need student populations, but have thrown their public schools under the bus, are a significant drag on our national performance.

And this is due to lack of effort as much as it is lack of capacity.  Higher effort states also tend to be the higher spending states which also tend to have the higher outcomes. And, when taken as a separate group, compare quite favorably on international performance comparisons.

Figure 6

Relationship between Fiscal Effort and Level of Financial Resources

www.schoolfundingfairness.org

Finally, these differences in outcomes, effort and pupil to teacher ratios are not all about differences in poverty. Again, I’ve already pointed out that these states have high pupil-to-teacher ratios and low spending not because they are poor but rather because they don’t put up the effort.

And now we are boldly (and belligerently) encouraging them to “do more with less” by which we actually mean “do even less with less?”

To clarify how poverty rates fit within this picture, Figure 7 provides adjusted state poverty estimates (see citation below figure) and pupil to teacher ratios. At their respective poverty levels, each of these states has higher – if not much higher than average pupil to teacher ratios. They also have much lower than average per pupil spending.

Figure 7

State Cost Adjusted Poverty Estimates and Pupil to Teacher Ratios

Renwick, Trudi. Alternative Geographic Adjustments of U.S. Poverty Thresholds: Impact on State Poverty Rates. U.S. Census Bureau, August 2009

Further, while these states have higher pupil to teacher ratios than other states with similar poverty rates, they also have very low outcomes even compared to other states with similar corrected poverty rates. Colorado remains somewhat in the middle of the pack on outcomes, having a lower poverty population than either Arizona or California and also having more recently slashed and burned its public education system. Colorado pupil to teacher ratios have also remained closer to those of other states, and much lower than California or Arizona.

Figure 8

State Cost Adjusted Poverty Estimates and NAEP Mean Outcomes

 

How does this all fit into the long-run picture of investment in public schooling? Yes, we’ve had the most significant economic downturn in several decades. State budgets took a hit, and good information on that budget hit can be found at www.rockinst.org, where, among other things, data show that the most recent quarterly estimates of state revenue are still about 7% off their peak in 2008. That’s 7% – not 100%, not 20% (even more important is the variation across states). It’s a hole. But it’s not ALL GONE (and only a complete fool would argue as much)! Note that there have been in the past few decades at least two other significant economic slowdowns/downturns that affected state revenues and education spending – from about 1989 to 1992 – with lagged effects in some regions, and from 2001 to 2002 (post 9/11 shock).  In some states, education spending rebounded in the wake of these downturns, but in others, state legislatures continued to constrain if not outright slash-and burn state education budgets (while expanding tax cuts) throughout the economic good times that followed each downturn (1996ish to 2001 and 2002 t 2008).

What’s different now? Why are we sitting at the edge of a much more dangerous policy agenda? Well, the recent economic downturn was greater. But again, recent data shows the beginnings of a rebound. What is most different is that we are now faced with this completely absurd argument of The New Normal – as a national agenda to scale back education spendingEVEN IN STATES WHERE IT HAD ALREADY BEEN SCALED BACK FOR DECADES. But who knew? Didn’t every state just spend out of its freakin’ mind for …oh… the past hundred years or so?

The New Normal argument that we must cut back our bloated education budgets and increase class sizes and pupil to teacher ratios back to reasonable levels is, at best, based on the shallowest understanding of (hyper-aggregated & overstated) national “trends” in education spending and pupil to teacher ratios, coupled with complete obliviousness to the variations in effort and spending and pupil to teacher ratios that exist across states, and for that matter, the demographic trends in some states which make it appear as if education spending has spiraled out of control (Vermont). That is, if we assume that those pitching-tweeting-blogging The New Normal have even the first clue about trends in education spending, state school finance systems, and the quality of public schooling across states to begin with. Personally, I’m not sure they do. In fact, I’m increasingly convinced they don’t.

Still searching for that pot of gold

The rhetoric about our decades-long drunken spending spree just won’t stop, nor will the rhetoric that the money is all gone. All of it. Nothin’ left. We spent it all. We taxed ourselves to the limit and those damn teachers unions and public schools just took it all and left us with the bill. It’s gone! all gone!

Here are some recent quotes/comments from pundits who’ve done little analytically but to offer a few absurd back of the napkin explanations for why they believe that a) we’ve been on a drunken spending spree and b) it’s all gone!

Andy Rotherham in Time:

the golden age of school spending is likely coming to an end.

http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2035999,00.html

There’s so much more in this article, including statements about how it’s plainly obvious that for each worker added to a private firm, there is an immediate incremental return in production output (each additional worker adds $x worth of output to any private firm) whereas in education we continue to add workers and see nothing in return. Both parts of this assumption are… well… just nutty.

