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Parsing Poverty: Charter Market Segmentation across & Within U.S. Cities

Late Thursday, I posted a follow up on the distribution of children with disabilities by disability classification across charter and district schools in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. This post explores the distribution of children who qualify for free lunch in charter schools and district schools within the city limits of major cities. Note that the unit of analysis – the charter market, per se – that I am using here is the “city limits” and all schools – charter and district that lie within specific large central cities (urban centric locale code 11). Why does this matter? And why do I do it this way? One reason is data convenience. Another is that it’s important to recognize that many U.S. Cities are carved into multiple school districts, often times relating to a long history of housing and school segregation. I’ll provide some Kansas City examples below. In other words, the traditional district system already creates some artificial boundaries of segregation, onto which the charter system is now being superimposed.

Again, in this post, I’m focusing on low income children. When it comes to low income children, Charter schools in many settings do tend to serve smaller shares of the lowest income children, leaving larger shares behind in district schools. Here, my interest is in evaluating major urban centers across the country to determine the extent to which these patterns are systematic. And also, the extent to which these patterns vary by charter market share. I believe I’ve mentioned on previous posts that it seems most likely that charter schools can maintain a cream-skimmed population when charters generally have smaller market share. That is, when there’s enough cream to go around.

So, here goes… using data from the 2009 Common Core (there were more gaps in free lunch and enrollment data in 2010) of Data from NCES.

Visualizing Market Segmentation

This first figure conveys my strategy for my first cut comparisons of charter market segregation by student low income status. Imagine for any given city, there are a certain number of total enrolled students and a certain number of low income enrolled students. If charter schools in the aggregate in that city are serving an equitable share of low income children, the share of low income children served should match the overall market share. That is, if charter schools serve 10% of all children enrolled in schools in the city, then charter schools should also be serving 10% of the low income children. One can graph cities accordingly.

When charters – or the citywide charter sector as a whole are operating at parity – they will fall along the red dotted diagonal line. But, when charters are serving a lower share of low income children, they will fall below the line. When they are serving a higher share than the city schools (which may include multiple districts/entities), they will fall above the line.

Major U.S. Markets

Here, I review the charter market  share and free lunch shares for small market share cities,  medium market share cities, and large market share cities.

An important clarification is in order with regard to certain cities like New York and Boston. In the NCES Common Core, these cities are actually broken up into many separate cities. Boston is broken up into Boston (central city),  Dorchester, East Boston, etc. New York is broken up into Manhattan/New York, Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens is broken up into separate cities (essentially neighborhoods).  As such, they each appear as smaller markets than one might expect.

Small Market Share

This first figure shows markets with relatively small charter market share – less than 5% of children enrolled in charters. Circle size indicates the aggregate enrollment across charter and district schools – or market size. In most of these markets including the Bronx, New York (Manhattan) and Philadelphia the charter free lunch share is below parity. This means that these charters are leaving behind more lower income kids than they are taking in.

Medium Market Share

In lower middle-market cities, things seem to even out a bit,  but many are still below the parity line, including Newark, which I have pointed out on many occasions. San Antonio charters have a higher free lunch share than the districts serving San Antonio.

Large Market Share

In larger market share cities there seems to be even greater parity, and in Minneapolis and Kansas City it would appear that the charters on average are serving more lower income children than the district schools within the city limits. But, some caveats are in order here…

Kansas City provides an interesting case where these descriptions are perhaps a bit deceiving. Kansas City – through strategic housing planning and school district boundary planning – was carefully carved into racially identifiable neighborhoods throughout the early half of the 20th century (and then some  – actually as late as 2007).  If we look at all zip codes within the broad city limits (below) we include several school districts. Among these, we include the central city district KCMSD, but we also include the predominantly white, higher income communities north of the river. Notably, as a function of the state’s original charter statute, there are no charters north of the river (as they were only permitted in KCMSD and St. Louis originally). So, this comparison needs some tweaking and more fine grained local analysis – like that which follows.

Finally, here’s a snapshot of the largest market share cities. Notably, even in Columbus Ohio and Washington DC, with relatively large total market size and large market share, charters seem to be under-serving the lowest income students. With such large market share, one can expect that this has a significant adverse effect on district schools.

Digging into the Cities

One can take the same approach and bring it down to the zip code level within cities. Now, because of data constraints, all of these analyses focus on school enrollments of schools that happen to be located in a particular zip code. I’m not able to look, for example, at the zip codes from which the students actually come to these schools. So, one must assume there to be some fuzziness around the zip code boundaries. That some lower income students do travel outside of their zip code to attend charter schools.

Los Angeles

Across all zip codes in Los Angeles, many operate at parity, but in some cases, charters are clearly underserving low income students at least compared to district schools in the same zip code.

Zooming in on zip codes with charter market share below 10%, we can see that there are actually quite a few where low income populations are underserved, and not so many where they are significantly overserved, per se.

Philadelphia

Philadelphia displays a similar pattern across all zip codes, with low income children significantly underserved in some markets including those with relatively high charter market share (over 40%).

Focusing on zip codes with smaller market share,  we see that some particularly large markets have charter schools that are underserving low income children.

This next figure paints an alternative picture of charter market segmentation in Philadelphia. Here, I do the more typical relationship between total zip code % free lunch and charter % free lunch. But, I also include all of the zip codes that don’t have any charters. AND, I plot as squares the overall market size (total enrollment) and as circles the charter market size (charter enrollment). Yeah… way to much for any one graph… but bear with me.

So, if there is a large square, with a small circle in it, that’s a high total enrollment zip code, with relatively low charter enrollment. If there’s a smaller square with large circle, that’s a smaller zip code market with a large charter enrollment. All of those squares along the bottom are zip codes with no charter market share at all. In Philadelphia, there exist several high poverty zip codes with no charters. And there are some large high poverty zip codes with large charter market shares – BUT… where those charters are underserving low income children.

Perhaps even more interesting but not surprising is that in this predominantly low income city, there are three relatively large markets, with very large charter market share, that are NOT zip codes with high low income share. That is, the charter sector has grown and taken large market share in what might generally be considered more advantaged zip codes.

Baltimore

Here’s Baltimore (I always get asked to include Baltimore… so here it is). And Baltimore’s low charter market share zip codes display what seems to be a typical pattern, with most having charter sectors that serve fewer than expected low income children (again, those qualified for free lunch).

Larger market share zip codes are more of a mixed bag in Baltimore, as one might expect.

As with Philadelphia, we see that some charters have established in generally lower poverty zip codes, but in this case, the charters are serving a lower income population than the other schools around them. But, in the higher poverty zip codes, charters tend to be serving lower poverty populations. And this includes several of the larger markets and includes those with particularly large charter market share. Again, my policy concern here is the effect that this has on the district schools which must serve those not siphoned off into charters. And this does not include the special education or ELL sorting, which in most cases I’ve evaluated thus far tends to be more extreme.

Kansas City

I close this one out with Kansas City. Recall that it appeared that charter schools in Kansas City actually serve a larger share of low income  kids than district schools in the city. But, that finding was complicated by the fact that the city limits actually include what many might consider to be the equivalent of suburban districts (the ones presently fighting in court against accepting KCMSD students on interdistrict transfer – another story for another day).  For the most part, across all KC zip codes that have charters, charter enrollment share and free lunch share are in line – but for 64113.

Citywide, charter market shares are concentrated in higher poverty zip codes, but for one, again, as a function of district organization and the original charter statute.

But even Kansas City has some issues regarding the extent to which charter schools actually reach the lowest income neighborhoods in the city. In fact, a really cool Kauffman Foundation (Charter Advocates for the most part) report about a year ago pointed out how charters had largely established around the edges of the poorest neighborhoods but were not embedded in those communities. I discussed that report here:  https://schoolfinance101.wordpress.com/2010/10/30/biddle-me-this-or-flunkout-nation/

The maps above more or less reinforce the Kauffman report findings. On the left are zip code free lunch shares, showing the core of higher poverty up through the center of the city (blue box). Charter schools are green, district schools black. Note that charters are mostly lined up along the western edge of the blue box, and to the north toward downtown. And on the right we see that charter market shares are largest to the west of the low income core, but not within it. This is one case, however, where I’d love to have the locations of residence for the students, to see how many cross over from the poorer zip codes to attend the charters. That said, the previous figures indicate that the low income concentrations in those charters resemble their surrounding schools in the same zip code – not the low income concentrations of the poorer zip codes to the east.

Closing Thoughts

So, this brings me back to the point I’ve been reiterating over and over these past several weeks. We need to figure out how all of this stuff fits together. From a policy perspective, we need to concern ourselves with the overgrowth of schools that do not serve representative populations in part because of the effect those schools have on the others around them. Indeed, it may not be wise to force some of these schools to take on students that they simply aren’t capable of handling. As I’ve said before, perhaps some of them do well with their select population because of their select population, and perhaps they’ve learned to work well with that population.

Allowing or even encouraging an unfettered parasitic decomposition of urban schooling is not a reasonable policy solution as it will ultimately harm large numbers of the lowest income, disabled and non-English speaking students disproportionately left behind. Some market segmentation is tolerable, and existed long before charter expansion became a primary cause.

Finally, there’s also that pesky concern I have about shifting larger and larger shares of children into schools where they and their parents may be unknowingly compromising constitutional and statutory rights. I am especially concerned given that charter school market shares tend to be largest and expanding most quickly in urban settings serving low income and minority children. As such, we are moving toward a system where low income and minority children are more likely than their white suburban peers to be attending a school that calls itself public, but one in which those students may be sacrificing constitutional and statutory rights they would otherwise have in a real public institution.

Again, this is not to say that charter operators are generally out to deprive kids of rights. But rather, that legal protections for these children are being quietly eroded by the emerging ambiguities of the “public until it’s legally convenient to argue otherwise” charter sector. We need to pay attention to this erosion of rights, and its disproportionate impact on low income and minority children.

The bright spot (he opined cynically) in the figures above is that in most charter markets – which do tend to be low income cities – the lowest income children are generally being under-served by these schools.

To the extent that we wish to make charters a significant player in the mix of providing “public” schooling, these issues must be resolved (and are resolved to a greater extent in some states than others).  If charters are going to be major players here, their various layers of governance must either be explicitly considered public (board members considered public officials) with all of the statutory and constitutional obligations (and protections) of public officials (open meetings, open records, bidding, etc.), or they must be bound by the same statutory and constitutional requirements (whether labeled as public officials or not). And it must be explicitly guaranteed in state charter laws that all statutory and constitutional rights pertaining to students and employees in traditional public/government (state actors) agencies also apply to charter schools. In other words, the rhetoric of “public” must be accompanied by the legal obligations of being “public.” Alternatively, if they’re simply NOT public, then just admit that fact (and dump the whole deceptive “public” charter label and call it a voucher system instead). In which case, a true public option must be made available to all children. Simply closing down all true public options – New Orleans style – for large portions of cities, leaving only pseudo-public and true private options is also likely to disparately deprive low income and minority students of constitutional and statutory rights.

More on this topic another day….

Parsing Charter School Disability Enrollments in PA and NJ

Here are a few quick figures that parse the disability classifications of children with disabilities served by charter schools in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Two previous posts set the stage for this comparison. In one, I explained how charter schools in the city of Newark, NJ, by taking on fewer low income students, far fewer LEP/ELL students and very few children with disabilities other than those with the mildest/lowest cost disabilities (specific learning disability and speech/language impairment) are leaving behind a much higher need, higher cost population for the district schools to serve.

Effects of Charter Enrollment on District Enrollment in Newark:

https://schoolfinance101.wordpress.com/2012/08/06/effects-of-charter-enrollment-on-newark-district-enrollment/

In another post, I walked through the financial implications of Pennsylvania’s special education funding formula and specifically the charter school special education funding formula on districts where large shares of low need disability students are siphoned off by charters and where high need disability students are left behind to be served by districts with depleted resources.

The Commonwealth Triple-screw:

https://schoolfinance101.wordpress.com/2012/06/05/the-commonwealth-triple-screw-special-education-funding-charter-school-payments-in-pennsylvania/

In short, under the Pennsylvania charter school funding formula, for each child classified as having a disability and choosing to attend a charter school, the sending district must pay the “average special education expenditure” of the district – regardless of the actual IEP needs of that student. So, there’s a strong financial incentive to serve large numbers of low need special education students in PA charters. But this, of course, leaves a mess behind for local districts, who then have a far higher need special education population and have lost substantial shares of their available funding (due to a completely arbitrary and wrongheaded calculation of the sending tuition rate).

This post merely provides a few more comprehensive follow up figures on the issue of higher versus lower need disability students and charter school enrollments.

First, in New Jersey, here’s the statewide breakout of charter special education enrollments and market shares based on data from 2010 (same as used in Newark post)

  • In short, charter schools in NJ serve about 1.7% of the population.
  • They serve about 1.05% of the population of children with disabilities.
  • AND… they serve only  about .23% of the population of children with disabilities other than Specific Learning Disability or Speech/Language Impairment!

That’s a big deal! It’s a big deal because this leaves behind significant numbers of high need disability children to be served by districts. And, to the extent that charter expansion follows the same trend, this will lead to even greater concentration of children with disabilities in general in district schools and children with more severe disabilities in particular.

Here’s the average disability classification profile for NJ public districts and for NJ charter schools.

Now, for Pennsylvania, where there exists a significant incentive for charter schools to boost their special education populations but to avoid serving children with more severe disabilities. Here are the counts for counties with at least 500 students in charter schools:

Here are the enrollment shares within counties:

And finally, here are the population shares served:

So, for example, in Philadelphia county, which is the city:

  • Charter schools serve 16.2% of the student population
  • Charter schools serve about 14.6% of the children with disabilities
  • BUT… charter schools serve only about 6.3% of children with disabilities other than SLD or SLI!

Even in those counties where charters serve a larger share of the county-wide total special education population, they only occasionally serve an equitable share of children with more severe disabilities (often in specialized schools).

In Delaware County, charters do serve a higher overall special education population share than districts in the county, but serve a much smaller share of non-SLI/SLD disabilities. And Chester-Upland in particular bears the fiscal brunt of this practice!

That said, clearly, PA charter schools are generally serving more comparable aggregate shares of children with disabilities than NJ charter schools and perhaps the financial incentive plays a role.

Again, a critical issue here is the nature of the population left behind in district schools.

These figures also dispel a common assertion of charter advocates/pundits who, when challenged as to why special education rates tend to be generally low in charters, often argue that it’s because the charters are implementing better early interventions and thus avoiding classifying children in marginal categories like “specific learning disability.” To begin with, there’s absolutely no evidence to support this claim. That aside, these figures show that in fact, many charters do seem to have plenty of students in these marginal categories. What they don’t have is students in the more severe disability categories such as mental retardation and traumatic brain injury and it is certainly unlikely that charter school early interventions are successfully preventing children from being later misclassified into these categories.

Statewide, of 724 children with TBA, only 7 were in charters. Of 21,987 mentally retarded children, only  396 (1.8%) were in charters.  But about 4.1% of all enrollments were in charters.

I’ll admit… I am losing my patience on some of these issues. Excuse me for a moment while I vent. I’m losing my patience in large part because of the ridiculous responses/reactions I get every time I simply post some data either relating to charter school enrollments or finances.  I seem only to get a flood of ridiculous responses when I’m presenting information on Charter schools. Not when I criticize value-added estimates, or point out misuse of SGPs. Pretty much exclusively when I present data on charter schools.

It’s time to cut the crap and start digging into what’s really going on here, and how to move toward a system that best serves all of the children rather than ignoring and brushing aside these issues and pushing forward with what appears to be an emerging parasitic model.

Let’s evaluate the incentives. And instead of protecting perverse, damaging financial incentives like those in PA, simply because they drive more money to charters, let’s do the right thing. Hey, it may be the case that charter allocations are otherwise too low, but raising them for the wrong reasons, with a wrong mechanism  and with bad incentives is still, wrong, wrong and bad.

It may also be the case that the data we are using for making comparisons – using total of free and reduced lunch, rather than parsing income categories, comparing total special education rates instead of by classification, are encouraging charter operators to boost their enrollment subgroups by focusing on the margins. In which case, we need to make it absolutely clear by increasing data reporting precision and availability, that serving kids just under the threshold (or in marginal categories) isn’t enough. More fine grained comparisons are necessary!

I’ve said before that I don’t really believe that every school – every magnet school – every charter school – every traditional public school – can or should try to serve exactly the same population. I do believe there’s room for specialization in the system. I also believe that many charters that “succeed” so-to-speak, do so because they’ve figured out how to serve well their non-representative populations. And many would likely fail miserably at trying to serve children with more severe disabilities (as many district schools have).

BUT… accepting that there’s room for some specialization within the system and some uneven distribution of students is a far cry from what is now emerging, as charter market shares increase significantly in some cities and in some zip codes. And that must stop!

Still Searching for Miracle Schools and Superguy: Updates on Houston and New York City

I was following a conversation on Twitter a short while back in which one student activist – Stephanie Rivera of Rutgers asked another – Alexis Morin from Students for Education Reform – why SFER chooses to focus almost exclusively on charter schools as beacons of “success” and thus a significant part of the “solutions” for urban education moving forward. Observing this interaction brought me back once again to the astounding gaps in logic which are so pervasive in the current reform rhetoric which seeks to find policy solutions almost exclusively in charter schools and in changing teacher compensation and dismissal policies.  The reformy solutions are pretty much a given regardless of the original question or what the analyses yield.

Too often, the following faulty reasoning is applied in search for solutions in the education reform debate:

  1. Scan the horizon for successful charter schools (even though charters are no more successful, on average than their more dominant counterparts – district schools). [Charter schools on average, are average. Some are above average and others, well, not so much. Because charters are still much smaller in total numbers, if one was to simply look for “good” schools, the odds of picking a charter would in fact be smaller.]
  2. Assume that better-than-average charter schools – successful ones – are better than traditional public schools. [ignoring that while, by virtue of being the upper half of a similar distribution, they are really no different from the upper half of traditional public schools].
  3. Assume that because the better-than-average charter schools are better than the average traditional public school, that being a charter school  – bearing the label/classification “charter” – has something to do with it. [even though a comparable – or even larger – share of other schools bearing the label “charter” are actually doing worse than the average traditional public school].
  4. Assume that bearing the label – “charter” – necessarily means that these schools have and use creatively and inventively the substantially greater autonomy granted to them. [That is, they certainly don’t waste their time on stuff like spending more money, providing smaller class sizes and paying teachers more].

I have seen this utterly ridiculous stream of contorted logic rolled out on numerous occasions in the past few years, and even in the past few weeks.

A while back, I posted two separate entries called “Searching for Superguy” – one for New York City and one for New Jersey – in order to display the distribution of performance, corrected for demographics, for New York City and New Jersey charter schools.

Since that time, I’ve compiled quite a bit more data on charter (and other) schools in a variety of settings. I’ve also developed a clearer vision of exactly what constitutes one of those “miracle” schools we’re all searching for. A miracle school is characterized by at least the following four factors:

  1. Serves the same kids (poverty, language proficiency, disability)
  2. Spends less than other schools serving similar kids
  3. Has high average outcomes compared to schools serving similar kids
  4. Achieves better value-added on measured student outcomes than other schools

For today’s post, I offer you a tour of charter schools in New York City and in Houston Texas – two cities with significant concentrations of charter schools and two cities with significant numbers of charter schools affiliated with major charter management organizations.

A Tour of Houston and New York City Charter Schools

Serve the Same Kids?

The first question, of course, is do charter schools in these cities serve the “same kids?” as traditional public schools in the same city/borough and at the same grade level. To answer this question, I estimate regression models to three years of data (2008 to 2010) where the population characteristic of interest is the dependent variable, and a)year of data, b) location of school (city) and c) grade level/range are the independent variables. Houston is treated as a single city (uh… because it is) and New York is carved into boroughs for this analysis. That is, schools are compared with same grade level schools in their borough. Charter Schools are lumped together by CMO, with schools not belonging to major CMOs lumped together for this analysis (they are indeed a very heterogeneous group). The analysis is weighted by the enrollment of the schools.

Figure 1 shows that in New York City, Charter Schools serve a) far fewer children who qualify for free lunch , b) far fewer LEP/ELL children and c) far fewer children with disabilities than school serving the same grade level in their borough. Uncommon schools are indeed the least common. But Success academies have particularly large deficits in LEP/ELL children. These schools simply aren’t comparable in terms of student populations.

Figure 1. New York City Demographics

Figure 2 shows the Houston schools by CMO. With my present data I was unable to parse free from free or reduced price lunch, which may be important. But, this figure and some of my previous analyses confirm that at least in Houston, charters are doing a better job of serving low income kids (than NYC charters). However, most Charter CMOs still seem to have a significant aversion to children with disabilities and in most cases, also to children who are LEP/ELL.

 

Figure 2. Houston Demographics

Spend Less?

The spending analysis is conducted similarly, using 3 years of data and using a regression model where spending per pupil is the dependent variable and where student characteristics, grade level and year are the independent variables. This analysis plays off our recent NEPC report, using the same data (expanded to include all NYC charters, and cleaned&merged with additional measures) and same methods.  I have stayed with my original expenditure measure for BOE schools (defended here) and have used Annual Financial Report (nor IRS 990) data for charters.

Figure 3 shows that in New York City, charters are generally outspending traditional public schools serving similar student populations. KIPP and Uncommon schools are outspending BOE schools by over  $4,000 and $3,500 respectively and Harlem Childrens Zone schools are spending similarly (and that’s not even counting all of the additional money flowing to/through the parent organization. it’s just the annual financial report data!).

Figure 3. New York City Spending

Figure 4 shows more of a mixed bag in Houston. Non-major-CMO charters spend less than district schools. KIPP’s elementary schools spend less, but not consistently/significantly so (some do). Cosmos/Harmony schools also spend less, but through different means.  Others are indistinguishable, with some network schools spending more and others less (some Yes Prep schools outspend districts schools serving similar students).

Figure 4. Houston Spending

Have High Average Outcomes?

The following several graphs explore ht distribution of spending and outcomes for individual schools. Note that these graphs don’t include all of the other stuff that might need to be included to parse whether spending differences actually help produce outcome differences. That’s not the point here. Rather, these are just descriptive graphs of the relative spending and outcomes of these schools – focusing on schools serving middle grades.

Figure 5 shows that each of the charters spends quite a bit more than otherwise similar district schools. Each charter also has higher average performance (except St. Hope) than district schools. But, as shown above, they also have less needy students.  In other words, no miracles by these measures. Higher average outcomes yes. Lower spending? NO. Same kids? NO!

Figure 5. New York City Average Outcomes

Figure 6 shows the average spending and outcomes for schools in Houston. Among KIPPs, all spend much more than district schools and two have higher than average outcomes and the other two have average outcomes. The Yes Prep school in the sample spends more and has higher than average outcomes. Meanwhile, some other charters spend less and do less well, and one spends less and has somewhat higher than average outcomes. Notably, however, the population characteristics of these schools were also mixed. It may be the case that these KIPP schools have more needy populations than the average district school, and on average are doing average to better. That’s not bad. However, we must acknowledge they are doing this at a much higher price! Similar kids? Mixed (more low income, fewer ELL or special ed). Better outcomes? Also mixed, but okay. Less money? No, actually more… a lot more.

Figure 6. Houston Average Outcomes (standardized)

Have Greater Gains?

Okay, here’s one last shot. Let’s look at achievement gains instead of just level of performance. I’ve constructed school level average gains for NYC schools by aggregating the teacher value added data for teachers in each school (weighted for the number of students who contribute to their scores in English Language Arts or Math). In other words, in this analysis a school is only as good as its teachers (consistent with reformy wisdom) and, for that matter, the children served by (linked in data records to) those teachers.