So, Rotherham has given us the argument that our “golden age” of school spending is coming to an end. And Mike Petrilli, in a twitter-battle with Diane Ravitch has laid down the Petrillian Truth (roll with that one Mike…it’s got a nice ring) that “The Money is Gone!”

MichaelPetrilli: That’s a great line, Diane, but it doesn’t solve the problem. The money is gone. We have to help schools cut smart.
http://educationnext.org/in-which-i-debate-diane-ravitch-in-140-characters-or-less/

That’s right. It’s all gone. It’s freakin’ gone. Cut, cut, cut. Cut it all. Zero out public education. It doesn’t matter what state you live in, what part of the country, your state has taxed you to the limit and has spent it all on the edu-bureaucracy. Every state… the whole nation has simply been pouring money into schools and they have to stop because the money is gone.

Okay, really, how much is gone? And has any of it come back yet? Is it really all gone forever? Is 20% gone, 50%, or perhaps even 70%? Must we reset the system to an average cost that is, say, 20% below where it was in 2008? 10?

You know, there are actually legitimate researchers and organizations out there tracking the condition of state and local revenues. And while these have been some tough times, their findings are somewhat less apocolyptic than the comments of Rotherham and Petrilli above… who don’t actually look at state budget data when making these claims. Here are the findings from the most recent quarterly report from the Rockefeller Institute:

The Rockefeller Institute’s compilation of data from 48 early reporting states shows collections from major tax sources increased by 3.9 percent in nominal terms compared to the third quarter of 2009, but was 7.0 percent below the same period two years ago. Gains were widespread, with 42 states showing an increase in revenues compared to a year earlier. After adjusting for inflation, tax revenues increased by 2.6 percent in the third quarter of 2010 compared to the same quarter of 2009. States’ personal income taxes represented a $2.5 billion gain and sales taxes a $2.0 billion gain for the period.
www.rockinst.org

Yes, revenues are down. State revenues are still rolling in about 7% below where they were in 2008, but in most states have begun to rebound… in order to reach that level. We took a hit. States took a hit. Some took a bigger hit than others and some are rebounding more quickly and others more slowly.

But, I must also reiterate that not every state really put their heart into public schools or the combination of their elementary and secondary and higher education systems to begin with. Many have already been systematically reducing their spending effort for years.

A few national graphs first. Here’s total state and local government expenditure as a share of personal income over time.Yes, on average, it has climbed slightly over 30 years. And, it has oscillated in between, with government expenditure (state and local) declining as a share of personal income during those periods when personal income grew quickly.

Elementary, secondary and higher education do make up a sizable share of this spending – albeit not clearly a drunken spree. Here’s education direct expenditures as a share of state and local general expenditures over the same time period.

So, the reality is that education spending first declined as a share of general spending and has since leveled off. So actually, it may be some of that other stuff that’s creating pressure on the system, a point duly acknowledged by Rotherham. But, the current argument seems to be that public schools are discretionary – negotiable – and all of that other stuff is not. Either way, even the total growth in the previous figure is not that disconcerting.  A whole other discussion for a later point in time is the issue of how many states have kicked non-current expenditures (pension obligations and other debt) down the road for someone else to deal with.

Most importantly, however, here are the differences in direct education spending as a share of personal income across states. When it comes to public K-12 and higher education systems, states vary widely. Some have provided high levels of support for schools, allocated that support fairly and maintained appropriate levels of effort to finance their education systems. Others have thrown their education systems under the bus. They don’t need some data-proof ideologue to tell them that the money is gone and now’s the time to cut.

This figure, like the ones in my previous “bubble” post, shows the variation in “effort” across states – measured somewhat differently – but same conclusion. That’s the thing – I keep taking different angles on these data and they keep telling me similar stories – that many states have actually systematically reduced their “effort” to finance public education systems over time, and yes, some have increased effort. And, there’s an interesting story behind each trend. Again, Vermont has systematically scaled up education spending relative to personal income over time. New Jersey has increased over time as well, but New Jersey has only risen to  a relatively below average position over time. By contrast, Colorado and Arizona both provide LESS DIRECT SPENDING ON EDUCATION AS A SHARE OF PERSONAL INCOME IN 2008 THAN THEY DID IN 1977!!!!!!!!!!  And they are not the only ones.  Perhaps those states need a correction in the other direction?