Figure 7 again shows that in New York City, charters tend to significantly outspend district schools with similar populations – well except Equality charter which is somewhat closer. On average, the average gains are indeed higher in these higher spending charters – actually moving upward in sort of a pattern. But remember, the peer groups in these schools also aren’t particularly comparable. KIPP AMP and Brooklyn prospect, however, don’t do so hot.  But, if there’s any case to be made here with these charters, resources just might matter. Not the same kids. More money. Some reasonable outcomes.

Clearly, some deeper investigation is warranted. But, in each case there are also district schools, including lower spending district schools that outperform most of the charter schools.

Figure 7. New York City Value-Added

Finally, we’ve got Figure 8, showing the distribution of school level value added ratings from the FAST TEXAS system. Here, the KIPPs in particular are more of a mixed bag. Some have higher and others lower value added.  Note that in Texas these “progress” metrics seem to be associated with student characteristics.  All of the KIPP schools and the Yes Prep school spend more than district schools. Clearly, some deeper investigation is warranted. But, in each case there are also district schools, including lower spending district schools that outperform all of the charter schools.

 

Figure 8. Houston Value-Added

As a bonus, I also have this slide on class sizes (8th grade math) for NYC schools serving 8th grade. I’ve related class size to spending here, showing that each of these higher spending charter chains (except for Democracy Prep) seem to be leveraging at least some of that funding to provide much lower class sizes.

Bonus Slide: Class Size and Relative Spending in NYC

Closing Thoughts

In closing, we all really need to step away from the misguided logic I laid out in the beginning of this post – that “charter” in and of itself is meaningful  and that the only answers for the future of education must be found among successful charter schools – especially miracle charters under the watchful eye of Superguy. If there’s anything we know by now about Superguy is that he’s got some pretty nice financial backing!

Superschools & Miracle-Guy… uh… wait… Superguy and Miracle Schools, if they do exist, are a rarity. Further, if they do exist, they are as likely if not more likely (by sheer numbers) to be traditional public schools and not charter schools. But regardless of the governance of the schools, when looking for ideas (not “solutions”) for how to improve educational opportunities, we should be focused on the following:

  1. Attempting to learn what we can from all types of schools and not predetermining that we should look at successful “charter” schools. This is especially true since charters are proportionately no more successful than other types of schools and, given that they are smaller in total numbers, they are in total, less numerous among all successful schools.
  2. Being really, really careful about parsing out reasons for success before declaring schools to be miracles (and we should avoid the whole notion of “miracle schools”). We must look closely at population characteristics and population dynamics (mobility/attrition/neighborhood changes).
  3. When we do find schools – charter or other – that appear to be making unexpected gains, we should explore what it is that they are doing. We should explore their resource use. We should explore the strategies they employ and we should figure out not just what it is costing them to adopt these approaches but what it would cost to adopt these approaches in other settings and more broadly.

Finally, publicness and true public access matters. While we may analyze and compare schools more thoughtfully regardless of their governance. I would now argue that when we consider the policy path forward we should actually give serious consideration to their governance.

All else equal, I am increasingly uneasy with the notion of creating larger numbers and shares of schools that are LIMITED PUBLIC ACCESS as I described in a previous post on charter schools. Intended or not, this is what has become of large segments of charter schooling.

I am concerned with the effect of expanded limited public access schools on those truly public schools around them. Intentional or not, this is how charter expansion seems to be playing out.

I am equally if not more concerned with the idea of shifting larger shares of children into schools where those children and their parents may forgo their constitutional and statutory protections, except where explicitly laid out in state charter statutes. Intended or not in the letter of state charter statutes, it is the charter operators themselves who invariably invoke their “private” status when defending the stifling of teachers’ free expression, or teachers’ claims seeking damages (under federal law) for mistreatment by a state actor, or students/parents claims regarding strict enforcement of discipline codes.

The maintenance of constitutional protections and true public access – non-exclusion – MUST play a significant role in the determination of the path forward. We should not be too quick to trade constitutional protections to employee or student free speech, privacy rights, protections from unreasonable searches and various statutory rights for a few additional points on state assessments or for a few dollars cut from school spending.

That said, the figures laid out above suggest that we likely aren’t even getting systematic or sizable bang for the buck when/if we do trade these constitutional protections. So perhaps that point is moot.

Related Resources

Baker, B.D., Libby, K., & Wiley, K. (2012). Spending by the Major Charter Management Organizations: Comparing charter school and local public district financial resources in New York, Ohio, and Texas. Boulder, CO: National Education Policy Center. Retrieved [date] from http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/spending-major-charter.

(Follow up: https://schoolfinance101.wordpress.com/2012/05/07/no-excuses-really-another-look-at-our-nepc-charter-spending-figures/)

Baker, B.D. & Ferris, R. (2011). Adding Up the Spending: Fiscal Disparities and Philanthropy among New York City Charter Schools. Boulder, CO: National Education Policy Center, 33. Retrieved April 24, 2012, from http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/NYC-charter-disparities.

The Gulen Charter School Teacher Supply Problem

There’s been some increased interest in recent months in what are often referred to as Gulen Charter Schools, or those schools affiliated with Fethullah Gulen. I’ve tried to stay off of this topic for the most part because I don’t like to write about “conspiracy theories” or even potentially inflammatory religious/cultural issues – at least on this blog.  Here are a few recent video clips/new stories:

From Ohio: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4qDbELO12uo

From 60 Minutes: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4OtHpUCqy0&feature=related

New York Times article on Texas Gulen Schools: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/education/07charter.html

There are also a handful of websites that provide additional highly critical information on these schools.

What has intrigued me when I’ve watched these news clips and when I’ve read other news stories, is that when these schools’ leaders are challenged as to why they hire so many teachers on visas from Turkey, their standard response is that there just aren’t enough qualified applicants for their schools from U.S. resident citizens.

Yes, teacher supply can be an issue, especially in math and science. And economic research on the topic suggests that wages – especially the competitiveness of wages with other career alternatives – may play a role. See this report for a related analysis of teacher wages in the State of Washington (& relative competitiveness of Science/Math teacher wages)

Now, I’ve been conducting several analyses of teacher salary structure over time, trying to see how charter schools pay their teachers compared to other charter schools and public districts. It’s really important to understand that wages, wage growth expectations and job security expectations all may have significant influence on the supply of quality applicants for teaching positions.

It strikes me, after looking at salary structure data on Gulen schools that therein lies the problem.

Check this out. First, there’s the graph I made for our recent report on charter school expenditures. This graph appears in an appendix to the report, and represents exploratory analysis of what’s behind some of the spending differences between charter schools and between charters and public districts.

For this graph and a following graph on NJ Gulen schools, I use teacher level data from multiple years to estimate a model of teacher salaries as a function of experience and degree level. Then I project out the predicted salary for teachers at each experience level holding degree levels constant. This gives me a picture of how teacher wages compare between schools for comparably educated teachers and at different experience levels.

Harmony (Cosmos/Gulen) schools in Texas are relatively low spending schools and have particularly low labor expenses. Notably, this network of Texas charter schools is large enough to drag down average spending and average labor costs for charters statewide.

In the Houston area in particular, not only do the Gulen schools pay very low starting salaries, but salaries don’t appear to grow over the first few years of experience. Notably, the Harmony/Cosmos/Gulen schools really don’t have any teachers with more than a few years of experience. Now, this could be in part because no-one would really want to stick around if there’s no outlook for wage growth over time, or because no-one who would have intended to stick around ever applied to begin with, leading the schools to make extensive use of temporary imported staff.

Figure 1. Houston Area Wages for Charter & District Schools

Source: http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/spending-major-charter

Figure 2 through Figure 4 show the average school level wages for teachers in Texas district and charter schools in Houston and Austin. Notably, Harmony schools have very low average experience levels and also have very low average salaries. They also have low average salaries even given their low average experience levels. Is it any wonder they suffer a teacher supply problem? Especially with a curricular emphasis on math and science? And especially in tech heavy urban centers.

Figure 2. Houston at all experience levels

Figure 3. Houston for teachers w/less than 5 years

Figure 4. Austin at all experience levels

Figure 5. Austin for teachers w/less than 5 years

Now, this salary structure anomaly for Gulen affiliated schools in Texas really isn’t just a Texas thing. That’s what struck me, and eventually led me to write this post – which at this point is still incomplete. Here’s what Gulen salaries look like in New Jersey, when compared with other charter schools and when compared with three major urban districts. Now, New Jersey’s urban districts have a quirky salary structure that I could quite honestly do without. As described by one NJ charter school leader, the urban districts in NJ often have a “hockey stick” salary schedule that stays relatively flat for the first several years/steps and then jumps way up around the 13th year. That actually permits some charter schools to gain a recruitment/retention edge by scaling up salaries more quickly on the front end. Notably, these charter schools to the best of my knowledge are not recruiting large shares of temporary staff from foreign countries!

But the Gulen affiliated schools – in this case Paterson Science and Technology and Central Jersey College Prep – have a strikingly similar compensation strategy to Harmony schools in Texas, and quite different from other major charter schools (notably, there are other minor charter schools that pay quite poorly, similar to the Gulen schools at the front end, but with more growth in pay for accumulated experience).  Again, one might expect these LOW and FLAT salaries to be a major barrier to generating a supply of high quality domestic applicants.

Figure 6. New Jersey Charter and District Salaries

Data Source: Based on regression model estimated to salary data from annual NJ fall staffing file. Salaries estimated as a function of a) total experience, b) degree level, c) year (3years of data included, 2008 to 2010) and d) FTE status.

In a sense, these Gulen salary structures and claims of insufficient teacher supply especially in math and science may be providing us with some insights as to what happens when we choose to pay teachers so poorly and when we strip them of any expectation of increased wages with experience. Maybe they do really have a domestic teacher supply problem. But their solution to that problem is not a scalable solution for American public schooling at large (cheap imported and temporary labor).

Quite honestly, any school that persists in offering this low a wage with no growth over time, while complaining about lack of supply of worthy U.S. applicants really isn’t even trying! Clearly, they are operating exactly how they want to operate – and have little if any interest in attracting the best and brightest science and math graduates from the U.S.

While it may be the case that some of these schools are producing reasonable average outcomes – and doing so at substantially reduced labor costs – this is clearly a model with serious limitations to its scalability. Further, there exist significant concerns that much of the apparent “high” performance in these schools is a function of student selection & attrition. (see also: http://www.texastribune.org/texas-education/texas-education-agency/what-drives-high-achievement-at-harmony-charters-/)

Just pondering. More to come, no doubt. Cheers!

For more on salary competitiveness and teacher quality/supply, see: http://www.shankerinstitute.org/images/doesmoneymatter_final.pdf

Note: There is also some evidence, like this: http://www.charterschoolwatchdog.com/tuzuk—a-contract-to-steal.html which suggests that for Turkish teachers, Gulen schools receive a sizable kickback on the salaries and levy numerous fees against those salaries. That would, of course, generate a substantial amount of money for the Gulen organization.  My Texas teacher level data set has over 800 teachers in Harmony schools in 2009-10, with cumulative reported base salaries near $30million. KIPP, Yes Prep and IDEA all have less than half of that number.  I’d appreciate any documentation readers might have regarding current contractual agreements, fees, etc. for non-U.S. employees of these schools. Thanks!

Friday Finance 101: On Parfaits & Property Taxes

Public preference for property taxes stands in perfect inverse relation to the public taste for parfaits. Everybody loves parfaits[i] and everybody hates property taxes.[ii] No, I don’t plan to spend this blog post bashing parfaits. I do like a good parfait. But, even more blasphemous, I intend to shed light on some of the virtues of much maligned property taxes.

I often hear school funding equity advocates argue that if we could only get rid of property taxes as a basis for funding public schools, we could dramatically improve funding equity. The solution, from their standpoint is to fund schools entirely from state general funds – based on rationally designed state school finance formulas – where state general fund revenues are derived primarily from income and sales taxes.  In theory, if the state controls the distribution of all resources to schools and none are raised locally through property taxes, the system can be made much fairer, even more progressive with respect to student needs and cost variation (as I discuss in this post).

Property Taxes are Less Volatile and their Decline (when/if there is one) Lags

The most recent cries for why the property tax is problematic came about because property tax revenues in some locations continue to decline marginally even as state revenues are rebounding! Damn those property tax revenues! Why don’t they rebound too?

As reported in The Atlantic, the question was: why are we still firing teachers even as the economy is rebounding (albeit slowly)? The answer- declining home values and thus declining revenues from taxes on those home values. Mind you, residential properties are only a share of taxable property values, and a much smaller share in some districts/locations than others. But more on that later.

The article in the Atlantic pointed to U.S. Census data on tax collections which are also summarized in recent reports from the Rockefeller Institute (www.rockinst.org), one of my most trusted sources for information on state and local tax policy. Consistently good stuff!  Figure 1 shows the fluctuations in state and local tax revenue sources over time. And yes, Figure 1 does show that property tax revenues continue to decline modestly. But figure 1 also shows that property tax revenues a) have much more consistently stayed in the positive zone since the early 1980s and b) have generally been much less volatile than income or sales tax revenues. Look at the most recent two downturns, in 2002-03 and 2009 to present.

Personal income tax revenues are most volatile, especially in states where larger shares of income are non-wage income.  You certainly don’t want all your eggs in that basket. And it was, in fact, state budgets that got most slammed, especially in states most reliant on personal income tax. Now this is not a case for eliminating the personal income tax. What goes down also goes up. And the personal income tax can be structured progressively and revenues from it can be distributed to improve equity. In education – or really any public service financed by a mix of income, sales and property taxes – property taxes serve as a buffer to the system – a stabilizer. While that buffer is not fairly distributed – wealthy communities having greater ability to buffer their aid losses than poorer ones – states could responsibly redistribute remaining state aid to those who need it most, or at least levy cuts in a pattern least harmful to the most needy, accounting for those with the strongest buffer. (which is not to say that states do, but rather that they could).

Figure 1. Rockefeller Institute Analysis of Revenue Volatility

 http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government_finance/2012-07-16-Recession_Local_%20Property_Tax.pdf

The other point here that The Atlantic latched onto is that property tax revenue decline, if and when it happens, occurs in a lag. They decline after others start going back up. So yes, while it does suck that property tax revenues haven’t rebounded right away, it sucks a lot less than if property tax revenues had tanked to the same degree and at the same time as sales and income tax revenues. Further, the blow of declining property tax revenues could now be softened with the political will to tap rebounding incomes and sales. (yes… could…)

Having these revenue cycles, be, well… off cycle with one another is helpful… or at least less harmful.

In short, for all their other faults property taxes help balance the revenue portfolio for public services. They are the stable, safer investment in that portfolio. Shifting too dramatically away from property taxes places a greater burden on the state to provide additional state aid for property wealthy and property poor districts. And we know who’s likely to win out in that tug of war.

Overall Funding Equity is NOT a Function of Whether the State Pays a Larger Share

Now here’s the real kicker. While school funding equity advocates like to believe that fully state funded systems would somehow be magically more equitable because state share has increased, it is not generally the case that states where school districts are more reliant on local revenue have less equitable school funding systems. In fact, as we found in our school funding fairness report, there exists no relationship at all between overall school funding fairness and the percent of money that comes from state versus local resources. Figure 2 illustrates this stunning lack of relationship.

Figure 2. Relationship between State Share and Funding Fairness

http://schoolfundingfairness.org/downloads_popup.htm# (2010, p. 35)

How can that be? Why, if more money comes from the state wouldn’t that improve funding equity? Clearly the ability to raise funds from local property taxes is inequitable? Thus, state aid is needed to counterbalance that inequity. More state aid, more equity! Viola.

But alas, as I’ve discussed many times previously on this blog, state aid formulas are the output of an ugly political process – and that’s just how it has to be. I’d love to substitute my infinite wisdom for the political meat-grinder – but that would be about as arrogant and disrespectful to our American political system as… well…  executive waivers from Federal statutory obligations. In fact, it would be equivalent to trying to use executive or regulatory (departmental) authority to rewrite components of a state school finance system that are spelled out in statute. Nah… that would be just wrong!

Some times, as in Figure 3, the political meat-grinder, under some influence of that other branch of state government – the judicial branch – produces a state school finance system that, while heavily reliant on local property taxes, still manages to achieve pretty darn good relative equity. See Figure 3- New Jersey.

 Figure 3. Equitable state w/Heavy Property tax Reliance

But other times, even when a state school finance system is heavily state funded, with relatively small local share, that system still ends up incredibly inequitable and regressive with respect to student needs. See Figure 4 – North Carolina.

Figure 4. Inequitable State with Low Property tax Reliance

 

And yes, sometimes, you do have a state that is very heavily reliant on local property taxes and has a very inequitable distribution of resources, like New York! But hey, at least it’s a stable inequity over time, right? Nothin’ like dramatic disparities that stand the test of time!

 Figure 5. Inequitable State with Higher Property Tax Reliance

 

And every state’s a bit different from every other – creating its own brand of state endorsed inequities – seemingly regardless of how dependent, or not, that state system is on local property taxes.

General State Equalization Aid IS Property Tax Relief Aid to those who need it most!

Now, it’s not entirely the fault of the property tax that we have these disparities in states like North Carolina and New York. Clearly something else is going on. I won’t go too deep on that here, because I’ve got a really fun paper coming out this September in which I go painfully deep on this topic. The paper will be rolled out in a public event in DC – more on that later. But clearly, if states more reliant on property taxes are not generally less equitable, there’s other stuff going on. Hey, just look at all of that state aid in North Carolina going to the lowest poverty districts, even when higher poverty districts could likely use a bit more. And what about the aid going to the wealthiest New York districts, a topic I’ve written about many times here? How does state aid get so screwed up as to not help?

One common argument among state legislators, especially those from property wealthy communities is that their communities need property tax relief. It’s easy to hold up the tax bill on a $2 million dollar home in New York or New Jersey and get an eye-popping response. What? You mean you pay over $30,000 a year in property tax? Clearly you need tax relief! Uh… but wait, despite the eye-popping tax bill, the effective tax rate on that house might just be lower than the effective tax rate on the $200,000 home in Newark, NJ or Utica, NY! The tax bill is high because of the value of the house, not because of some unfair tax policy or aid distribution scheme.

The bottom line is that general state aid to schools – the equity enhancing aid – is already designed to promote tax equity. State aid to schools and property tax relief, are, to a large extent flip sides of the same coin. When a community gets more in aid, they need to raise less locally to achieve the desired quality of service. If they get less in state aid, they need to raise more. Communities with greater capacity to raise more should, in turn, get less.  There’s no reason to then turn around and say that those with greater capacity to raise more all of the sudden need a break… and need additional aid… that could have otherwise gone to those with less capacity? Such an argument presumes that the state has already over-corrected tax inequities between rich and poor communities. Highly unlikely! Even New Jersey, which has corrected more than many by providing aggressively targeted state aid hasn’t gone that far. See this post!  Effective tax rates remain lower in NJ districts with higher property values (at the peak of aid targeting).

New York certainly hasn’t “over-corrected,” the property tax burden across districts, warranting the counterbalancing distribution of un-equalization aid. Figure 5 shows the relationship between taxable property values per pupil and local effort rates. Local effort rates remain systematically higher in lower wealth communities.

Figure 5. Insufficient General Aid and Persistent Tax Inequities

 

But, as I’ve discussed on a number of occasions on this blog previously, New York still goes out of its way to operate a completely separate property tax relief subsidy program, which on average, spends more state resources each year to buy down property taxes in richer rather than poorer communities. See Figure 6.

Figure 6. Un-equalizing Distribution of Unnecessary Aid

 

 So the point of this seemingly tangential portion of this post is that states like New York and others, find ways to consume state resources toward making school funding less equitable. It’s not entirely the property tax that’s at fault here. Rather, it’s the use of state resources to buy down property taxes in wealthy communities – actually encouraging even more spending in these communities that already have greater capacity and are exerting less effort. Go figure.

And that’s ONE OF MANY REASONS why simply increasing the level of support coming from the state doesn’t always improve school funding equity. Heck, North Carolina barely even tries to equalize (adjust) general school aid for differences in local capacity. You get more or less the same state aid per pupil no matter how wealthy or poor. Thus, whatever disparities exist in local revenue are simply added onto with state aid.

Closing Thoughts

There are lots of ways to make property taxes “better” and “fairer.” But even in their current form, property taxes play an important role in stabilizing the revenue on which our public schooling system operates.  Further, overemphasis on the classic, savage inequalities of American public schooling that emerge from the inequitable mess that is property taxation may distract from the reality that state school finance systems often make things worse rather than better, replacing savage inequalities with stealth inequalities.

The solution is not to get rid of property taxes but to integrate them wisely into state school finance systems, use other state revenues to better achieve overall funding equity by aggressively targeting those revenues, count on property taxes as a portfolio stabilizer and, to the extent possible, seek ways to improve equity with property taxes and improve the equity of property taxation.

 


[i] Donkey (2001) Shrek.  

[ii] http://businessweekly.readingeagle.com/?p=2860 (okay, this is an indirect cite to the Tax Foundation, which isn’t really the most credible source on Tax Policy. See: https://schoolfinance101.wordpress.com/2010/03/17/just-the-facts-nj-taxes-teacher-salaries-and-spending-fluff/)

Poverty Counts & School Funding in New Jersey

NJ Spotlight today posted a story on upcoming Task Force deliberations and public hearings over whether the state should continue to target funding in its school finance formula to local districts on the basis of counts of children qualifying for free or reduced priced lunch.  That is, kids from families who fall below the 185% income threshold for poverty.

The basic assumption behind targeting additional resources to higher poverty schools and districts is that high need districts can leverage the additional resources to implement strategies that help to improve various outcomes for children at risk. I have discussed this issue at length in this related post.  New Jersey has done this better than most states over time. (evidence on outcomes here)

The idea is to find the indicator or measure that seems to best capture the likelihood that children will struggle in school – that they will enter kindergarten less prepared and have access to fewer out of school resources during their time in school (including limited summer learning opportunities). A variety of socioeconomic indicators might be considered. But often, the information that happens to be most available is counts of kids who are from low income families, as identified through the National School Lunch Program income criteria.  And, as a measure of convenience, it tends to work quite well. I compare this measure below with Census poverty measures, based on children in families living in a certain area (within school district boundaries) who fall below the much lower income threshold of 100%, which has some advantages but also some major shortcomings.

Of course, in the political context, this is really all about finding ways to deliver more aid to districts whose representatives/political leaders wield the most power in the political debate. That’s just the nature of the beast – the politics of school finance. Sometimes it goes well for the kids who need it most… other times, not so much.  I watched this play out in Kansas a few years back, and have seen similar conversations occur across other states.

Typically, the whole thing plays out according to the following politically motivated steps:

  1. Manufacture some scandalous but largely irrelevant, anecdotal manifesto about how local district officials are egregiously mislabeling children as low income in order to hoard and misappropriate obscene sums of state aid.
  2. Manufacture other claims that poverty really doesn’t matter anyway and certainly these poverty measures have little or nothing to do with determining whether children are likely to do well in schools.
  3. Assign a task force composed mainly of lay people with little or no expertise in education policy, finance or specifically the measurement of poverty, to swallow whole the manufactured evidence and generate politically convenient policy recommendations.

As I mentioned, Kansas went through this process while I lived there – establishing an “At Risk Council,” and now New Jersey is headed down a similar road. In Kansas, the political strategy of using the Task Force to reduce poverty based funding and drive more to the suburbs was thwarted by the assignment of a knowledgeable individual to head the task force – or At Risk Council – former Commissioner Andy Tompkins. In the end, Tomkins and the Kansas At Risk Council concluded:

The Council continues to believe that the best state proxy for identifying at-risk students is poverty, whether that be measured by free or free and reduced price lunches.

Darn them. Blasphemy! Amazingly, Andy Tompkins was not exiled from Kansas for his leadership in this matter, and he remains one of the kindest, most thoughtful individuals with whom I’ve ever interacted on state education policy issues!