It will indeed be interesting to see how these “effort” measures shift as income takes a temporary hit and a bigger one that it has in the past. Most of the differences in the level of “effort” in the above figure are a function of income. States with higher personal income are able to raise what they need in education spending with a much smaller share of income. Even New Jersey, which is a relatively high spending state has relatively low effort. Other lower effort states include Connecticut and Massachusetts.

But, back to the point – These national aggregate claims that we’re tapped out – all of us – and every state – are entirely inappropriate and irresponsible. Let’s take a hard look and a more precise look at what’s really going on. Let’s focus our attention on useful quarterly reports like those from Rockefeller Institute on the condition of state revenue and lets provide appropriately differentiated instruction to states based on the widely varied conditions they face and the widely varied levels of effort they’ve applied thus far toward improving their education systems. The current rhetoric is unhelpful, and sadly, I think that’s the point!

The problem? Cheerleading and Ceramics, of course!

David Reber with the Topeka Examiner had a great post a while back (April, 2010) addressing the deceptive logic that we should be outraged by supposed exorbitant spending on things like cheerleading and ceramics, and not worry so much about the little things, like disparities between wealthy and poor school districts. I finally saw this post today, from a tweet, and realized I had not yet blogged on this topic.

This logic/argument comes from the “research” of Marguerite Roza, who, well, has a track record of making such absurd arguments in an effort to place blame on poor urban districts and take attention away from disparities between poor urban districts and their more affluent suburban neighbors.

This new argument is really just more of the same ol’ flimsy logic from this crew. For the past several years, Roza and colleagues have attempted to argue that states have largely done their part to fix inequities in funding between school districts, and that now, the burden falls on local public school districts to clean up their act. Here’s an excerpt from one of my recent articles on this topic:

On other occasions, Roza and Hill have argued that persistent between-district disparities may exist but are relatively unimportant. Following a state high court decision in New York mandating increased funding to New York City schools, Roza and Hill (2005) opined: “So, the real problem is not that New York City spends some $4,000 less per pupil than Westchester County, but that some schools in New York [City] spend $10,000 more per pupil than others in the same city.” That is, the state has fixed its end of the system enough.

This statement by Roza and Hill is even more problematic when one dissects it more carefully. What they are saying is that the average of per pupil spending in suburban districts is only $4,000 greater than spending per pupil in New York City but that the difference between maximum and minimum spending across schools in New York City is about $10,000 per pupil. Note the rather misleading apples-and-oranges issue. They are comparing the average in one case to the extremes in another.

In fact, among downstate suburban[1] New York State districts, the range of between-district differences in 2005 was an astounding $50,000 per pupil (between the small, wealthy Bridgehampton district at $69,772 and Franklin Square at $13,979). In that same year, New York City as a district spent $16,616 per pupil, while nine downstate suburban districts spent more than $26,616 (that is, more than $10,000 beyond the average for New York City). Pocantico Hills and Greenburgh, both in Westchester County (the comparison County used by Roza and Hill), spent over $30,000 per pupil in 2005.[2] These numbers dwarf even the purported $10,000 range within New York City (a range that we agree is presumptively problematic); our conclusion based on this cursory analysis is that the bigger problem likely remains the between-district disparity in funding.

http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/viewFile/718/831

My article (with Kevin Welner) goes on to show how states have far from resolved between district disparities and that New York State in particular has among the most substantial persistent disparities between wealthy and poor school districts.For more information on persistent between district disparities that really do exist, see: Is School Funding Fair?.

I have a forthcoming paper this spring where I begin to untangle the new argument about poor urban districts really having plenty of money but simply wasting it on cheerleading and ceramics. Here’s a draft of a section of the introduction to that paper:

A handful of authors, primarily in non-peer reviewed and think tank reports posit that poor urban school districts have more than enough money to achieve adequate student outcomes and simply need to reallocate what they have toward improving achievement on tested subject areas. These authors, including Marguerite Roza and colleagues of the Center for Reinventing Public Education encourage public outrage that any school district not presently meeting state outcome standards would dare to allocate resources to courses like ceramics or activities like cheerleading. To support their argument, the authors provide anecdotes of per pupil expense on cheerleading being far greater than per pupil expense on core academic subjects like math or English.

Imagine a high school that spends $328 per student for math courses and $1,348 per cheerleader for cheerleading activities. Or a school where the average per-student cost of offering ceramics was $1,608; cosmetology, $1,997; and such core subjects as science, $739.[1]

These shocking anecdotes, however, are unhelpful for truly understanding resource allocation differences and reallocation options. For example, the major reason why cheerleading or ceramics expenses per pupil are highest is the relatively small class sizes, compared to those in English or Math. In total, the funds allocated to either cheerleading of ceramics are unlikely to have much if any effect if redistributed to reading or math.