Report here: LEG At-Risk Council Report SFFF

Of course, Kansas legislators still found additional clever ways to shift money away from higher need and toward lower need districts.

In any case, even though no-one asked me… nor do I really want to be asked to participate in such a charade, here are the questions and considerations that should guide the choice of measures for determining state aid distribution.

Two Key Questions:

First, the questions… and the data on New Jersey schools and districts.

Is the Poverty Measure Correlated with Other Poverty Measures?

It is indeed desirable to find some measure on which to base funding allocations that can’t be gamed, or manipulated by those who stand to receive the additional funding. But that’s not always feasible (or cost effective). And, even if a count method does involve local district officials gathering data, it can still be checked/audited (in a  more thorough and responsible way than checking a smattering of individual families forms for those who fall closest to the income threshold, necessarily ignoring those who fall just the other side of the threshold but didn’t file).

One reasonable way to evaluate district collected data on children qualifying for free or reduced lunch is to evaluate the relationship between the free/reduced lunch concentrations and census poverty estimates based on resident populations. Here are three versions of that comparison:

Figure 1. Relationship between Census Poverty 2010 and District Free/Reduced Lunch 2011

In this first figure we see that Census poverty rates tend to range from 0 to about 45% and free/reduced rates – children in families under a much higher income threshold, up to about 100%. In fact, as I’ve noticed in many analyses, the free/reduced lunch data tend to get messy above 80%, suggesting that this is the range within which local administrators may be maxing out their ability to get parents to comply & file paperwork. Here, we see that even though poverty rates keep climbing, free/reduced rates seem to level off. Arguably, if anything is going on here, it’s that very high poverty districts like Camden and Trenton – which fall “below the curve” are under-reporting their free/reduced rates – with some possibility of marginal over-reporting in Elizabeth.

Overall, however, census poverty explains nearly 90% of the variation in free/reduced rates. In other words, free/reduced lunch makes a pretty darn good proxy.

In this second figure, I’ve tried to better tease out the districts that may be under or over reporting by cleaning up that non-linear relationship and expressing both measures in their natural logarithm form. Here, we see that the relationship remains very strong and still slightly curved. If there were districts substantially over-reporting free/reduced lunch, they would appear to pop above the outer/upper edge of the curve. There’s not much of that going on. On the other hand, there are a number of districts that are relatively low in poverty but report disproportionately low free/reduced lunch rates – that is, under-reporting.

Figure 2. Logged Relationship (natural log) between Census Poverty and Free/Reduced Lunch

In general, these figures show that free/reduced lunch rates are a pretty darn good proxy for district poverty rates. And at least this analysis here doesn’t indicate substantial, systematic (beyond predicted, based on resident child poverty rates) mis-classification.

Is the Poverty Measure Correlated with Student Outcomes?

The “big question” is which version of the measure better captures differences in student outcomes – or predicts educational disadvantage.  This is straightforward enough to check as well. The first figure hear shows the relationship between free/reduced lunch rates and proficiency rates on state assessments in 2011.

Now, I know, we’ve been told that this relationship doesn’t really exist. There are lots of schools that flat out buck this trend, right? So much so that it’s not even a trend, right? In fact, we’ve even been fed a totally absurd graph which purports to validate that free/reduced lunch really doesn’t relate to performance.  Oh wait… and we’ve been fed even more ridiculous graphs to reinforce this point!

Setting aside all of that stuff, Figure 3 shows that % free/reduced lunch alone explains about 81% of the variation in proficiency rates across districts.  So, it’s a pretty reasonable proxy of educational disadvantage.

Figure 3. Free/Reduced Lunch & Proficiency in 2011

Now, I do have some concerns about the extent to which this relationship erodes at and approaching free/reduced rates above 80%. Is it really that Camden and Trenton perform that poorly compared to Union and Elizabeth despite serving even less poor populations? Or might the story be more complex than this. Figure 4 which shows the relationship between Census Poverty and proficiency sheds some additional light on this issue.

Figure 4. Census Poverty and Proficiency

Figure 4 suggests that Camden and Trenton are actually a) higher poverty than Elizabeth (and Camden higher than Union) and b) perform more or less where they are expected to [somewhat below… as opposed to well below]. This is an interesting contrast that adds some support to my speculation above that these very high poverty cities may in fact be understating their poverty rates in their free/reduced lunch data. Indeed, there may be some overstating in Union and Elizabeth, but neither “popped” substantially above the curve in the previous charts.

Census poverty rates, while capturing a unique story of difference between Camden and Trenton vs. Union and Elizabeth do slightly less well at explaining variations in proficiency rates, making the free/reduced count preferable in this regard.

Additional Policy Considerations:

Given all of this, there are a few additional considerations when pondering which measure to actually use in state school finance policy.

More Stringent Count Methods require Larger Weights

First, if we choose to use a more stringent income threshold for poverty, like the census poverty measure, we would need to assign the appropriate weight to drive the appropriate amount of funding to high need districts. Simply changing our method of counting kids in poverty doesn’t change the needs of Camden or Trenton. It merely recasts those needs with an alternative measure. More stringent measures require larger weights, an issue that has been explored empirically.

The applies to the choice of using free lunch (130% income threshold) as opposed to free or reduced lunch. Using free lunch only might permit better differentiation between high poverty districts, but a higher weight would then be required to drive sufficient funds to those districts.

Problems with Residential/Geography Based Measures in New Jersey

Census poverty measures are limited in their usefulness in the current New Jersey policy context, because they are based on location of residence and linked to geographic boundaries of school districts. New Jersey has significant numbers of non-unified, regional secondary school districts for which poverty estimates may be imprecise or inaccurate.

Further expansion of charter schools and inter-district choice programs complicates use of measures based on place of residence. Funding to schools must be sensitive to the demographics of students enrolled in those schools.  It would be entirely inappropriate, for example, to require a sending district like Newark or Camden to pay charter or other district tuition on the basis of their own average resident poverty rate if the charter school or receiving district is not taking a comparable share of children in poverty. This is certainly the case in Newark.

As a result, free or free and reduced price lunch measures remain preferable.

So, that’s my 2 cents (okay, more like a few dollars worth) of advice on this issue.

More on this later, no doubt, when the Task Force releases its final recommendations.

Related paper on poverty measurement.

http://aefpweb.org/sites/default/files/webform/VOL%20I-POVERTY%20REPORT-METHODOLOGY%202011-21-12%20CLEAN.docx

Effects of Charter Enrollment on Newark District Enrollment

In numerous previous posts I have summarized New Jersey charter school enrollment data, frequently pointing out that the highest performing charter schools in New Jersey tend to be demographically very different from schools in their surrounding neighborhoods and similar grade level schools throughout their host districts or cities. I have tried to explain over and over that the reason these differences are important is because they constrain the scalability of charter schooling as a replicable model of “success.” Again, to the extent that charter successes are built on serving vastly different student populations, we can simply never know (even with the best statistical analyses attempting to sort out peer factors, control for attrition, etc.) whether the charter schools themselves, their instructional strategies/models are effective and/or would be effective with larger numbers of more representative students.

Here, I take a quick look at the other side of the picture, again focusing on the city of Newark. Specifically, I thought it would be interesting to evaluate the effect on Newark schools enrollment of the shift in students to charter schools, now that charters have taken on a substantial portion of students in the city. If charter enrollments are – as they seem to be – substantively different from district schools enrollments, then as those charter populations grow and remain different from district schools, we can expect the district schools population to change.  In particular, given the demography of charter schools in Newark, we would expect those schools to be leaving behind a district of escalating disadvantage – but still a district serving the vast majority of kids in the city. I’m not sure why I never got around to looking this issue. I’ve certainly explored it in Pennsylvania with respect to special education populations (where there exists an incentive for PA charters to serve low need special education students, leaving high need ones behind for the district to serve with fewer resources).

First, here are the data sources on which I am relying for this analysis:

1) school level enrollment data 2010-11: http://www.nj.gov/education/data/enr/enr11/stat_doc.htm

2) school directory (for identifying city location): http://education.state.nj.us/directory/schoolDL.php

3) special education classification & placement: http://www.nj.gov/education/specialed/data/ADR/2010/EligibilitybyPlacement/PlacementByElig6-21.xls

[Placement by eligibility 6 to 21 year olds. I left of 3 to 5 year olds for now]

This is a rough first cut at an analysis that should be done in greater depth at some point and for more than just Newark. Consider this to be illustrative.

Here’s my usual starting point – % free lunch and % ell by school for schools with their city of location as Newark.

Again, most of the charter schools in Newark have very low % Free Lunch or % ELL when compared with other schools in Newark, except for a handful of NPS specialized and magnet schools. Indeed, the district does impose a significant degree of segregation on itself.

The real trick in all of this is to figure out how to balance the presence of these specialized schools, charter schools and district schools to create the best set of opportunities for the largest share of children.

If we take the school level enrollments for charter schools in Newark and for NPS schools in Newark and sum them up we get the following distribution of students:

Table 1. Summed School Level Enrollments* from Enrollment File

SLI = speech/language impairment, SLD = specific learning disability.

*Note that if we look at the district enrollment data, NPS enrollment is actually greater than the figure above, and greater in each other category. Some of the difference is a function of special education out of district placements, where many of those students are both disabled and low income. District reported totals are enrollment = 33,279, free lunch = 26,320, ELL = 2,665 (leading to slightly higher disadvantaged shares than above). see: http://www.nj.gov/cgi-bin/education/data/enr11plus.pl

A noticeable feature of Table 1 is that for the most part, charter schools aren’t serving many children with disabilities to begin with. But, they are especially not serving children with disabilities other than mild specific learning disabilities or speech/language impairment.

Table 2 puts Table 1 into percentages.

Table 2. District school and charter school enrollment characteristics by percent

Here, we see that few charters in Newark have anywhere near the % free lunch share of the district as a whole. The differences are especially large for Robert Treat, North Star and Greater Newark. The differences are even more striking for LEP and special education classifications, except for TEAM which enrolls a sizable share of SLD/SLI students, but very few more severe disabilities.

Now, here’s another angle on the student populations. Table 3 shows the effect of extracting these charter enrollments from the district enrollments. In the first column, I include the summed enrollments of all schools in the city of Newark including charter schools (but not private schools). In the second column I include the summed enrollments of Newark Public schools within the city of Newark.

The fourth column is particularly important. This column shows that:

  1. Charter schools listed above have absorbed about 15% of the district total enrollment. 
  2. But, these charter schools have absorbed only 13% of the district’s lowest income children.
  3. Further, they have absorbed less than 1% of the district’s ELL population.
  4. They have absorbed only 8.3% of the district’s low need special education population
  5. And, they have absorbed only 2% of the district’s higher need special education population (most of these being students listed in the broad, “other health impairment” category and attending TEAM academy).

For charter schools not be be having a negative effect on district enrollment characteristics, they would have to be – in the aggregate – absorbing 15% of each special needs group. But clearly they are not. Thus, we can expect that those left behind in district schools are becoming a higher and higher need group as charter enrollments expand (unless they become more representative in the aggregate).
Table 3. District & Charter Enrollments & Effect of Charter Enrollments on District

  • Thus far, growth in enrollment of the charters included here has led to an increase in district schools % free lunch of 2%.
  • Thus far, growth in enrollment of the charters included here has led to an increase in the district schools % ELL of greater than 1% (given that the rate is only around 7%, this is sizable).
  • Charter enrollment growth has also led to growth in concentrations of children with lower and especially higher cost disability classifications.

Again – this is just a cursory, preliminary cut at these data based on simply summing up the available enrollment data from 2010 and 2011.

There are numerous potential additional complexities here. For example, does the presence of some high flying charters keep some families in the district that might otherwise seek to move elsewhere? That is, if the charters weren’t there, would the district lose less needy students to out-migration? That’s possible, but likely in smaller shares than seen here.

My main point here is that this is yet another issue of New Jersey charter schooling that requires much more in-depth investigation… with improved data on specific student level mobility… and also exploring the effect of charter enrollment attrition mid-year on nearby school population characteristics.

These issues are particularly worthy of additional exploration as NJDOE considers massive charter expansion in other cities such as Camden. Again, if the successes of some of these charters are largely contingent on the selective populations they serve, the successes of these charters (a) may be limited in their replicability and b) may be coming at significant expense to other children left behind.

Further, these issues are of critical importance when determining the appropriate approach to financing charter schools and their host districts. As I have noted previously, Pennsylvania has chosen among the worst approaches for dealing with special education charter school financing. New Jersey must avoid a comparable debacle (and thus far, has largely done so). All student needs based funding must be distributed with respect to the actual needs of students served – especially in the case of children with disabilities.  That is, if a charter school serves a district student with a mild, specific, low cost disability, they should be subsidized specifically on that basis, so as to ensure that sufficient funding is left for the district to serve remaining higher need students. New Jersey charter school financial data continue to be woefully inadequate for detailed analysis. More on that at a later point.

Cheers!

 

A not so modest proposal: My new fully research based school!

It’s about time we all suck it up and realize that the best of economic research on factors associated with test score gains not only can, but must absolutely drive the redesign of our obviously dreadful American public education system! [despite substantial evidence to the contrary!]

With that in mind, I have selectively mined some of my own favorite studies and summaries of studies in order to develop a framework for the absolutely awesomest school ever! I’ve chosen to focus on only economic studies of measurable stuff that is actually associated with measured test score gains. After all, that’s what matters – that’s all that matters!

Mind you that this school will be awesomest not merely in terms of overall effectiveness, but also in terms of bang for the buck, because I’m not messin’ around with expensive curriculum or elaborate facilities… or high priced consultants… or really expensive strategies like class size reduction.

I’ve chosen to avoid enrolling grades K-3 since the research is actually pretty strong that I should offer smaller class sizes in those grades. If I don’t have those grades, I guess I don’t have to worry about class size! Right?  In the absence of such clear research for grades 4 to 8 (or my choice to ignore that which really is relevant), I’ve decided that when it comes to class size, anything goes.

I’m goin’ for low hangin’ fruit here. Keepin it simple – with class sizes of 60 or so (since we know that doesn’t matter???) , running my school in a vacant lot and with absolutely no administration and/or supervision – since I’ve negated the need for the principal role in guiding high quality teacher selection by using an alternative, necessarily cost effective strategy!

So, here goes… Here’s my Econometric Academy Middle School (Grades 4 to 8).

Hire and keep only those teachers who have exactly 4 years of experience

First, and foremost, since the research on teacher experience and degree levels often shows that student value-added test scores tend to level off when teachers reach about the 4th year of their experience, I see absolutely no need to have teachers on my staff with any more or less than 4 years experience, or with a salary of any greater than a 4th year teacher with a bachelors degree might earn. Anything above and beyond this is simply inefficient. Paying a teacher more after the 4th year is simply inefficient. Boosting 4th year pay is also inefficient if I can simply, in perpetuity, employ only teachers with exactly 4 years experience.

Here’s a graph from a Calder Center report summarizing the student test score gains in relation to teacher experience.

http://www.caldercenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001455-impact-teacher-experience.pdf

Now, I’ve reviewed the various economic simulations that suggest that dismissing teachers on the basis of student value added test scores is a reasonable approach to, over time, increasing teacher quality. For my nifty new school, I choose to believe in their assumption that there will always exist a normally distributed flow of new applicants whose average quality is the same as the current pool of teachers.

My approach allows me not to even worry about selecting out the bottom 5 or 10% and replacing them with average teachers. Instead, I’m going for cost-effectiveness! You see, if the average teacher has already achieved their likely best value-added outcomes by year 4, then (accepting the current experience based pay system) at year 4 I’ve got teachers who are at their maximum productivity and the lowest wage – and I don’t have to ever worry about paying them more! That’s totally freakin’ awesome! I just have to make sure that every year, when I let my entire staff go, I get out there and find a totally new crop of teachers who have just completed their third year of teaching elsewhere – and are at least “average” among soon-to-be 4th year teachers at producing outcomes. Thus, every year, I will have teachers who have the average production of 4th year teachers and the average wage of 4th year teachers.

That is, they are necessarily better than average in terms of cost effectiveness.

This is a no brainer!

Implement carb loading on testing days, scaled up w/grade level (& in spring where fall-spring assessments are given)

Now, let’s shoot for some somewhat more obscure ideas… that have great potential to yield some nice marginal gains to tests scores on top of my already optimally staffed school. For my next few clever strategies, I turn to the work of David Figlio formerly of the University of Florida and currently at Northwestern (yes… this is a sarcastic post… but Figlio is a truly exceptional scholar… really clever guy… and one of the nicest people you could ever meet. Plus, he produces some really fun food-for-thought!).

Research from back in 2002 found that under Virginia’s accountability system, many school districts were adjusting their lunch menus to increase carb loading on SOL (uh… standards of learning) testing days. More importantly, David Figlio and colleagues found that it worked!

Using detailed daily school nutrition data from a random sample of Virginia school districts, we find that school districts having schools faced with potential sanctions under Virginia’s Standards of Learning (SOL) accountability system apparently respond by substantially increasing calories in their menus on testing days, while those without such immediate pressure do not change their menus. Suggestive evidence indicates that the school districts who do this the most experience the largest increases in pass rates.

Specifically, the authors note:

We observe that the estimated effect of calorie manipulation is positive across all five tests, and is statistically significant, despite the extremely small effective sample size, in the case of mathematics. (Figlio, food for thought)

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.159.8754&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Yeah… this is really low hanging fruit (perhaps quite literally) for my bang-for-the-buck econometric academy. All I have to do is carefully plan out my school menus to optimize their influence on student test scores. I might want to think carefully about how to play this right in a value-added structure. For example, if we have fall-spring assessments, do I carb load only in the spring?

(from the authors acknowledgement section)

The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of their employers, funders, or young children, the latter of whom respectfully disagree with the authors’ derogatory characterization of “empty calories.” We, in turn, blame them for any remaining errors.

Rename all students prior to entry

Figlio has also produced an intriguing series of studies that consider how students’ names affect their behavior and performance in school. There’s some more low hanging fruit for making my school the best performing school ever with little additional costs! The policy implications are absolutely clear from the research – I must review the names of all incoming 4th graders for two potential performance inhibiting characteristics. First, are their boys who have names that sound like girls names? Second, are there kids with either names that sound “black” or names that sound like they were given by less educated and/or lower class parents.  Next, I simply have to require that the parents of their kids change their names prior to starting 4th grade. To aid these parents in making good name choices, I will have available a list of gender appropriate, Asian sounding names, because that too is backed by the research!

Here’s the research behind my brilliant, cost-effective proposal… and it is both statistically significant, and compelling!

Racially identifiable names:

The persistence of the Black-White test score gap, and its widening over the course of the school cycle, is an issue of significant public policy concern. This paper presents evidence that a portion of these patterns could be due to the names given particularly prevalently to Black children. Children with names associated with low socio-economic status, and to a limited degree, with “Blackness” per se, tend to score lower on their reading and mathematics tests, relative to their siblings with less race or class-identifiable names.

This hypothesis is also bolstered by the finding that the opposite set of results are observed in the instance of Asian families, for whom a racially-identifiable name may signal attributes that are perceived to be associated with success. Asian children with racially-identifiable names apparently face higher teacher expectations and also tend to score higher on examinations.

http://faculty.smu.edu/Millimet/classes/eco7321/papers/figlio.pdf

Boys with female sounding names:

 I find that, as suggested above, boys with female-sounding names tend to misbehave  disproportionately in sixth grade, as compared to other boys and to their previous (relative) behavior patterns. In addition, I find that behavior problems, instrumented with the distribution of boys’ names in the class, are associated with increased peer disciplinary problems and reduced peer test scores, indicating that disruptive behavior of students has negative ramifications for their peers.

http://www.aeaweb.org/assa/2005/0107_1430_1102.pdf

Have salaries based entirely – not just partially – on loss aversion tied to test score gains

Finally, what kind of econometric academy would I have if I didn’t totally buy into the most recent study on  loss aversion as a compensation strategy! Roland Fryer and colleagues have provided us a real gem here. Fryer and colleagues find:

In this paper, we demonstrate that exploiting the power of loss aversion—teachers are paid in advance and asked to give back the money if their students do not improve sufficiently—increases math test scores between 0.201 (0.076) and 0.398 (0.129) standard deviations.

http://scholar.harvard.edu/sites/scholar.iq.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/enhancing_teacher_incentives.pdf

Now, I’m going all out with this one. Every teacher gets paid their full salary at the beginning of the year (I’ll have to use some kind of accounting trick to deal with the timing of my state aid and local transfer payments, or once I’m up and running, rely on the money I took back from the previous year teachers to pay those up front salaries the next year). If your kids’ scores don’t increase more than the average, you lose your whole salary (see, it’s all relative, I get half the salaries back every year no matter what!).

I can see how this strategy might create a divisive culture in some schools or might create animosity between teachers and administrators for teachers who repeatedly lose compensation – and may lose that compensation largely as a function of random error and/or omitted variables bias in the model designed to estimate their effectiveness. Yeah… I can see how taking teachers’ salaries away for factors that may be entirely outside their control could really piss them off, more than actually inspiring them to try to control these uncontrollable in a subsequent year.

But, my school is different. I really don’t have administration… because decisions are already made, by me, at a great distance. Besides, I don’t have to see any of my teachers the following year anyway because they all get dismissed every year, and a new crop of 4th year teachers – equal to the previous – comes in (at least I think they will…). I just have to inspire them (scare the crap out of them) to kick some butt for that one year!

And that my friends, is the Econometric Academy of Achievement Test Excellence!

 

Closing thoughts

But seriously, much of the past week or so seems to have been dominated by discussions of Roland Fryer’s new NBER working paper indicating that while typical merit pay incentives don’t seem to influence student outcomes (by increasing teacher effort), when those incentives are paid up front, and taken back in response to lower performance, gains can be noticed. The buzz phrase (and theoretical framework) for the analysis is “loss aversion,” and a common assumption is that people may have more incentive to work harder if they fear losing something they already have, as opposed to gaining something they never had.

This stuff is fun to ponder (in a warped, academic sort of way), and potentially interesting as a research topic. But it’s all highly questionable in terms of usefulness for improving school quality (note that I said school quality, not test score gains!).

And that’s true of a lot of educational, psychological and econometric research related to schools. It’s especially true of any one of these branches of research in isolation!

The real key with most of these studies and others like them is to avoid the leap that these studies have immediate decisive policy implications – that they can and should be used to inform school reform – school redesign and state and federal education policy more broadly. Yes, each bit of information can advance our understanding. But, we must avoid the urge to assume that each new tidbit provides a new silver bullet answer and also negates all that we’ve learned previously.

Policymakers (and newspapers) want research with immediate and obvious policy implications. They want the silver bullet. They want the breakthrough that negates all previous understanding – that tells us why everything we’ve done to date is wrong and paints a clear path forward. Unfortunately, too many researchers feel compelled to play along.

Consider the great Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff one great teacher can earn a classroom of kids and extra quarter million dollars study, from this past winter. Many policymakers leaped to use that study as an immediate call to use value-added data for teacher de-selection policies. That call was endorsed by one of the authors own media quotes in which he asserted that we should fire sooner than later! (and that assertion was built on an overly bold if not absurd extrapolation of the earnings effect based on the single age at which the earnings effect was largest).

Similar overreaching for immediate policy implications appeared in the author-endorsed media spinning of Roland Fryer’s piece on “no excuses” charter schools in New York City, where despite not even attempting to accurately measure school expenditures, or the cost of “no excuses strategies” Fryer  fueled the media assertion that “no excuses” strategies and NOT money are the answer to improving urban school performance (partly in language embedded in the working paper itself).

If we are willing to accept these types of bold immediate policy recommendations, then we might actually be willing to accept the school I’ve laid out above as a reasonable proposition. My research based academy above might actually produce some marginally greater value-added estimates on student achievement data than it would for the same group of kids if I didn’t strategically carb load on testing days, change the kids names (to alter teachers’ expectations of them) and threaten their teachers with complete loss of salary.