Further, the requirement that poor urban (or other) districts currently falling below state outcome standards must re-allocate any and all resources from co-curricular and extracurricular activities toward improving achievement on tested outcomes may increase inequities in the depth and breadth of curricular offerings between higher and lower poverty schools – inequities that may be already quite substantial. That is, it may already be the case that higher poverty districts and those facing greater resource constraints are reallocating resources toward core, tested areas of curriculum and away from more advanced course offerings which extend beyond the tested curriculum and enriched opportunities including both elective courses and extracurricular activities.  Some evidence on this point already exists.

The perspective that low performing districts merely need to reallocate what they already have is particularly appealing in the current fiscal context, where state budgets and aid allocations to local public school districts are being slashed. Accepting Roza’s logic, states under court mandates or in the shadows of recent rulings regarding educational adequacy, but facing tight budgets may simply argue that high poverty and/or low performing districts should shift all available resources into the teaching of core, tested subjects. Lower poverty districts with ample resources that exceed minimum outcome standards face no such reallocation obligations, leading to substantial differences in depth and breadth of curriculum. Arguably a system that is both adequate and fair would protect the availability of deep and broad curriculum while simultaneously attempting to improve narrowly measured outcomes.

More later as this research progresses.


[1] “Downstate Suburban” refers to areas such as Westchester County and Long Island and is an official regional classification in the New York State Education Department Fiscal Analysis and Research Unit Annual Financial Reports data, which can be found here: http://www.oms.nysed.gov/faru/PDFDocuments/2008_Analysis.pdf and http://www.oms.nysed.gov/faru/Profiles/profiles_cover.html

[2] Interestingly, however, Bridgehampton and New York City have relatively similar “costs” due to Bridgehampton’s small size and New York City’s high student needs (see Duncombe and Yinger, 2009). The figures offered in this paragraph are based on Total Expenditures per Pupil from State Fiscal Profiles 2005. http://www.oms.nysed.gov/faru/Profiles/profiles_cover.html. Results are similar when comparing current operating expenditures per pupil.

Potential abuses of the Parent Trigger???

This article in the LA Times has been getting a lot of buzz today – http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-compton-parents-20101207,0,1116485.story

The article discusses the use of what is called a “parent trigger” policy.  Here’s the synopsis:

On Tuesday, they intend to present a petition signed by 61% of McKinley parents that would require the Compton Unified School District to bring in a charter company to run the school. Charter schools are independently operated public schools.

“I know it’s never been done before, but I want to step up because I’m a parent who cares about my children and their education,” Murphy said Monday. She and other parents were meeting with organizers from Parent Revolution, a nonprofit that lobbied successfully last year for the so-called parent-trigger law.

So, what you’ve got is 61% of parents in a community pushing for a school to be converted to a charter school and potentially pushing for that school to be a specific type of charter school. This presents all sorts of interesting – and twisted possibilities.

I wrote about a week ago on how some charter schools, like North Star Academy in Newark have established themselves as the equivalent of elite magnet schools – potentially engaging in activities such as pushing out lower performing kids over time.

So, my question for the day is whether these “parent trigger” policies might allow a simple majority of parents – or some defined majority share – to force a reorganization of their neighborhood school into a charter – that would subsequently weed out those other “less desirable kids?”

That is, does this new policy of simple majority (mob) rule allow parents in a specific community to redefine their neighborhood school so that the school no-longer serves lower performing kids or kids whose parents are less able or for that matter less interested in engaging in a level of parent involvement that might be required by a specific charter operator? In short, can the majority of parents effectively kick out a minority of parents that they don’t like – including parents of kids with disabilities or non-English speaking parents?

Sure, you say – charters can’t discriminate in this way because they must rely on lotteries for admissions and must take children with disabilities and those unable to speak English. They would have to accept those kids in the neighborhood. Yes, by law this might be true. But experience with many charters proves otherwise. Many do rely on attrition to boost scores – somehow avoid serving kids with disabilities and non-English speaking kids. But the neighborhood school couldn’t do the same.

Taking this a step further, envision a neighborhood split along language, ethnic or even religious lines. Can the parents of the majority group force their neighborhood school to be reconstituted as a cultural, language or for that matter religion (argued as culture) specific school that is effectively hostile to the minority?

Hey education law friends – help me out with the possibilities here?