And it might even be a really efficient approach to value-added gains if my (completely ridiculous) assumption holds that I can find a pool of average 4th year teachers willing to enter such a toxic environment for a single year, every year at an average 4th year salary. Yeah… that’s one $#!+load of assumptions (worthy of a few pages of appropriately formatted footnotes!).

But I’m pretty sure it would be a really sucky place to work as a teacher or to attend as a student. And call me a sappy, post-empiricist, sucker, but that matters too!

Learning from Really Bad Graphs & Ill-informed Conclusions: Thoughts on the New PEPG “Catching Up” Report

A new policy paper from Eric Hanushek, Paul Peterson & Ludger Woessmann has been receiving considerable attention. This despite numerous completely outlandish assertions drawn from junk charts that fill the pages of this reformy manifesto.

Look, I’ve said it before and will say it again. Eric Hanusek has contributed a great deal of high quality research to the fields of education policy and economics of education over the years and I have in the past and continue to this day to rely heavily on much of it to inform my own analyses and thinking in education policy. But this kind of stuff is really just infuriating. Rather than spend too much time venting, let’s try to use this new report for instructive purposes – to instruct the casual reader how to debunk and distill complete and utter BS when presented with pretty scatterplots and glossy formatting.

First, for your reading pleasure, the complete brief may be found here: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/pepg/PDF/Papers/PEPG12-03_CatchingUp.pdf

Before I go down this road, allow me to point out that it’s one thing to offer up this type of analysis as a conversation starter… or even as a provocation with all relevant caveats and disclaimers. It’s yet another to present information of this caliber (or lack thereof) as a serious attempt at immediate influence over policy. There’s a huge freakin’ difference there. And it is certainly my impression that this brief, by its framing, is indeed intended to shape the immediate policy conversation as much if not more so than to generate speculative, intellectual musings over the various possible meanings of the charts.

Further I’m particularly concerned with the way in which much of the information is presented and the way in which conclusions are drawn from that information. This is where this brief can be useful and illustrative – where we can turn this clumsy manifesto into a teaching moment.  I’ll tackle three specific issues here:

  1. measures matter, especially when we are dealing with money and test scores,
  2. the complexity of educational systems is difficult to untangle two-measures at a time,
  3. always watch out for the ol’ bait and switch! (sometimes it’s really obvious!)

The report presents numerous international comparisons (that’s the focus) of similar rigor to the state level comparisons I critique here. I’m just a bit pressed for time, and had the state data more readily available.

Measures Matter!

Okay… so here’s the first graph that drove me up the freakin’ wall. This graph is a classic extension of what I refer to as the Hanushekian cloud of uncertainty.

Figure 1 – State Spending Increases & Test Score Gains (from report)

For decades, Hanushek has been presenting deceptively oversimplified scatter plots of school district, state level and international data on education spending and outcome measures. These scatterplots in and of themselves are invariably freakin’ meaningless.  I evaluate this body of literature by Hanushek as a whole in my policy brief Revisiting the Age Old Question: Does Money Matter in Education?  

This graph provides a new twist, comparing the dollar increases in spending to the NAEP average annual gain. Hanushek uses this graph to draw the following conclusions:

 According to another popular theory, additional spending on education will yield gains in test scores. To see whether expenditure theory can account for the interstate variation, we plotted test-score gains against increments in spending between 1990 and 2009. As can be seen from the scattering of states into all parts of Figure 9, the data offer precious little support for the theory.

On average, an additional $1,000 in per-pupil spending is associated with a trivial annual gain in achievement of one-tenth of 1 percent of a standard deviation.

Michigan, Indiana, Idaho, North Carolina, Colorado, and Florida made the most achievement gains for every incremental dollar spent over the past two decades.

(keep an eye on Michigan and Indiana – we’ll hear from them again later. Here, they are AWESOME – getting bang for the buck… Of course, one can look good on this indicator by simply not spending much more and showing commensurately paltry outcome gains!)

I love the sarcastic use of “precious” in this quote. But I digress.

But there are at least a few small – okay… pretty damn big … okay … huge… completely undermining – problems with using this scatterplot to draw these conclusions.

Let’s set aside the outcome measure for now and focus on two other not-so-trivial issues. First and foremost, a $1,000 increase in spending in Louisiana and a $1,0000 increase in spending in New Jersey or Connecticut may… just may… not be worth the same. Does $1,000 more go as far to improving competitiveness of teacher salaries in New Jersey as it does in New Mexico? Uh… not so much.  In fact, the National Center for Education Statistics Education Comparable Wage Index indicates that competitive wages in New Jersey are substantially greater than in Louisiana, significantly altering the value of the additional dollar.  Second… it’s possible that other factors may actually play a role too?

Let’s shatter the spending measure & related conclusions first! Here’s an alternate view – taking the current expenditures per pupil from 2008-09 over the current expenditures for 1990-91 – that is, expressing them effectively as a percent increase over base year (albeit not inflation adjusted – see this post for more on this topic).

Figure 2

Hmmm… as it turns out, New Jersey spending really didn’t increase much as a percent over the base year. Louisiana, however, did. In fact, Louisiana actually had among the highest growth among states.  Well then, that would mean that New Jersey really kicked some butt! Not much spending increase at all… and some pretty damn good outcome gain!

The bottom line however, is that either scatterplot is pretty meaningless, with mine arguably slightly less meaningless than the original! But neither really useful for making any bold statements about state aggregate spending and outcome gains. Again, in my policy brief on Money Matters, I explore these issues in much greater detail. Referring to more rigorous studies attempting to link spending and outcome measures, I explain:

They [more recent studies] also, however, raised new, important issues about the complexities of attempting to identify a direct link between money and student outcomes. These difficulties include equating the value of the dollar across widely varied geographic and economic contexts, as well as in accurately separating the role of expenditures from that of students’ family backgrounds, which also play some role in determining local funding.

http://www.shankerinstitute.org/images/doesmoneymatter_final.pdf

I can’t pass up this seemingly tangential point.  I took particular enjoyment in this finding from Hanushek’s new report:

Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey enjoyed substantial gains in student performance after committing substantial new fiscal resources.

Hanushek went to great lengths in an earlier book and in related policy papers to make the case the New Jersey was a classic example of failed massive spending increases and he has repeatedly cited New Jersey’s failures (as recently as this spring – my rebuttal here!) as a reason why other states should not increase funding for schools. Kevin Welner and I discuss this Hanushekian claim extensive in a recent article in Teachers College Record.

Isn’t that precious?

Two Measures Generally Insufficient for anything but Playful Speculation & Exploration!

As I noted above, the second reason why we should NOT take the Hanushekian cloud seriously, nor should we take the other graphs in the new report too seriously is that they attempt to draw inappropriately bold conclusions from graphs involving only two variables at a time. This approach can be useful for exploring patterns and/or raising questions. We all should spend much time exploring visual representations of our data- getting to know our data – our measures and how they relate. But to take this information and assert that spending matters little, or to go even further and make claims that the South is rising again… and that accountability driven policies of southern states are leading to disproportionate gains while curmudgeonly anti-reformy anti-accountability Midwest states are suffering, is just absurd.  I’ll dig into these conclusions a bit more in the next and final section.

What else might be going on here? Well, one likely issue requiring at least some more exploration is whether there are any substantive changes in the demography of these states. Yeah… it’s just possible that states that saw greater improvement saw less increase in poverty. Uh… and yeah… it’s possible that states that started lower gained more. Now, the authors acknowledge this latter point, but then brush it off. Instead, they assert that a likely alternative explanation is that Midwest states were riding high on their past successes and great universities, and simply got complacent.

Here are a few figures to chew on.

Figure 3 – Demographics and Outcome Change

Note that Hanushek, Peterson and Woessmann make a big deal about the great performance of Louisiana, Delaware, Maryland and Florida and the particularly sucky performance of Michigan, Indiana, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Uh… wait, weren’t Indiana and Michigan awesome above – for getting those paltry outcome gains for little or no additional investment? Yeah… but now they suck. Really… suck… because… they’re complacent… and not reformy.   As it turns out, the states referred to as generally awesome by the authors also had generally less increase in % low income students.

Figure 4 – Starting Performance Level and Outcome Change

While the authors acknowledge that starting performance levels are associated with outcome change, they go to great lengths to blow off this issue, arguing a) that it explains a relatively small share of the variation (uh… only about a quarter of it… which is actually quite large for this type of data/analysis) and b) that other plausible explanations involving the southern reformyness vs. midwestern complacency dichotomy may explain much of the rest of the difference? (without any evidence to support this notion!).

Yes. Starting level does seem to matter! And that can’t be overlooked, or brushed aside.

Together, change in % free lunch and 1992 8th grade math score explain about 41% of the variation in annual gain across the 34 states for whom each measure is available.

Ye Ol’ Bait & Switch

But there are bigger and more obvious problems with the conclusions drawn in this report… that don’t really even require much statistical digging. A classic deceptive strategy used in this type of reporting is ye ol’ bait and switch and/or conflating one group identification with another.

Ye ol’ bait and switch is often used in voucher debates where pundits will point to elite private schools as examples of the choices that all children/families should have and will then point to the average tuition of Catholic elementary schools (circa 1999) as an example of the cost of private education (see: http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/private-schooling-US). Uh… 1999 national average Catholic elementary school tuition won’t cover much of the tuition at Sidwell Friends in 2012!

An entire subsection of the Hanushek, Peterson and Woessmann report is titled Is the South Rising Again? Much attention is paid in the report to the premise that southern states are staging an impressive comeback and that this impressive comeback is a function of their forward thinking in the 1990s and 2000s.

Specifically, the authors laud the achievement gains of Louisiana, Delaware, Maryland and Florida! All, of course, “southern.”

And specifically, the authors laud the early reformyness of Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas – as providing possible explanations for the high performance of southern states!

Wait a second…. Those aren’t the same freakin’ states are they? What’s up with that? Did they really do that? Did they really frame it that way?

Here’s what the report says:

Five of the top-10 states were in the South, while no southern states were among the 18 with the slowest growth. The strong showing of the South may be related to energetic political efforts to enhance school quality in that region. During the 1990s, governors of several southern states—Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas—provided much of the national leadership for the school accountability effort, as there was a widespread sentiment in the wake of the civil rights movement that steps had to be taken to equalize educational opportunity across racial groups. The results of our study suggest those efforts were at least partially successful.

Meanwhile, students in Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, and Indiana were among those making the smallest average gains between 1992 and 2011. Once again, the larger political climate may have affected the progress on the ground. Unlike in the South, the reform movement has made little headway within midwestern states, at least until very recently. Many of the midwestern states had proud education histories symbolized by internationally acclaimed land-grant universities, which have become the pride of East Lansing, Michigan; Madison, Wisconsin; St. Paul, Minnesota; and Lafayette, Indiana. Satisfaction with past accomplishments may have dampened interest in the school reform agenda sweeping through southern, border, and some western states.

Keep in mind that Louisiana and Delaware didn’t get all reformy until the Race to the Top Era. Further as shown above, Louisiana actually had one of the largest proportionate increases in funding and Louisiana had relatively low growth in low income students.

Here’s a look at the BAIT and at the SWITCH, where I consider the bait to be those precious high outliers – the over-performers in the analysis, and the switch to be the states that were lauded as implementing policies that are likely behind this performance. As it turns out, while those early accountability/reform states also saw pretty good gains, their gains are more or less in line with gains of other states that had similar starting point – at least on 8th grade math (my apologies for simply not having the time to combine all NAEP scores, but the 8th grade math starting point explains 27% of the variation in gain, and along with free lunch change explains 41% of the variation in gain. Not bad, and more than Hanushek, Peterson and Woessmann suggest!).

Figure 5 – The BAIT… and the SWITCH!

Why is this relevant? The assertion being made in this report is essentially that the SWITCH group of states were implementing desired policies… policies that the sucky states like Michigan and Indiana should perhaps consider – or at least should have instead of resting on their laurels. Then, perhaps they could have looked more like the  precious bait. The problem is that the only overlap between the BAIT and the SWITCH is Florida – hardly a stereotypical “southern” state… and one whose reformyess and NAEP gains have been discussed & critiqued extensively by others in recent years (not time for that here). And then of course, we have the proclamation of the suckyness of Michigan and Indiana. Okay… which is it?

The bottom line in all of this is that this new report doesn’t tell us much. I don’t really have a problem with that. What I have a problem with is assuming that it does.

I do have a problem with particularly junky charts/analysis like the one asserting that spending increases have no relationship to outcome increases – with no consideration at all for the regional differences in the value of those increases – and all of the other variables that may… just may… play some role! That’s just lazy and sloppy and inexcusable.

But, at least I’ve got a new handout for discussion & critique for the first week of my fall semester class on data analysis and reporting!

Moneyball, Superman, Angry Royals Fans and Education Reform?

These past few days have been interesting, as I’ve followed more than usual, the festivities around the Major League Baseball All Star Game. I’ve followed the festivities in part because the game was in Kansas City this year and I lived in the Kansas City ‘burbs for 11 years up until 2008. I’m an east coast guy – born & raised Vermonter, livin’ in Jersey – college in PA, masters in CT, Doc in NYC… also taught in NH. I love east coast cities, and I probably fit the typical east coast snob profile. But some of the events that went down this week at the ASG left me feeling a bit uneasy.  Now, even as a kid, I kind of like the Royals. They were pretty damn good when I was growing up, and had that cool stadium with the fountains. While we lived in KC, we went to quite a few games… ‘cuz tickets were cheap and accessible.[1]

As I sat down to watch the Home Run Derby, I happened to be checking twitter – where I still follow some Kansas City media folks. I starting seeing tweets with the hashtag #boocano… along with links to explanations as to why KC fans should boo when Yankee Robinson Cano comes to bat.  Even as the booing actually happened… and it was quite impressive… the story I was getting from ESPN was strangely disconnected from the story I was getting from my KC tweets.

In case you missed it here’s some video from the stands at the K:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LZlQk861C5c&feature=plcp

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sPl9Ez8dE6w&feature=plcp

In fact, ESPN wasn’t sharing much of anything… rather, suggesting that the KC fans were being inappropriate and expressing sour grapes simply because their guy (who must suck, because he’s a Royal) didn’t get picked for the home run derby. Eventually, ESPN and also Fox would post on their websites, stories of how Kansas City fans were “classless” and rude, while never actually sharing the details behind why Royals fans booed Cano.  For my east coast peers, here’s a Kansas City run down on what actually happened, since the national media found it far more convenient to demonize the rough and tumble, classless meanies in Kansas City rather than the upstanding and esteemed Yankee Cano.

As someone from the east, who headed to KC for 11 years after living in Yonkers, teaching and attending grad school in NYC… I found KC… and its sports fans to be frustratingly mild & passive, but still enthusiastic. Rough and tumble, rude, classless meanies? Nah… those are attributes of the fan base of my team – the Red Sox (remember, I’m a born/raised New Englander) – and we’re damn proud of it!

The national media spin was that KC fans were over-reacting because Billy Butler wasn’t picked for this inconsequential event. There was no mention of the fact that Cano said he would likely pick him – for this inconsequential event. That’s what fueled the whole #boocano movement in social media. So, the whole Boo Cano thing itself was about a lie and a broken promise [whether obnoxious and condescending or simply oblivious on Cano’s part] and was really directed at Cano himself. This wasn’t about some misguided, misplaced Yankee envy from a poor Midwestern team that just can’t get its own act together.

 What does this have to do with Education Reform?

The subsequent national media spin was both interesting and disturbing to me –  and I began to see all sorts of parallels between a) the national media coverage of this event and the national media coverage of (and spin on) “education reform” (such as NBC’s Education Nation & Waiting for Superman), and b) the real inequities of major league baseball that thwart any possibility that it will ever be a legitimate, fair competition, and the real inequities of American education that thwart any possibility that kids, regardless of where they grow up will ever have equal opportunity for social mobility.

I was particularly struck by how the national media constructed a storyline that allowed them to generate sympathy for Cano while demonizing Royals fans, blatantly suppressing the actual reasons why those Royals fans were so angry. It’s rather like the demonization of teachers in the ed reform debates (finding the right visuals of teachers as angry mobs protesting, carrying pickets decrying salary cuts & furloughs, etc.). It’s just bizarre. Teachers tend to be about as angry & aggressive and threatening…on average, as, well… Royals fans!

Why, then, are the Royals fans the preferred demons in this story line, and the Yankees and Cano the upstanding victims?  This one particular blog post seems to have nailed it best:

It’s perfectly fine for Phillies fans to be passionate for their team. It’s a crime for the Royals faithful to do the same. Why? Because we’re supposed to be the doormats. Doormats do not speak out about being walked out. They do not protest their role as a cleaner of the feet of the social elite. They do their jobs quietly.

http://kingsofkauffman.com/2012/07/10/we-will-remain-silent-no-longer/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

Even worse, doormats are supposed to feel lucky they are allowed to be the doormats for the elite. Doormats are supposed to know their place, sit down, shut up and take it. Questioning one’s place, as a doormat, is certainly out of the question! [again… this isn’t what the Cano thing was about initially… it wasn’t about salary equity… Yankee envy… etc. It was about Cano. The media response – referred to by one Boston outlet as “yankee Jazeera”, however, was all too illustrative of the media interest in preserving the inequities of baseball – and the status of the Kansas City Royals as doormats!]

What Do Moneyball and Superman Have in Common?

There was a time when Royals fans were legitimately angry and outspoken about the financial inequities of Major League Baseball. They even had the gall to stage a protest against the Yankees when they came to town in 1999. Royals fans donned t-shirts which said “share the wealth” on their backs, and about 3,000 fans with the shirts turned their backs to the Yankees.

Arguments over making baseball more legitimately competitive by capping salaries and/or aggressively sharing revenue seem to have died down since that time. Much like arguments about school funding equity or adequacy that were more prominent a few decades ago. I guess this is because in both cases we have simply come to realize that money really doesn’t matter in either case. Low payroll teams have as much chance as anyone else of winning? And of course we all know about those charter schools serving low income kids that consistently beat the odds with so few resources?

Hmmm… that still doesn’t make a whole lot of sense? Why would public sentiment shift so sharply away from these glaring inequities. Cleary, even if other stuff in addition to money matters, having a level financial playing field is still relevant? As I explained in a recent post, there is certainly no evidence that more equitable student outcomes are attainable in a less financial equitable system. And there’s certainly no evidence that baseball is fairer by virtue of the huge salary inequities!

When did we become so distracted? How? Why?

Moneyball and Superman!

The American public has to a large degree been duped by clever media portrayals of statistical anomalies and superhero disinformation.

First, let’s take a look at some of the baseball evidence. Here’s the relationship for the current year between win/loss percent and team salaries up to the All Star Break, for the American League (where salary disparities are greatest).

FIGURE 1

Now, here is a look at cumulative salaries and cumulative won/loss percentages from 2009 to the all star break of 2012.

FIGURE 2

Yeah… there’s actually a pattern here. In fact, in the AL, salary variation alone explains nearly half of the variation in won/loss percentage, when taken over time. Money may not be “everything” but it’s clearly something!

But… but… but… MONEYBALL! The concept of Moneyball and its popularity provide MLB an excuse to ignore that which makes the entire sport illegitimate. The idea that if teams just got clever with their statistical analysis – thought about baseball differently – they could realize that this salary stuff is really completely meaningless. Who needs to pay big bucks? It’s about being smart! Yeah… exactly what the big dollar teams would like everyone else to think.

Those wishing to maintain the distraction will often use more anecdotal and less relevant characterizations of the numbers – such as pointing out that in most years the highest payroll team does not win the World Series – and/or that sometimes low payroll teams do really well – MONEYBALL!

Two important points are in order here. First, even if a team does come up with a clever strategy that works well in one season like finding the cheapest players who add value to the team, as other teams catch on and adopt similar strategies, the market adjusts and those with the big bucks still win.

Second, outliers and/or outlier seasons are not a basis for making judgments about what is better policy for achieving a legitimate competitive playing field for Major League Baseball.

This is much the same argument – and a similar distraction being used in the education reform debates. The argument is that parents and kids in low income districts need to shut up and sit down, not ask for a fair share of funding. Instead, they should play moneyball! Or… uh… no money… ball. And, since they are incapable of determining the rules for themselves, we shall impose upon them a statistical system of teacher reshuffling and deselection!  We’ll moneyball their schools for them – through ill-conceived reformy state mandates… with few or no additional resources attached!

Let’s take a look at two of our least equitable states, New York and Illinois. I’ve used these graphs before in posts, and they come from this recent paper: https://aefpweb.org/sites/default/files/webform/Baker.AEFP_.NY_IL.Unpacking.Jan_2012.pdf

FIGURE 3: ILLINOIS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS 2008-09

FIGURE 4: NEW YORK PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS 2008-09

Each of these graphs (statistical analysis explained in the linked paper) shows that in each state there are districts that have very high resource levels – after adjusting for student needs and district cost factors – and there are districts that have lower resource levels.

In each case, higher need districts, serving very low income populations and lacking the resources to get the job done have systematically lower outcomes.  In really simple terms, there are winners and there are losers – there are Royals and there are Yankees – and there are resource disparities that match.

The whole idea behind Waiting for Superman, like Moneyball, is similarly to assert (read deceive) that there are these clever costless strategies out there being used by (mainly charter) schools that simply beat the odds, while serving the very same kids and while having no special, additional resources upon which to draw.

It’s got nothing at all to do with money! Instead, like the 2002 Oakland A’s, schools that beat the odds know how to buck the standard practices of the game, recruit exceptional team players, and callously – I mean efficiently – dump those who don’t immediately produce.

Unfortunately, many modern reform strategies and rhetoric are little more than distractions from the root issues of inequity in the American Education System – just like Moneyball was a convenient distraction from the inequities that plague MLB. While there might be some legitimate lessons to be learned in each case (including lessons on using statistics in decision making, where relevant), neither moneyball nor superman validate a claim that money really doesn’t matter.  It does.

Again, it’s utterly foolish to assert that baseball is fairer by maintaining salary inequity, and similarly ridiculous to assert that equitable schooling can be more easily achieved with vastly inequitable funding.

How Education is Different from Baseball

Now, here’s the big difference between public schooling and Major League Baseball:

Educating future generations of children isn’t a freakin’ game!

Yeah – Major League Baseball will never have any credibility as a legitimate competitive sport as long as it permits some teams to spend more than 3.5 times what other teams do. Arguably, MLB has little interest in favoring such credibility over generating revenues. MLB likely benefits more as a commercial for-profit entity by maintaining the disparity than by quashing it. TV revenues are likely higher when the World Series includes big market teams. So it’s in the interest of MLB to increase the odds that big market teams make the series.  So, I accept that the revenue interests of the sport override any efforts to make it a legitimate competition. So be it.

One can make a similar case that it’s in the interest of those who have the resources in elementary and secondary education to suppress the odds of children from lower income families competing for admission to colleges and universities. But while it may be reasonable to overlook such interests in Baseball, I find it somewhat more offensive when it comes to kids and their schools.

So, yeah… I think the Royals fans were just fine when the booed Cano and the media was simply wrong for demonizing them while selectively presenting facts.

But those Royals fans were even more right when they donned those t-shirts back in 1999.  Yeah… it is the money. Money matters. Equity matters.

And don’t let Moneyball or Superman convince you otherwise.

 


[1] funny tangent – being an east coast snob [having just finished my doc work at Columbia the previous year] and understanding how ticket access works back east, when I went to get our first Royals tickets, I called in a favor through a friend in the MLB central office, to get us some extra-special seats… they gave me the phone # of someone in the Royals front office… who seemed to think I was being a total ass by trying to get a favor… free tickets… from a team that could really use the ticket revenue! In retrospect, he was totally right!